VOLUNTEERISM IN THE EIGHTIES

Fundamental Issues in Voluntary Action

Edited by

John D. Harman
St. John Fisher College

Produced with funding from
Joint Action in Community Service, Inc.

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ISBN (Perfect): 0-8191-2399-4
ISBN (Cloth): 0-8191-2398-6

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 81-40622

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

These essays and responses grew out of a Conference on Philosophical Issues in Volunteerism held in November, 1980 in Blacksburg, Virginia. The Conference was funded, in part, by a generous grant from the Virginia Foundation for the Humanities and Public Policy. Most of the major essays in this volume are revised versions of papers presented there. The essays by Flathman, Hogan, Langton, Rosenbaum, Smith, Wortman and Vosburgh were subsequently published as a symposium in the January 1981 issue of the Journal of Voluntary Action Research and I am grateful to that Journal's Editor and Board for permission to reprint them, comprising pp. 4-102 of Volume 10, Number 1, in this collection. I also thank Kerry Kenn Allen, Richard Wokutch and Alex DeNoble for permission to reprint their contributions.

This volume would not have been published, however, without the further support of several other individuals and organizations. Foremost in this respect is Mary DeCarlo, whose suggestions, ideas and efforts in getting this into print I am happy to acknowledge; George Spellman's and the JACS organization's gracious willingness to underwrite part of the printing costs were crucial as well. I appreciate Richard Hillman's encouragement and the assistance given by St. John Fisher College in covering the cost of typing the manuscript. Mrs. Dorothy Kalb's excellence as a typist will be evident to every reader. Her patience, cheerfulness and efficiency will not and so must be gratefully reported.

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PREFACE

As the 1980s develop into an era of profound changes in the way society and government interact, it is becoming more widely acknowledged that the voluntary sector will play a pivotal role in such changes and already represents a vital aspect of American life. This increasing recognition has been reflected in the expanding efforts of researchers in many disciplines to identify the special problems faced by elements of this sector in carrying out their responsibilities. However, many of the theoretical, legal and ethical issues that underlie such problems and even our conception of what those responsibilities are have not been extensively or explicitly explored. With the heavier burden of social service delivery, welfare program operation, vocational education and the like that the voluntary sector is being asked to assume, it is crucial that these issues be more deeply explored, clearly defined and widely debated. The essays and responses in this volume provide a basis for such exploration, definition, and debate. Together they address issues relevant to volunteers, administrators, and others involved in a wide range of volunteer and volunteer supporting organizations.

The first part of this collection treats some of the conceptual issues attending the emergence of the "New Volunteerism" in the past decade. Stuart Langton begins this section with an essay that traces this emergence and identifies the respective emphasis of the 'old' and 'new'. He further discusses difficulties that voluntary action organizations share with other institutions in dealing with the changing expectations of organizations in our society. He concludes with an outline of four special areas of concern unique to the voluntary sector from which controversies and problems are likely to develop in the forseeable future.

The second essay in this section, by David Horton Smith, will generate its own controversy. Among the values many have regarded as central to volunteerism is altruism, or selfless sacrifice. Drawing on the perspectives and findings of different disciplines, Smith offers a careful and provocative critique of what he takes to be a flawed public appraisal of the relationship between altruism and volunteering. He also explores some of the implications of a revised understanding of that relationship for problems like

volunteer recruitment, resource mobilization, and government policy towards the voluntary sector. Harlan Miller, in turn in his response to Smith, suggests that this critique suffers from some important flaws of its own.

One of the problems that the voluntary sector shares with other institutions in American life has to do with the increasing appeals made by organization members and clients to various legal or moral rights. The next three papers examine varying aspects of that problem coming to very different estimates of the usefulness of the idea of rights in the context of volunteering. Richard Flathman, on the basis of a reflective examination of the concept of rights and the nature of membership in volunteer groups, calls into question the idea that volunteers enjoy special rights against the organizations to which they belong. On the basis of her experience in volunteering, Florence Schwartz challenges Flathman's view, suggesting a positive role for claims that he believes are destructive. In his discussion of the rights of recipients, in turn, William Vosburgh describes a very positive role that volunteers can play in mediating between the organization and its direct beneficiaries when rights claims are advanced on behalf of the latter. Thus rights claims, in his estimation, have made it attractive, even necessary, for social service agencies to use volunteers in the delivery process.

The final debate in this section deals with the relationship between the business and voluntary sectors. Kerry Kenn Allen examines the development of corporate support for volunteer efforts as a practical way for business to discharge its social responsibility. He concludes with an appraisal of the benefits and problems this poses for volunteering. Richard Wokutch and Alex DeNoble, on the other hand, approach the phenomenon from the standpoint of business in their response to Allen. From that perspective they suggest some cautions against what they view as overoptimistic expectations, as well as some specific measures to help overcome business reservations about investing in volunteer-support activities.

One of the problem areas that Langton discusses has to do with the conflicting impulses and pressures to professionalize and to maximize reliance on volunteers within the voluntary sector. The second part of

the collection focusses on this and other questions involved in the administration of volunteer organizations. Orion White's essay attempts to locate the source of the difficulties with professionalization in the theories of action espoused by many social scientists and others. He proposes an alternative conception of action and suggests ways this could help overcome the problem of professionalization within voluntary organizations and beyond. John Rohr, although sympathetic to the thrust of White's argument, nonetheless has some reservations about the assumptions he makes and implications White draws, especially about the notion of freedom and human nature.

While White's essay and the response to it address difficulties in administration arising from the concept of human nature, the next two papers look at administration from the perspective of the management scientist. Max Wortman argues that many of the current difficulties faced by volunteer administration could be remedied by shifting away from an operational focus to a longer range "strategic management" posture. He concludes with a discussion of some of the difficulties voluntary action organizations might face in making this transition. In her response to Wortman, Mary DeCarlo identifies some weaknesses in his discussion, but tries to carry his analysis forward with some specific recommendations for organizational change.

In the coming decade, the relationship between government and the voluntary sector will be a major source of controversy and challenge for both sectors. The essays in part three of this volume explore several aspects of this relationship beginning with an assessment of the role of volunteering in a democracy. In the first essay, Jon Van Til surveys several approaches to defining democracy and discusses the part volunteering and voluntary action plays in each. Deborah Mayo, in turn, probes some conceptual difficulties in that discussion in her response to Van Til.

Dick Simpson moves the discussion away from the level of theoretical possibilities to an exploration of ideals in practice in his essay. He outlines the current interest in and experimentation with one of the approaches to democracy that Van Til discusses--populist, or participatory democracy--under the rubric of neighborhood governance. As part of this, Simpson also discusses the role of neighborhood voluntary

organizations in such governance.

Nelson Rosenbaum, finally, looks at the relationship between the voluntary sector and a democracy at the most concrete level in his examination of volunteering and government funding. He reviews the structural impact such funding has had on the voluntary sector and concludes with a discussion of changes in both the voluntary and governmental sectors that might help ameliorate existing and incipient problems.

In the concluding section of the volume, Harry Hogan tries to place the development of volunteerism in a broad historical perspective. He argues that the voluntary sector has become the main alternative to the secular statist approach to fulfilling social welfare responsibilities (a perception that is becoming more widely shared of late), and one of the few possibilities for preserving distinctive American values in an era of intellectual and social crisis. He concludes with an examination of some immediate challenges and opportunities facing the voluntary sector in current national legislative proposals.

As the essays and responses in this volume suggest, many of the issues facing the volunteer community are profound, complex, and potentially affect the entire society of which it is a part. These essays also indicate that the response to such issues is by no means uniform. Not only do they differ about the immediate questions and solutions, but even about the basic vision of volunteering itself. One need only contrast Smith's sober estimate of volunteer motivation, with its implicit suggestion that we tailor our expectations to fit the realities of human nature, with White's optimistic appraisal of the potential for dramatic society-wide change embodied in volunteer organizations, or with Flathman's ideal of volunteer motivation, to sense the depth of division and the range of alternatives that exist at the most fundamental levels. Clearly these essays cannot of themselves resolve even the issues they address, not to mention the equally significant and complex problems they do not. They do, however, provide a starting point for the dialogue, the serious controversy and investigation that must precede such resolution. And they collectively attest to the imagination and conceptual sophistication of those who are concerned about the future of volunteering in the decade ahead. Such attributes sustain my faith that this future will be an exciting one in spite or perhaps because of its challenges.

PART I

THE NEW VOLUNTEERISM

Conceptual and Ethical Challenges

THE NEW VOLUNTARISM

Stuart Langton

The 1970s marked a renaissance of interest in voluntarism in America. Since de Tocqueville noted the unique role of voluntary associations in American society 150 years ago, we have never before shown such conscious interest in the nature, role, and practices of voluntary groups. As a result, the 1970s witnessed an unprecedented growth of knowledge, new organizations, and expectations concerning voluntarism.

During the decade, we discovered how extensive the so-called "voluntary sector" had become. For example, we learned: voluntary associations account for more than 80 billion dollars of our annual economy (Filer Commission, 1975); 84 percent of the adult population donate to voluntary associations (Gallup, 1979); there may be as many as six or seven million voluntary groups in the United States (Nielsen, 1980b); the gross annual receipts of United Way agencies would place them within the top 200 of the Fortune 500 companies; and one voluntary group (the YMCA) would be ranked as the eighth largest hotel chain in the nation (Bakal, 1979).

Also, during the decade, over a dozen new national organizations were formed to foster voluntarism. For example, the decade began with the founding of the National Center for Voluntary Action and the Association of Voluntary Action Scholars. In 1979, the decade closed with the creation of the two largest organizations ever created to promote voluntarism, INDEPENDENT SECTOR and VOLUNTEER: The National Center for Citizen Involvement.

Government also showed unprecedented interest in voluntarism during the 1970s. In 1973, Congress passed the Voluntary Services Act, ACTION was created, and national volunteer service programs were launched for the elderly, retired business executives, and students. In 1974, the Social Security Act was amended to encourage state governments to use voluntary associations and volunteers to deliver social services. By 1977, many states had established offices for voluntary action. And, in March, 1978, President Carter announced his Urban Policy, calling for the active involvement of voluntary associations in the revitalization of American cities.

Meanwhile, literature and training programs about voluntarism flourished. New magazines were founded such as Volunteer Administration, Voluntary Action Leadership, Volunteer Leader, Volunteers' Digest, Volunteer Viewpoint, Grantsmanship News, Citizen Participation, and the Journal of Voluntary Action Research. Annual national conventions on voluntarism were established, countless books were published, and dozens of centers were established to train volunteer leaders.

As to the nature of this new interest, there was a fair share of romantic excess, as well as critical reflection. There were volunteer posters and pins, Annual National Volunteer Awards, and even a National Volunteer Week. But, beyond boosterism and hype, there was thoughtful analysis and criticism. For example, the implications of the Nixon Administration's fawning over the virtues of the "Voluntary Society" were challenged as a justification for the status quo (Smith and Freedman, 1972: 232) and the "negative state" (Adams, 1976: 81). The threat that federal government regulations pose to voluntary associations was identified at mid-decade by the Filer Commission and updated in 1979 by Waldemar Nielsen. And the perceived dangers of philanthropic imperialism by United Way agencies was challenged by the emergence of new organizations like the National Committee on Responsive Philanthropy and the National Black United Fund.

THE RISE OF SECTOR CONSCIOUSNESS

Beneath these observable expressions of America's rediscovery of voluntarism, there was and is more. The social significance of this new-found appreciation rests in the emergence of new attitudes and feelings toward the role of voluntary associations in American society. In this sense, one of the distinctive features of the renaissance of voluntarism is its cathartic quality. By this, I mean to use the term in the sense that Aristotle understood the role of katharsis in art as a process of expressing strong emotions in order to restore a healthy sense of balance in the human soul. What I am proposing, however, is not an aesthetic principle but, rather, the idea of a social experience in which people experience and express strong negative feelings about some things and are (at least partially) restored through positive feelings about something else in a mass society. The possibility of such a social catharsis, I believe, is reflected in our growing enthusiasm about voluntary associations and the hope they

represent in a period of cultural crisis.

The cathartic quality of America's renaissance of interest in voluntarism is rooted in our painful national moral reassessment which took place during the 1970s. During the decade, guilt and disgust over such events as the Vietnam War and Watergate and the dramatic loss of confidence in almost all of our institutions, led to a critical sense of collective ennui and self-doubt. Not only did it seem that the nation of manifest destiny had fallen from grace, but narcissism (Lasch, 1979) and civic abandonment (Sennett, 1977) were identified as dominant cultural forces.

In contrast to our growing sense of alienation from big government and big business, voluntarism stood out as a tradition that was all the more worthy of pride, and to the extent that we could allow ourselves, trust. Symbolically, voluntarism represented impulses and behavior that offered hope that a humanitarian element remained in our society, and it encouraged a sense of transcendence beyond our angst and anger over the preponderance of greed, violence, and depersonalization. Ultimately, this gave rise to a popular feeling as expressed recently by Father Theodore Hesburgh (1980: 487) that, "Voluntarism...is America uniquely at its best."

Further, these feelings about voluntarism gave rise to a new level of conscious awareness of voluntarism as a distinct institutional segment within our society that was substantially different from government and business. While the profound level of diversity among voluntary associations was seldom overlooked, it became more and more common to think and speak about the voluntary "sector" in a generalized fashion, and increasingly, to define this sector _via negativa_ as the Third Sector, the not-for-profit sector, and (most hopefully, of late) the Independent Sector.

The social significance of this new sector consciousness has hardly become clear to us. Yet, its meaning could be rather profound as it represents a new way of feeling and thinking about an institutional segment of society which possesses substantial resources and a positive standing and following within American society. The voluntary sector is a sector of hope in an age of diminishing expectations and, in that respect, it may contain potential for social reform yet to be fully appreciated.

THE NEW VOLUNTARISM

The new voluntary sector consciousness includes more than a general appreciation of the historical importance of voluntary associations. In addition, it involves an entirely new expectation of the voluntary sector as a corrective force in American society. Because this new expectation suggests different roles or new ways of looking at the roles of the voluntary sector, I will refer to this outlook as the new voluntarism. In so doing, I am not suggesting that the new voluntarism is a unified theory, nor am I suggesting that it rejects older notions of voluntarism (a matter which will be discussed shortly). What I do intend to convey in referring to the new voluntarism are several new expectations about the voluntary sector which emerged during the 1970s.

At the core of the new voluntarism is a critical sense of the fallibility of the modern state and the corporation. The new meaning of the voluntary sector, therefore, is conditioned by our sense of alienation from the bureaucratic, centralized, and depersonalizing features of contemporary government and business. In this sense, we can say that the new voluntarism is reactive; however, it is not revolutionary. It does not reject the essential foundation of American government and business, but it does imagine that voluntary associations can perform three important corrective functions in relation to these two dominant institutions.

The Prophetic Function. The first expectation of the new voluntarism is its potential power to speak to the conditions of injustice and depersonalization that are present in post-industrial society. In secular terms, this expectation conceives of a new moral mission for the voluntary sector based on the belief that "the primary role of voluntary associations is to continuously shape and reshape the vision of a more just social order" (Sherry, 1970: 3). In theological terms, such a perspective might be spoken of as a "prophetic attitude" which contains a "view of history that signifies a moment of time filled with unconditional meaning and demand" (Tillich, 1971: 61). Our time is viewed by many as such an historic moment of meaning and demand which offers the challenge as to if and how, "the voluntary principle is to serve nourishing and prophetic purposes" (Adams, 1977: 88).

The new voluntarism is essentially an attitude of

acceptance of this prophetic challenge. Its most obvious expression is evident in the dramatic growth of citizen advocacy movements since the 1960s (Langton, 1978). However, this prophetic function is not limited to this one segment of the voluntary sector. Even service oriented voluntary associations increasingly believe in its importance. For example, Vernon Jordan (1977: 495) has complained that "Voluntarism has been caught in the straightjacket of service. It has become fixated on the concept of service provision to the neglect of advocacy that deals with the root causes that create the demand for service." Still further, there are many within the voluntary sector who believe that this prophetic function should constitute the new priority for voluntarism. As Brian O'Connell (1978: 198) has suggested, "There are multiple roles the voluntary sector plays, but anything which compromises or detracts from efforts to influence public policy diminishes the sector's capacity to function in the role society most depends on it to perform."

This prophetic function, it should be clarified, is not synonymous with advocacy, nor is every expression of advocacy within the voluntary sector an expression of the prophetic function. This distinction is important because there has been an enormous growth of different types of advocacy within the voluntary sector. To distinguish what I refer to as the prophetic function, I propose a distinction between two dominant types of advocacy. The first type, which I will refer to as subjective advocacy, reflects proposals which have a direct and relatively exclusive benefit to the advocating institution. By contrast, prophetic advocacy reflects proposals concerned with correcting unjust conditions in society and which will have little or no direct benefit to the institution. Within the voluntary sector, prophetic advocacy is particularly concerned with correcting conditions, policies, and practices in business and government that are hazardous, depersonalizing, or unjust.

To illustrate the difference between subjective and prophetic advocacy, let me offer examples from three totally different kinds of voluntary organizations. When the Sons of Italy argue that less restrictive liquor licenses should be given to fraternal organizations, when the YMCA advocates changes in the tax codes to allow nonprofit agencies to earn income for activities like their health clubs, or when a museum

calls for more federal grants to museums, they are making proposals that directly benefit their organizations. However, these examples of subjective advocacy differ considerably from instances as when the Sons of Italy criticize the movie industry for portraying most Italians as mafioso; or when the YMCA advocates reform of the juvenile justice system; or when a museum encourages a school system not to discontinue its art and music programs for elementary school students. In these instances of prophetic advocacy, there is no direct or immediate benefit to the voluntary institution, but there is an attempt to correct a situation which is detrimental to some group or to society as a whole.

The Supplemental Function. The second expectation of the new voluntarism is that voluntary associations should replace government agencies in providing many of the services citizens have come to expect within the welfare state. For example, Etzioni (1977:322) has proposed that, "Greater reliance on the third sector, both as a way of reducing government on all levels and as a way of involving the private sector in the service of domestic missions, would be significantly more effective than either expanding the federal or other levels of government or dropping them on the private sector." Berger and Neuhaus (1977: 6), in discussing the importance of voluntary associations as mediating institutions, have recommended: "Whenever possible, public policy should utilize mediating structures for the realization of social purposes."

Bruce Smith (1975: 11) has referred to this notion as "hiving off" and has pointed out that it includes two very different implications, "since, for some, hiving off may mean that the private sector is acting as the government's instrumentality, while others visualize total independence from any governmental directives of funding and a complete return of a function to the private market." While I suspect that each of these possibilities will be given increasing attention as America assesses the future nature of the welfare state, it is the former notion that is a feature of the new voluntarism. The expectation of the new voluntarism clearly does not assume a withdrawal or reduction of governmental commitment to social need. This was the point of James Luther Adams' criticism of Richard Nixon, noted earlier. "In face of serious economic maladjustment, or of major structural social needs," Adams wrote (1976: 81) "the appeal for voluntary associational solutions of the problem is likely to be motivated by

class ideology. For example, Richard Nixon's theory of 'the voluntary society' leaves it to the people of tender conscience to cope with pervasive maladjustments by means of voluntary association, thus relieving government, or the community as a whole, of responsibility."

What the new voluntarism does propose is that government should alter its role as a provider of service to become more of a supporter of services that will be provided by voluntary associations. As Berger and Neuhaus (1976: 1) have proposed, "We suggest that the modern welfare state is here to stay, indeed, that it ought to expand the benefits it provides -- but that alternative mechanisms are possible to provide welfare state services."

Certainly, this idea has already obtained some reality since "Private centers of basic scientific research are ... receiving 80 to 90 percent of their resources from government...hospitals receive 40 percent or more...(and) cultural institutions now receive 15 to 20 percent" (Nielsen, 1980a, 23). However, this is an idea and a reality that is not without difficulty since, as the old saw goes, "He who pays the piper calls the tune." Whether or not voluntary associations can retain their distinctive qualities that recommend them as an alternative to government service bureaucracies while performing service for those bureaucracies is one of the most critical questions the voluntary sector must now confront as a result of this new expectation.

The Modeling Function. The third expectation which distinguishes the new voluntarism as a social movement concerns the experimental and innovative capacity of the voluntary sector. This expectation is best symbolized by the belief that "voluntary associations are important laboratories of innovation in social services" (Berger and Neuhaus, 1977: 36). In this view, the voluntary sector is expected to demonstrate forms of organizations and practice which are oriented more to what Kirkpatrick Sale (1980) has recently referred to as "Human Scale." In so doing, voluntary associations can perform the function of creating models of organizational life that overcome or reduce depersonalization, bureaucratization, and sterile professionalism that we have come to associate with the governmental and corporate sectors.

The modeling function includes two distinct but related dimensions. First, new organizational procedures

created within voluntary associations may be transferred to other voluntary agencies, as well as to the governmental and corporate sector. The most significant experimental developments of this kind during the past decade have concerned governance practices of voluntary groups, as well as interorganizational relations.

The new developments in governance practices have reflected a strong sense of democratic values and a participatory ethos (see, for example, Schindler-Rainman and Lippitt, 1977, and O'Connell, 1976). Among some of the examples of new governance practices that emerged during the 1970s were: The use of questionnaires and study groups in setting long-range goals (YMCA), the use of "affinity groups" as a means of protecting group member differences while encouraging consensus (Clamshell Alliance), mailed ballots to select Board members and annual priorities (Common Cause), the practice of group management (Mother Jones Magazine), the use of rotating leadership (Citizens for Participation and Political Action), and the practice of decentralized conferences to develop proposals to be voted on at a national level (National Association of Neighborhoods).

The new developments in terms of interorganizational relations have reflected values of openness and willingness to share (again, see Schindler-Rainman and Lippitt, 1977, as well as Sarason, et al. 1977, and Sarason and Lorenz, 1979). Among the examples of these new practices are: the development of temporary coalitions such as the National Conference on Citizen Participation (Langton, 1979), the creation of resource exchange networks (Sarason and Lorenz, 1979), the development of permanent advisory coalitions (such as the New Hampshire Environmental Coalition), the sharing of office facilities among affinity groups (Chicago YMCA and Appalachian Mountain Club), the development of joint projects among very different types of groups (such as the Sierra Club and National Urban League); and the willingness to merge to avoid duplication and increase effectiveness (as is evident in the merger of the National Commission on Philanthropy and the Coalition of Non-profit Voluntary Organizations to form INDEPENDENT SECTOR).

The second dimension of the modeling function is the development and growth of several different types of organizations within the voluntary sector in the past decade. I am speaking here particularly of the

many different kinds of self-help groups which have been recently described by the New World Foundation (1980). These kinds of institutions reflect the participatory and cooperative practices identified above, but they also provide alternative voluntary organizations in the marketplace and in the political sector. Among the examples of these new types of organizations are non-profit food and housing cooperatives, neighborhood associations and coalitions which have an increasing impact on local government, community-based and worker-owned corporations such as those pioneered by the Delta Foundation and Mississippi Action for Community Education, technical assistance organizations such as Community Change and Accountants for the Public Interest which seek to help local groups, and mediating groups that attempt to reduce public conflict by serving as mediators between groups in conflict.

NEW AND OLD VOLUNTARISM

One of the implications of referring to the new voluntarism is that it suggests a logical distinction between a new and old notion of voluntarism. Earlier, it was stated that the concept of the new voluntarism did not mean that it rejected an older and earlier notion. In fact, it would be more accurate to say that the ideas that constitute the new voluntarism grow out of and are related to earlier conceptions of voluntarism and are still in the process of emerging. Essentially, we are talking about an idea in the process of becoming in the sense that Hegel (Logic) used the term aufheben to indicate how a new idea annuls, alters, and elevates an older version. In so doing, the new idea leaves a part of the old behind, yet carries other parts into a new level of consciousness.

The new features of our understanding of voluntarism have been described above. They include: a) an increased awareness of voluntary associations as constituting a distinctive institutional sector; b) the belief that this sector can be a corrective force in society, especially in relation to problems associated with the governmental and corporate sector; and c) that the voluntary sector can carry out its corrective mission by performing prophetic (telling), supplemental (doing for), and modeling (showing how) functions.

While these ways of looking at voluntarism are new in the sense that they are increasingly more clear, more widespread, and more differentiated, they are,

nonetheless, very much rooted in earlier, more general conceptions of the role of the voluntary sector. For example, seeds of the new voluntarism are found in de Tocqueville's belief that (1960: 117), "Governments should not be the only active powers; associations ought, in democratic nations, to stand in lieu of those powerful private individuals whom the equality of conditions have swept away." William Ellery Channing (1891: 147) understood the prophetic power of voluntary associations when he noted, "Those (associations) are good which communicate power, moral and intellectual action, and the capacity of useful efforts to the persons who form them, or on the persons on whom they act." In 1909, Rabbi Stephen Wise proclaimed that justice, rather than charity, must guide the voluntary sector. "As a substitute for justice, he noted (1909: 28), "Charity is irredeemably and hopelessly bankrupt." In 1934, Professor Kenneth Pray (1934: 212) made an explicit defense of the supplementary function in calling for acceptance by "voluntary groups, organized around common interests and mutual understanding, of responsibility for initiative and for continued contact and cooperation with public authorities in the development and execution of public policies." And, a case was made for the modeling function by George deHuszar (1945: 35) in his book, Practical Applications of Democracy, in which he proposed that "associations are an ideal proving ground for the problem-centered-group method" which he felt was essential to democracy.

Further, many earlier values of voluntarism remain intact and are, in fact, implicit in the new voluntarism. For example, the voluntarism continues the historical appreciation of voluntary associations as a means of: fostering pluralism, protecting against totalitarianism, providing vehicles for altruism, developing socialization skills, preserving order and stability, encouraging opportunities for individual fulfillment, and serving fellowship needs. As such, none of these values are abandoned and, further, they are assumed by the new voluntarism.

However, some older practices associated with these traditional values are questioned, although not rejected. For example, one area of practice that is under greater scrutiny concerns philanthropic procedures. Increasingly, there is concern that United Way agencies and large foundations unwittingly have a class bias in allocating funds and that those groups which are most responsive to those in need or perform significant pro-

phetic functions are inadequately supported or overlooked by the philanthropic establishment. A second issue of developing concern is the nature of giving and helping. Increasingly, the question of empowering people on their terms rather than providing gifts which increase dependence upon the giver is being raised. A third concern is the domination by professionals of voluntary associations as managers and professional helpers, and the potential weakening of volunteers as policymakers and helpers. Yet, in all of this, the new voluntarism does not reject the ideas of philanthropy, giving help to those in need (caritas), or professional leadership in voluntary associations. What the new voluntarism does do, however, is to raise questions about these and other practices in light of the changing expectations of the voluntary sector.

PATHOLOGY AND PARADOXES IN VOLUNTEERISM

The new voluntarism exhibits considerable faith in the potential of the voluntary sector. But, this faith would be naive and foolishly romantic if it were not balanced by a corresponding sense of the limitations of and problems that are common among voluntary associations. Therefore, any analysis of the potential of voluntarism would be incomplete without consideration of what James Luther Adams (1976: 80) has referred to as "the pathologies of voluntary associations."

The most common problems of voluntary associations are relatively well known and understood. However, what is most striking about these problems is that, to differing degrees, they are problems that are shared by the corporate and governmental sectors. For example, consider the following ten problems of voluntary organizations which have been frequently identified and discussed:

1. Trends toward bureaucratic practice.
2. Insufficient financing to support organizational goals.
3. Wasteful duplication and practices.
4. Excessively narrow issue advocacy by many groups.
5. Insufficient opportunities for participation in decision-making.
6. Ineffective accountability procedures.
7. Excessive and/or harmful government regulations.
8. Increasing centralization.

9. Inadequate long-range planning.
10. Rigid and routinized allocation practices.

Each of these problems, which are very critical for voluntary associations, are not unique to the voluntary sector. They are problems that are endemic to all the dominant institutions of our society and, as such, are pathological expressions of modern organizational disease.

This point should not minimize the importance of these problems. To the contrary, their commonality infuses these problems with even greater significance within the voluntary sector. The sharing of organizational pathology should strengthen the "real life" standing of the voluntary sector. It provides a significant congruence of interest in organizational form and practice between the voluntary sector and the governmental and corporate sectors; and, thereby, points to two paths of opportunity. On the one hand, it infuses the modeling function of the voluntary sector with greater relevance and meaning. On the other hand, it points to problem areas in which successful innovations in the corporate and governmental sectors can benefit the voluntary sector. In either case, the reciprocity of interest may strengthen substantially the role of the voluntary sector as it does its part to discover how to manage organizational life with greater effectiveness and human sensitivity.

There are, however, a series of problems which are more unique to the voluntary sector and particularly relevant to the new voluntarism. In one sense, these problems are intractable in that they represent unavoidable tensions which are given in the nature of voluntarism and the new roles that are suggested by the new voluntarism. Essentially, these problems are paradoxical in that they represent a series of competing organizational needs that should not only be met, but also be balanced in such a way that serving one does not undermine the other. There are four such paradoxes that need to be dealt with by voluntary associations.

1. Advocacy vs. Supplemental Functions. One of the major problems of voluntary associations is the threat of seduction and cooptation by the governmental sector. This threat is implicit in the acceptance of the supplemental service function in three respects. First, increased financial dependence upon government

can temper the prophetic passion of a voluntary organization for fear of biting the hand that feeds them. Second, the style and objectives of an organization can be modified excessively to serve the government's agenda. Third, the growing presence of voluntary association leaders in the governmental sector may subtly influence leaders of voluntary associations to be more cooperative with governmental agencies than they might otherwise be because of the lure of potential governmental service.

Now, these are not necessarily reasons to abandon or avoid the supplementary function. However, they do suggest that voluntary organizations should develop enlightened and imaginative policies and practices to reduce these potential dangers and to develop a healthy balance between advocacy and service functions.

2. Professional vs. Voluntary Leadership. An enduring problem of voluntary organizations is to establish a healthy balance between professional and volunteer leaders. The inherent danger in every voluntary agency is two-fold. On the one hand, professional leaders can wrest control of the organization from volunteer leaders and, thereby, drive away good volunteers and shape the organization to their particular needs. On the other hand, volunteer leaders may act out of ignorance or prejudice in policy-making or intervene disruptively in matters best left to professionals.

These problems are intensified by the new voluntarism. The prophetic, supplemental, and modeling functions all increase the need for professional leadership while, at the same time, demanding more of volunteer leaders. Advocacy requires relatively sophisticated policy analysis by professionals, but it also demands more thoughtful and disciplined review by volunteer Board members. Accepting government contracts and grants usually implies more professional specialization by staff, but it also calls for greater monitoring by volunteers to preserve the integrity of the organization. The modeling function involves innovation that necessitates considerable effort by staff, but it requires a corresponding evaluative effort by volunteers.

In each of these areas, it is clear that more will be demanded of professionals and volunteer leaders in the future. This implies both a greater awareness of the kinds of functions each must perform, as well as

voluntary sector is particularly evident in relation to matters of advocacy, accountability, and capacity building, all three of which are especially relevant to the new voluntarism.

In order for voluntary associations to carry out prophetic advocacy functions, intra- and inter- organizational coalescing needs to take place and concentrated action must then follow in centralized locations of power. If diverse units or groups cannot "get their act together," they will remain fragmented and not make their voices heard in any influential way. Therefore, one of the implications of advocacy is the need to centralize the focus of power. However, there is a related decentralizing force at work in this equation since the potential power of advocates operating at centralized levels is enhanced to the extent that they can call upon decentralized (grassroots) support. Accordingly, voluntary groups that want to strengthen their advocacy potential must create and maintain centralized and decentralized dimensions to their advocacy network.

Increasing demands for accountability also call for greater centralization in the establishment of standards. Accountability demands tend to be felt most strongly at the most centralized points in voluntary organizations. This tendency is intensified in government contracting since government agencies like assurance that a group of voluntary agencies meet general criteria for granting contracts (such as affirmative action or a fixed overhead rate) as well as more specific standards (e.g., certification of staff in a specialty area). Centralized offices, therefore, take on importance in encouraging or imposing standards on decentralized units or members. However, this relationship requires acceptance and interest at decentralized levels for them to have any meaning. So, dynamics of centralized leadership and decentralized support must be present in the creation of standards.

Finally, if voluntary associations are to be effective in prophetic, supplemental, and modeling functions, enormous support efforts must be undertaken to strengthen the capacity of the voluntary sector. This will require imaginative and powerful centralized attempts to mobilize adequate support for the voluntary sector through reforms in government tax and regulatory policies (Nielsen, 1979) and by a much greater commitment from the corporate sector. However, for

the need for training and educational programs that will encourage the qualitative development that will be required of professional and volunteer leaders.

3. Accountability vs. Innovation. The new voluntarism has increased awareness of the internal dynamics and needs of voluntary associations in light of changing expectations of the role of the voluntary sector. As a result, there is growing interest in two competing demands which are being experienced with greater intensity by voluntary organizations. One is the demand for accountability which is imposed by government, the philanthropic establishment, and by volunteer boards. Governmental units which give contracts and grants demand financial accounting and program evaluation to guarantee that their resources have been well used. Foundations and United Way agencies do the same. Such demands continue to intensify as the public becomes more aware of the potential for waste or abuse in government and inequities in funding practices by philanthropic groups. In turn, volunteer boards become more concerned that their organizations will not only avoid embarrassment but also continue to be supported.

These demands require that voluntary organizations adopt more rigid procedures of management and routinized practices of planning, budgeting, and evaluation. The inevitable outcome is pressure toward bureaucratization and control. However, voluntary associations experience a countervailing demand that they be responsive to social needs and humanistic in practice. In fact, it is these very qualities which make them preferable to government in performing the supplemental function. To remain attractive to volunteers and staff, and to be effective in serving elements within a community, requires that voluntary associations be more concerned about the human quality of their organizations than its efficiency. Ultimately, cost effectiveness; and the emerging challenge of voluntary associations is how to strike an appropriate balance between these two demands.

4. Centralization vs. Decentralization. One of the paradoxes that is experienced in all institutional sectors are the conflicting pressures toward centralization and decentralization. While the voluntary sector is commonly viewed as being highly decentralized because of its rich diversity, there are strong centralizing tendencies as well. The conflict between centralizing and decentralizing demands within the

these centralized efforts to have any real social significance, they must result in practical programs of training, innovation, and assistance at decentralized levels. Thus, centralized efforts to increase support for the voluntary sector must be matched by efforts to see that increased support is applied meaningfully and equitably at the grassroots.

PROSPECTUS

A realistic understanding of the shared pathology and paradoxical problems of the voluntary sector should alert us to what James Luther Adams (1976: 81) has called "the evil of making too great claims for the competency of voluntary associations." However, a corresponding evil would be to overlook the potential of the voluntary sector as a corrective force. The challenge of the new voluntarism, therefore, is to avoid the polar evils of hubris, on the one hand, and timidity on the other.

Since the new voluntarism is still essentially in a mythic stage, the dangers of false pride or diffidence are matters of future theoretical possibility. For now, however, any theory of the new voluntarism is rooted in a mythos that suggests new possibilities for the voluntary sector which remain to become. As such, the mythos of the new voluntarism conveys the attitude that the voluntary sector is something special, something to be nourished as a force for a more just and fulfilling social order. In this, the new voluntarism is not a theory, but it is a prelude to a theory. It is an invitation to logical exploration, to empirical discovery, and practical construction. The challenge is to accept this invitation with courage and objectivity.

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ALTRUISM, VOLUNTEERS, AND VOLUNTEERISM

David Horton Smith

The question of the relationship of altruism to volunteerism and to volunteers is a huge topic on which one could write several volumes. Hence, this brief overview of the problem must be viewed as an attempt to sketch some major perspectives and lines of further inquiry, not as an attempt to settle the central question involved. To begin with, the present question involves to a substantial extent matters of definition. Where definitions are concerned, because they are matters of sociocultural custom or convention, arguments tend to be endless and heat tends to far exceed light in these debates.

The present question also relates closely to a number of crucial ethical, philosophical, and theological issues, hence making the stance of many otherwise reasonable individuals already hardened in terms of "received doctrines" and their minds closed to the possibility of better, more fruitful, more useful, more clear and consistent definitions. For example, the issues of "free will," "responsibility," "morality," "destiny," and many others are raised at the individual level. At the analytical level of organizations or groups, still other important issues are raised such as the relationship between church and state, "voluntarism" and "freedom of association," the rights of the individual vs. the powers of the state, the role of "intermediate associations" in society, and many others. Most of these issues have received extensive treatment by scholars of philosophy, law, theology, history, sociology, and other fields (Robertson, 1966; Pennock and Chapman, 1969), though it would be an exaggeration to say that any have been really "settled."

There are other difficulties involved in addressing the present question that can best be understood in terms of a sociology of knowledge. To discuss the meaning of "altruism," thus, one must come to terms with various social constructions of reality (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) as they bear on accepted "common sense" views of altruism, as contrasted with more objective, analytical views. A related problem involves "common language" definitions of "altruism" and other terms involved here, as contrasted with analytical, technical definitions--the semantics of the central question. Such issues lead to a deeper

consideration of the methods by which we might determine what is in fact, rather than by definition, the substantive relationship between altruism and volunteerism. These epistemological and methodological matters have been only seldom dealt with, and very rarely dealt with adequately. To structure the present paper in a manner that does justice to the latter criticisms of other work, I shall discuss altruism and volunteerism below in three separate sections corresponding to three analytical levels of discourse that are often confused in these kinds of discussions: the individual level (a single person), the group level (for instance, a voluntary organization or volunteer program), suggest what I believe to be the most useful approach to definitions, the problems of custom in social constructions of reality, and the nature of substantive research findings that are relevant.

Before turning to these three tasks, however, there is still another and broader methodological-epistemological and theoretical issue that must be squarely addressed. As I have discussed and demonstrated elsewhere (Smith et al., 1972a: Part 2; Smith et al., 1980) approaches to the study of volunteerism and discretionary time activity (free time activity, leisure time activity, voluntary action in all its organizational and less organized or informal modes) by social and behavioral scientists are generally inadequate. The root problem is that, although scholars in all disciplines studying human behavior claim to be interested in discovering the "truth" or approximations thereto as current "scientific knowledge," each discipline by itself is insufficient to the task and yet there are strong barriers to interdisciplinary inquiry. These barriers are particularly strong to highly multidisciplinary theory and research as contrasted with bidisciplinary work (e.g., political psychology, economic anthropology, social geography). I have argued that the reasons for this lie in the "intellectual turf-guarding" or "territorial imperative" activities of academic disciplines as sociocultural subsystems, as well as in the lack of any truly adequate interdisciplinary worldview paradigm that would permit integrative theory and research of a precise and comprehensive sort (Smith, 1979; Smith, 1980). In a recent book, I have attempted to outline the framework for such a paradigm which I refer to as "synanthrometrics"--the precise, integrative/synthesizing study of human beings (Smith, et al., 1980: Parts I, V).

The foregoing is relevant to the central question of the present paper because it argues strongly for the need to approach the problem at hand with a multidisciplinary perspective as regards methods, concepts, variables and theoretical models of a narrow sort. Conversely, it argues against the possible adequacy of the perspective of any single human science discipline taken by itself or even pairwise with any other related discipline. The relation of altruism to volunteerism and voluntary action can only be properly and adequately understood by something like a synanthrometric approach.

ALTRUISM AND INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTEERS

I have elsewhere discussed the problem of defining a "volunteer" at some length, as have others in the same volume (Smith et al., 1972a; Smith et al., 1972b). Essentially, I define a volunteer as an individual engaging in behavior that is not bio-socially determined (e.g., eating, sleeping), nor economically necessitated (e.g., paid work, housework, home repair), nor socio-politically compelled (e.g., paying one's taxes, clothing oneself before appearing in public), but rather that is essentially (primarily) motivated by the expectation of psychic benefits of some kind as a result of activities that have a market value greater than any remuneration received for such activities. This definition makes being a volunteer a matter of degree, for the market value of one's activities can vary greatly, as can the remuneration (if any) received for such activities. By this definition, a low skilled Peace Corps "Volunteer" receiving both expenses and a "stipend" may indeed not be a volunteer at all, but merely a low paid worker. In contrast, a law school professor who forgoes private practice, either totally or partially, because of dedication to teaching and research on the law may be viewed as a quasi-volunteer, assuming an average academic salary. "Pure" volunteers, in the sense of people fitting the ideal type construct best, would be individuals receiving no remuneration whatsoever while performing very valuable services.

The definition of "volunteer" given above does not beg the question of the relationship between altruism and volunteerism, unlike many definitions of "volunteer." The social construction of reality by a great many social service volunteers is that their work/activity is by its very nature "altruistic," and therefore "volunteer" should be defined in such a way as to capture this "fact." From my viewpoint, such reason-

ing is faulty on both counts. By my definitions, the degree of altruism manifested by a particular volunteer or kind of volunteer is an empirical question, not a definitional matter. Indeed, to define the term "volunteer" or the sum of volunteer activities, "volunteerism," in such a way as to include altruism necessarily is useless and a foolish conceit. An underground resistance fighter, performing terrorist activities in pursuit of national independence without remuneration, coercion, or compulsion, is just as much a volunteer as, for example, a social service volunteer. Though no research has been done on the subject, so far as I know, the vast majority of volunteers as I define them do not think of themselves as volunteers even though they are such, in analytical terms. But there is never a necessity for common language terms to overlap perfectly in meaning with technical terms.

I find it most useful to define "altruism" as an aspect of human motivation that is present to the degree that the individual derives intrinsic satisfaction or psychic rewards from attempting to optimize the intrinsic satisfaction of one or more other persons without the conscious expectation of participating in an exchange relationship whereby those "others" would be obligated to make similar/related satisfaction optimization efforts in return. This definition is complex, but nothing else will serve, in my view, as I shall now attempt to show briefly.

For a start, there is literally no evidence to justify a belief in some "absolute" form of human altruism, in which the motivation for an action is utterly without some form of selfishness. Psychological research and adequate self reflection show that significant degrees of selfishness are present even in the most apparently altruistic actions. No matter how altruistic an act appears, there is invariably, so far as is known, some important degree of psychic reward or intrinsic satisfaction derived for one's self from the performance or anticipated performance of the act. Altruism makes one, at least those who practice it, "feel good"--receive psychic rewards for their selves, contribute to a positive self-image, induce ego enhancement, etc.

For various reasons, whether as a result of personal vanity and pride or socioculturally induced constructions of reality, some people who perform altruistic acts as defined above refuse to admit the

actual or probable presence of some self-satisfying (and hence selfish) psychic rewards directly resulting from altruistic action. This is understandable, but hardly changes the psychological facts of the matter. Human beings have selves as the central organizing principle/pattern of their psyches, and all human beings strive in one degree or another at every waking moment to maintain, and if possible enhance, both the structure of the self and positive net sentiments regarding the self.

Given there is no absolute altruism, no absolute lack of concern for self in the net motivation for any act, there can only be relative altruism--and this is what I have defined above. Relative altruism is a variable, while absolute selfishness (concern for some kind of rewards for oneself) is a universal feature of human nature, hence not variable. Such relative altruism seems most reasonably and usefully defined as involving some degree of non-selfish motivation. Here is where many who consider altruism get hopelessly confused, being unable to grasp simultaneously the presence of universal absolute selfishness and the possible presence of relative unselfishness or altruism. Clearly, the most nearly unselfish, non-self-seeking, altruistic sort of motivation involves gaining one's own psychic rewards/intrinsic satisfaction from attempting to make others happy or satisfied. The satisfaction one receives thus comes not from a principal motivational focus on one's own satisfaction but from a focus on satisfying others. And this altruism, of a relative sort, is all the more clear and strong if it is rooted in a net motivation of the individual actor who does not expect reciprocity. Where one tries to please another to a significant degree because one expects reciprocity, the degree of selfishness is higher and the altruism lower than where no such exchange relationship is contemplated. In Boulding's terms (1973), there is more relative altruism to the extent that the individual is acting in a "grants economy" mode rather than in a market or "exchange economy" mode. Thus, there is more altruism where the individual is essentially "giving something away" without expected recompense, payment, or return of the "grant" or "gift" in some equivalent form or value.

Given these definitions of volunteers, volunteerism, and altruism, one can now ask about the empirical relationship between denotative referents of these con-

cepts. In a review of altruism and helping behavior, Kemper (1980) found that the general baseline level for the U.S. population for altruism (using a definition roughly similar to the present one) is about 20 percent. That is, about 20 percent of the adult population of the United States (based on averaging the results for a variety of studies of non-random samples in different parts of the country) are likely to engage in an altruistic act when an opportunity is presented to them (e.g., a person dropping a bag of groceries in their vicinity; a person needing some coins to make a phone call). This figure varies markedly according to the situation, the level of altruism rises on the average; and it is generally greatest in disaster situations. An even more extensive review is given in Staub (1978), showing broadly similar results. These social psychological studies focus almost exclusively on volunteerism of an informally organized nature.

Studies of individual volunteerism in organized groups, however, show similar results on the whole. Before reviewing a few such studies, a methodological note is in order. Several studies purporting to examine the motivation for volunteerism have used a ridiculously inadequate and simplistic methodology, showing almost total ignorance of the study of attitudes and personality, of values and beliefs. Specifically, these studies (e.g., ACTION, 1974) inquire only about the "vocabulary of motives" of people by asking the openended question, "Why did you volunteer for X group or program?" Such sophomoric and pedestrian research tells us little or nothing about the underlying motivations for people's volunteerism. At most it tells us about socioculturally accepted "reasons" people tend to give. Not surprisingly, the giving of altruistic reasons for involvement is fairly popular. However, more adequate and sophisticated research on why people participate in volunteerism (see reviews in Smith et al., 1972a; Smith, 1975; Smith et al., 1980) shows that most volunteer activity is the result of multiple causation, with altruism being a very minor factor in most organized volunteerism, defined as volunteerism taking place in the context of a formal group (Smith, 1972).

To illustrate my conclusion that altruistic motivation, even in its relative form, is a minor rather than a major causal factor or correlate (I add the latter term since most relevant research is cross-sectional in nature, allowing causal interpretations but often compatible with quite opposite causal

hypotheses) of most U.S. organized volunteerism, I will review briefly a few studies from recent years that make the point rather conclusively. Again it is important to note that organized social service volunteering constitutes only a small fraction of all volunteerism, contrary to the social construction of reality of volunteering by those involved in this form of activity. Widely cited studies of U.S. organized volunteerism such as the ACTION (1974) national survey, for instance, sometimes fail even to consider volunteerism for unions, professional associations, or other economic associations as volunteerism. Volunteerism of a religious nature (service to the religious organization of one's preference) is similarly often ignored as not part of volunteerism (e.g., an earlier survey of the U.S. population's volunteer activity, performed for the U.S. Department of Labor [1969] in 1965, failed to ask in detail about religious volunteerism).

An excellent example of a study that attempts to separate self-oriented (selfish, non-altruistic) motivations from other-oriented (unselfish, altruistic) motivations for organized volunteering is one by Gluck (1975). Studying 50 Democratic and Republican volunteer precinct comitteepersons in Buffalo, N.Y., Gluck asked extensive questions about the rewards and satisfactions of this kind of political volunteerism, carefully distinguishing among recruitment, contribution (performance), and retention motivations. He found that by far the most frequent and powerful motivations were self-oriented, whether tangible or intangible. Other-oriented motivations were important only for younger and very highly educated political volunteers.

Another study of political volunteerism is similarly instructive (Flynn and Webb, 1975). The authors studied women (N=46) involved in local policy campaign activism in a Michigan metropolitan area, using a group-interview method. They found that these women initially became involved for motivations relating to self-maintenance such as to keep busy or to obtain psychic satisfaction of felt deficits. After significant amounts of experience, motivations for involvement shifted to self-actualization, such as personal growth and self education. Particularly interesting is the fact that the vast majority of these women obtained out-of-home employment in the next five years, suggesting that their volunteer activity was at least in part a way of sharpening old skills and gaining new ones that could lead to paid jobs. Altruistic moti-

vations were rather rarely mentioned, and then only by the more experienced volunteers.

Volunteerism in occupation-related voluntary organizations is clearly the most common kind of volunteerism, according to properly done national sample surveys of the United States (Verba and Nie, 1972). No one is likely to suggest that motivations for union participation are altruistic in any significant degree (see Spinrad, 1960), but one might query whether professional associations have such motivations. Weinstein's (1974) study of three social science professional/scientific associations shows that, of the numerous types of satisfactions members receive from these groups, very few can be interpreted as in any way altruistic. And Warner and Heffernan's (1967) study of volunteer participation in farmer's organizations shows clearly that levels of participation are significantly related to the ratio of benefits-to-contributions ("costs") for such participation.

Some readers might argue that at least in social service volunteerism altruistic motivation must be dominant. The evidence does not support this, when adequately performed research studies are examined (i.e., in particular, studies that go beyond merely asking a question or two about why people became involved). For instance, Sharp (1978) studied citizen volunteers involved in crime prevention, blockwatching, and other policing work in three metropolitan areas. She found that the most important motivations for involvement were the psychic benefits from interpersonal relations with other volunteers. Even the advocacy volunteers who were trying to induce improvements in the activities of the regular paid police force had non-altruistic motivations. Wolensky (1979), as have others before him (e.g., Barton, 1969), shows that although there are some altruistic volunteers in disaster situations, altruism is only a minor aspect of a much larger range of motivations of disaster volunteerism. In a related type of study, Stinson and Stam (1976) develop an economic utility model of volunteering in which satisfaction derives both from intrinsic rewards (some of which may be altruistic) and from extrinsic rewards (none of which are altruistic). Of special interest here is the fact that they make a cogent case for the potential role of a "shadow wage" (indirect remuneration) in the case of service volunteers working for local government -- volunteer firemen, for instance. This shadow wage comes in the form of tax

savings to the volunteers relative to the tax rates that would be required to support a paid fire department (or other paid local services, if one focuses on other types of local government service volunteers).

Some readers will still not be satisfied with these studies. They will argue that, although I have cited research on various kinds of service volunteerism, I have not looked at the core of really humanitarian service volunteerism where it is virtually impossible for self-oriented, selfish, non-altruistic motivations to be present. I will simply cite the study by Kessler (1975) of emergency "on call" blood donors. Kessler in fact chose this particular kind of blood donor (who makes himself/herself available "on call" 24 hours a day, for various periods, as a blood donor of a particular blood type, should that type of blood be needed in some emergency) because preliminary investigations of blood donors of all kinds indicated that such donors seemed to be "pure humanitarians" (or "pure altruists," in my terminology). He found great variety in the reasons people gave for involvement in this type of service volunteerism, gathering his information through lengthy interviews with 58 such "on call" donors. Kessler came to the conclusion that there were three main factors involved from the standpoint of motivation: (1) Most of these donors were involved out of sheer habit, to a significant degree, having generally "drifted into it" rather than making some conscious altruistic decision. (2) They all had some kind of image of the recipient that was a key to the gift's meaning (that is, the gift of blood); often they were giving because they saw their family or company possibly or indirectly benefitting. (3) They all had some personal goal for giving (e.g., a quart a month) which created a context for and means of interpreting for themselves "success;" their satisfaction came to a major degree from meeting their personal goal, and from the prestige they felt they received from friends, co-workers, and relatives for giving as much blood as they did. Only a few of these donors stayed on after they had met their personal giving goal over the course of a few years. Those who did stay on as donor volunteers indefinitely had adopted an ideal of giving that focused more on the people remaining to be helped rather than on the few that had been helped by their past giving. Perhaps here, at last, we find some "pure altruists" -- but in very, very small numbers relative to the larger population.

The foregoing studies, selected as particularly relevant to the central question of this paper, are supported by a very large research literature on the determinants/correlates of volunteering. This literature (e.g., Tomeh, 1973; Smith and Freedman, 1972; Smith et al., 1972a, Smith, 1975; Smith et al., 1980) shows clearly that participation in volunteer activities, formal or informal, reflects highly multiple causation and that altruism as a personality trait is only one minor factor out of a great many as a determinant of volunteerism. These conclusions are solidly supported by numerous studies that go beyond simplistic approaches to the study of why people volunteer. Simplistic, unsophisticated, and methodologically inadequate studies, relying on only one or a few questions about the "reasons for" or "motivation for" volunteering, tend to find altruistic responses given. Such responses are most appropriately interpreted as reflections of people's perceptions of an acceptable "vocabulary of motives" for volunteering. These responses have no necessary relationship to the actual reasons for volunteering, but rather mask such motivations to a large extent. Altruistic reasons are given to superficial questions about the reasons for volunteering, thus, mainly because people believe the interviewer or other investigator will view the respondent more positively if such reasons are given and because such answers avoid the necessity of providing more lengthy and complex real reasons.

ALTRUISM AND VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS

The matter of defining "volunteer organization," "voluntary organization," and related terms used to refer to voluntary and non-profit groups of various kinds has received much attention, but again without real consensus (Smith et al., 1972a: Part 1). I prefer to see "voluntary organizations" (synonym: "non-profit organizations") as formal groups that are non-governmental and not-for-profit in their legal status and basic purposes. Within this broad category, I distinguish two main sub-categories of organizations which operate quite differently and which have very different degrees of dependence on volunteers. One type, the paid-staff non-profit organization, I define as a voluntary organization which accomplishes its goals mainly through the efforts of paid staff rather than volunteers, even though volunteers are likely to be present as officers and members of the board of directors or even as an associated volunteer program.

Examples of paid-staff non-profit organizations would include many museums, hospitals, universities, and social service agencies.

Paid-staff non-profit organizations perform all manner of services for varying sets of members, clients, constituents, and the public at large. One may reasonably ask to what extent such organizations are altruistic or reflect altruism. Because most of the "analytical members" (see Smith, 1972) of these organizations are paid for their work, by definition, the degree of volunteerism present depends on the difference, if any, between the market value of the services rendered by employees and their remuneration. I have no documented evidence that the employees of such organizations are paid less on the average than government or business organization employees. However, anecdotal evidence convinces me that any adequate study of the matter would generally show such a differential, on the average, with substantial variation according to the size of the organization in terms of number of employees and annual budget (e.g., the Ford Foundation vs. a local Visiting Nurses Association). Assuming this differential, there is a kind of quasi-volunteerism among paid-staff non-profit organizations in general, at least to the extent that the general employment situation in the country is sufficiently flexible to permit non-profit organization paid employees to find jobs in business or government should they desire to.

Comparative studies of the motivation of employees of paid-staff non-profit organizations vs. business or government organizations are extremely rare. However, the few studies that exist suggest that the motivations of managers/leaders of paid-staff non-profit organizations are significantly different from the motivations of business managers. For instance, Gatewood and Lahiff (1977) compared the ratings of importance given to different aspects of one's job for about 280 managers of businesses and voluntary organizations (mainly paid-staff non-profit). The results showed that the managers of the voluntary organizations (and specifically, the managers of voluntary organizations not related to community business interests, such as the Chamber of Commerce) had motivations very different from business managers in terms of the rank order of importance attached to different job aspects. For the voluntary organization managers, community involvement and co-worker relationship factors were very important; while prestige was a paramount consideration for business

managers. This suggests that, at least among managers of non-business related paid-staff non-profit organizations, there is some significant altruism at the root of their quasi-volunteerism. Much more comparative research is needed here before the question can be settled, however. It will be particularly important to study lower level employees in the different types of organizations. I would hypothesize that there will be less altruistic motivation among the latter than among managers and other higher level staff, because a larger proportion of lower level employees (e.g., secretaries, maintenance personnel) will have taken their job with the paid-staff non-profit organization out of economic necessity rather than out of personal choice and commitment to the organization's goals.

The second kind of voluntary organization that I distinguish is a "volunteer organization," in which goals are mainly accomplished through the efforts of volunteers rather than paid staff. Obviously, there is likely to be a continuum of voluntary organizations in terms of the degree of dependence on volunteer vs. paid employee efforts. Hence, the distinction I make between paid-staff non-profit and volunteer organizations is not to be viewed as a dichotomy, but rather as pointing to significantly different modes of operation when one considers polar types at the two ends of the continuum. For voluntary organizations near the middle of the continuum, differences in operation may be small even though one organization is assigned technically to the category of volunteer organizations and the other to the category of paid-staff non-profit organizations. Furthermore, the measurement of "degree of dependence on volunteers vs. paid staff for the accomplishment of organizational goals" is problematic. A variety of possible measures could be used (e.g., numbers of volunteers vs. paid employees; numbers of volunteer vs. paid employee person-hours of work; significance of the work contributions by volunteers vs. paid employees), and each would result, most probably, in different categorization of a given set of voluntary organizations. Further research is very much needed to determine which of these possible measures corresponds most closely to variations in the structure and operation of voluntary organizations. For the present, it is my impression that the measure of number of volunteer vs. paid person-hours of work is most appropriate.

However the measurement is made, volunteer organizations are likely to have substantially more volun-

teerism involved in their operation than are paid-staff non-profit organizations. And volunteer organizations are also likely to have many more volunteers involved than quasi-volunteers and paid employees (the latter two categories being non-mutually exclusive). Again one may ask how much altruism is present as a motivation for the volunteerism present in volunteer organizations (e.g., in local Scout troops, local environmental groups, local political campaign committees, hospital volunteer programs, volunteer boards of directors). The answer to this question has been given in the preceding section of this paper: Not very much! Volunteers of all types, whether performing services or making donations for voluntary organizations or government agencies, tend to be participating for a variety of complex reasons, most of which are definitely not altruistic as defined here.

There is a different level at which one can pose the question of altruism, however. Leaving individuals aside, how altruistic are voluntary organizations as organizations? Some would argue that all voluntary organizations are altruistic as organizations by definition. This is not correct, I argue. My earlier definition of altruism applied only to individuals. At the level of organizations or groups more generally (including informal groups), I find it most useful to define "altruism" as an aspect of organizational purposes and goals that is present to the degree that the organization is attempting to optimize satisfactions of non-members of the group itself without the expectation of participating in an exchange relationship whereby the non-members are obligated to contribute anything to the organization or its members in return, whether in the form of tangible or intangible goods or services (or money). The justification of this definition is essentially similar to the one I gave for my definition of individual altruism, so I need not repeat it here. Basically, an organization is altruistic if and only if its operative purposes and goals (irrespective of official or purported purposes and goals) direct the allocation of organizational resources toward the optimization of the satisfaction of non-members without expectation of a quid pro quo exchange of any sort.

By this definition, most voluntary organizations are not altruistic as organizations, since they are generally directed toward benefitting their members in some way. Voluntary organizations dealing with work

and play are clearly the most common in numbers (Smith et al., 1981), and these certainly are self-serving rather than altruistic. Only those organizations that are social service or advocacy groups working for the general welfare or the welfare of some specified category of non-members can be generally termed altruistic. And many of these find ways to be ultimately self-serving in practice, letting organization maintenance considerations or organizational enhancement concerns dominate their ostensibly altruistic purposes and goals. The former generalizations about the degree of organizational altruism of various kinds of voluntary organizations are admittedly impressionistic, and need to be documented by research. However, the very purposes and goals of most voluntary organizations can be used as information to classify them initially as altruistic or not. Additional research is necessary to determine the relationship between stated/official purposes and goals, on the one hand, and actual/operative purposes and goals on the other hand.

There is a minor paradox involved in the foregoing, but one readily understood if differences in levels of system reference are kept in mind. The paradox is that there can be altruistic organizations whose members are not generally altruists. For instance, a volunteer organization whose primary purpose is to raise money for development assistance abroad would be properly termed an altruistic organization, yet most of its members if not all may have non-altruistic reasons for being volunteers in it. This is only paradoxical if one fails to understand that groups and their members need not necessarily have the same characteristics.

As defined here, then, volunteers are <u>not</u> generally altruistic although they like to think of themselves as altruistic. And voluntary organizations of both main kinds, including volunteer organizations, are <u>not</u> generally altruistic although they like to think of themselves as altruistic. In both cases, at both system levels of reference, the quality of altruism is more socioculturally acceptable and desirable, hence the effort of both individuals and organizations to categorize themselves as altruistic in spite of facts that indicate substantial self-interest, selfishness, and non-altruism. And just as there is an absolute form of selfishness of individuals that makes absolute individual altruism impossible, so too there is an absolute form of selfishness of organizations that makes absolute organizational altruism very difficult

though not impossible. This absolute form of organizational selfishness or self-interest is the tendency for all organizations to attempt to maintain their existence and to enhance their prestige, power, and wealth -- often at the expense of pursuit of their stated purposes and goals in a strict sense. In its worst form, this institutional or "organizational imperative" completely dominates the resource allocations of the organization so that the original purpose and goals are lost sight of.

INCENTIVES FOR VOLUNTEERISM

So far I have directed my attention to the central question of the relationship between volunteerism and altruism. Now I would like to address an important related issue: What are the most effective incentives for volunteerism? If, in fact, most or all volunteers were altruistic and most or all voluntary organizations were altruistic, then appeals to altruism would be both necessary and sufficient as incentives for volunteerism. Such is not the case, and hence one may well ask about optimizing the incentives for volunteerism. At the highest level of complexity, one can interpret the question in its broadest sense as meaning, "What are all the determinants of participation in volunteer activity?" I cannot begin to treat the problem at such a level of complexity here, but I have done so in other published works (see Smith et al., 1980; Smith, 1975; Smith et al., 1972a). At a lower level of complexity, one can interpret the question in terms of current theory and research that takes an "incentive perspective." I propose to do the latter here.

Although there are doubtless many forerunners, the incentive perspective in relation to organizational participation can be most clearly traced to a classic article by Clark and Wilson (1960). In this article, the authors suggest a theory of organizations based on the kinds of incentives and incentive mix that characterize an organization. Three principal types of incentives are various kinds of tangible rewards -- goods, services, money, and equivalents. Solidary incentives are interpersonal rewards of various kinds--fellowship, friendship, prestige, and similar positive outcomes from personal relationships. Purposive incentives are various kinds of intrinsic, intangible satisfactions that result from feeling one is contributing to some purpose, helping to achieve some valued goal, being a means to some valued end.

The studies briefly reviewed earlier suggest that material and solidary incentives are far more important for most kinds of volunteerism than are purposive incentives. And purposive incentives, when the purpose involved refers to optimizing the satisfactions of others than oneself or non-members of one's organization, are the kind of incentives that most closely relate to altruism. Not all purposive incentives are altruistic, but virtually all altruism somehow has to involve purposive incentives. Appeals to altruism and the achievement of altruistic goals of some volunteer organization, while conducive to volunteerism, are likely to be insufficient to develop and maintain effective volunteer activity or effective volunteer organizations.

The clear implication of all of the foregoing is that volunteer organizations should never depend solely on appeals to altruism and other purposive incentives. Indeed, what research of an adequate sort that has been done suggests that altruism and related purposive incentives should play only a minor role in the reward system for volunteers. Material and solidary incentives, appropriate to the particular volunteer group or program, should be provided as the major elements of the reward system if volunteerism is to be maximized.

Even in those volunteer groups, such as protest and advocacy groups, where purposive incentives might be expected to be most important (given the frequent presence of elaborate ideologies in such groups), research evidence shows the importance of material and solidary incentives (Gamson, 1975). The various kinds of material incentives in the form of tax deductions for volunteer time that are currently under discussion and consideration in the U.S. Congress are clearly likely to have a positive effect on the amount of volunteerism, in spite of the special problems of record keeping, verification, and revenue loss to the government that would be entailed. Such tax incentives would in no way make the volunteerism or volunteer organizations involved less "voluntary." As I have noted above, various kinds of material and solidary incentives are already far more important than purposive (and specifically altruistic purposive) incentives in inducing volunteerism.

Where volunteer organizations are seeking some kind of collective good (Buchanan, 1968), something

that is essentially indivisible and shared by all if present (e.g., clean air, freedom of association, a comprehensive national health care delivery system), voluntary organizations are likely to have difficulty in attracting volunteers, as Olson (1965) has pointed out. But this can be readily overcome by the provision of selective material and solidary (or even purposive) incentives to volunteers that are not available to non-volunteers. The greater the demands placed on volunteers (e.g., in terms of responsibility or time commitment), the greater the selective incentives need to be in order to attract and retain high quality volunteers. Evidence supporting this statement was referred to earlier, when I noted that the Warner and Heffernan (1967) study showed clearly that one cannot consider benefits (incentives) alone in relation to volunteerism. There is always some kind of cost to the individual for volunteer activity, if only the opportunity cost involved in not being able to do something else that would bring greater rewards, tangible and intangible. Volunteerism levels seem to be directly and positively associated with the ratio of benefits (incentives) to costs (disincentives). Hence, as a volunteer organization demands more of volunteers, creating greater contribution costs for them, it must provide correspondingly greater incentives of various kinds in order to retain (or attract) the kinds of volunteers it needs (see Rich, 1980).

One other point is important to mention in this brief discussion of incentives for volunteerism, namely, the fairly widely accepted "social construction of reality" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) by many leaders in volunteerism that there is something "bad" or "wrong" about discussing, let alone utilizing, material and solidary incentives to attract and retain volunteers. Many leaders of volunteer organizations (and even leaders of paid-staff non-profit organizations, in some cases) tend to feel guilty of some kind of "treason" to the morality of volunteerism if any incentives other than purposive and altruistic ones are used. This kind of attitude, based on false premises about the relation between altruism and volunteerism, does real disservice to volunteerism, however well-meaning it may be.

The essence of volunteerism is not altruism, but rather the contribution of services, goods, or money to help accomplish some desired end, without substantial coercion or direct remuneration. It is the

voluntariness and unremunerated character of volunteerism that is distinctive. For individuals, lack of remuneration means no pay (or less pay than the market value of services, in the case of quasi-volunteers). For organizations, lack of remuneration means that the organization does not have profit as a goal (although it must usually engage in some kind of fund raising activities, and may have substantial numbers of paid staff). Volunteers are not angelic humanitarians in any sense. They are human beings, engaging in unpaid, uncoerced activities for various kinds of tangible and intangible incentives, with psychic or intangible incentives being especially important. Nor are volunteer organizations paragons of organizational virtue in any sense. Some do very positive things for the general welfare; others are harmful, and selfish in the extreme. Altruism is a variable both among volunteers and among voluntary organizations. Failure to admit this constitutes a failure to face human social and individual reality.

ALTRUISM AND SOCIETY

Very, very little consideration is given to the "big picture" of volunteerism, the possibilities for a "voluntary society" or at least a "volunteer society." Etzioni (1968), in his book The Active Society, is one of the few who have given the matter substantial thought. The idea of a "voluntary society" or "volunteer society" has many possible interpretations. One that I personally favor is the ideal of moving our society, or any society, toward an optimal balance of the performance of necessary and worthwhile tasks by individuals and groups acting as representatives of the four major sectors of society--business, government, voluntarism, and the household/family. The volunteer society is not, thus, a society without government or business organizations. Rather it is a society in which volunteerism and voluntary organizations are truly taken seriously, where they do the things that they can do best while the other kinds of groups and sectors do what they can do best. Such a society cannot come about without first considering it as a possibility and making a voluntary commitment to work towards its achievement with an open mind about which tasks should best be performed in which sectors. The idea is admittedly utopian, in a sense; yet it is also eminently rational and practical, for it calls on all people and groups to work together for the common good. And it is not really altruistic, at base; it is

firmly rooted in enlightened self-interest. This fact makes it possible to achieve, where vast numbers of utopian schemes that are theoretically rooted in human altruism are doomed to ultimate failure because genuine altruism, even in the relative sense, is a rare motivation in humans, individually or collectively.

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ALTRUISM, VOLUNTEERS AND SOCIOLOGY

Harlan B. Miller

Question-Begging Definitions

Professor Smith offers the following definition of 'volunteer.' A volunteer is "an individual engaging in behavior that is not bio-socially determined (e.g. eating, sleeping), nor economically necessitated (e.g., paid work, house work, home repair), nor socio-politically compelled (e.g., paying one's taxes, clothing oneself before appearing in public), but rather that is essentially (primarily) motivated by the expectation of psychic benefits of some kind as a result of activities that have a market value greater than any remuneration received for such activities." (p.25) It is a strength of this definition, he claims, that it "does not beg the question of the relationship between altruism and volunteerism." (p.25) But this definition does in fact beg the question, as it makes volunteer activity ipso facto selfish. This definition excludes altruism by fiat.

Smith objects, rightly, to definitions which make volunteerism necessarily altruistic; but he fails to see that his requirement of motivation by the expectation of psychic benefits is itself question-begging in the opposite way. Insofar as one is motivated by the expectation of benefits for oneself (psychic, financial, or any other sort) one acts selfishly.

We can modify Smith's definition by simply deleting all reference to motivation, thus obtaining

> A volunteer is an individual engaging in behavior that is not bio-socially determined, nor economically necessitated, nor socio-politically compelled in which he or she carries out activities that have a market value greater than any remuneration received.

This definition does not beg any questions about the relation between altruism and volunteerism.

As Smith points out, his definition (and ours just derived from it) covers a substantially broader area than that which comes to most of our minds when we think of volunteer activities. Not only does it cover

much work for religious groups, labor unions, political parties, professional organizations, etc. (noted by Smith), but also many activities that it seems quite strange to call 'volunteer work.' Suppose you take your family out for a picnic. Such an action need not be determined in any of the ways excluded by the definition, and presumably it does have some market value, even if not much. You receive no remuneration. It therefore falls under the definition. It seems just a bit strange to call this a bit of volunteerism, but this is hardly a very weighty objection to the definition.

I am quite sure that Professor Smith had not the slightest intention to beg the question with his definition. Since he believes, and in fact explicitly claims, that all human action is selfish, he of course believes that volunteer activity, if not compelled and not just random, must be a particular kind of selfish activity. He believes that altruism is simply impossible.

WHAT IS ALTRUISM?

The term 'altruism' was coined by Auguste Comte. As a term of art it may be defined with a confidence that is often inappropriate for terms with deep and tangled roots in intellectual history ('freedom', say, or 'democracy'). The O.E.D. definition seems quite satisfactory. Altruism is

> regard for others as a principle of action: opposed to egoism or selfishness.

One acts altruistically when one acts for another's good. When one is motivated by 'psychic benefits' expected to accrue to oneself, one is just not acting altruistically. If I do something because I expect it to make me feel good, or to feel good about myself, I am not insofar as that is the spring of my action behaving altruistically. It is true that if I perform a genuinely altruistic act, one in which my motivation is the expectation of another's good, I may well receive psychic benefits in the form of self-approval, 'warm glows,' boosted self-esteem, and so on. But it is not these benefits that motivate me (granted that the act is really altruistic).

The point at issue here is applicable not just to

altruism, but to a broad group of notions including, inter alia, a number of central moral concepts. In general, if I act as I think I ought, I will probably feel good about it. But it is not that I think I ought to do it because it makes me feel good, but rather that it makes me feel good because I think I ought to have done it. There is so much muddled thinking about this matter that I will belabor it a bit longer. Please bear with me.

If you ask me "Why are you rubbing your back against that tree?" I may well answer "Because it feels good." This is a clear case of an action motivated (assuming that I am sincere and undeceived) by the expectation of psychic benefit. (Or are these somatic benefits? I doubt that the distinction is worth making in this case.) Similarly, if you ask me "Why do you engage in this acrobatic waterskiing?" I may answer "Because I enjoy the feeling that the spectators are admiring me." The motivation here is clearly expected psychic benefit.

But if you ask "Why did you point out to the cashier that you had only given him a ten when he offered you change for a twenty?", I might make any of several different replies. It is possible that the right answer would be "Because I wanted to enjoy admiration for my honesty" (but of course with some audiences I would reap instead contempt for my perceived foolishness). If that is a correct description of my motivation, then my action was not genuinely an honest one. But if instead my sincere answer is "Because it was the right thing to do" then my action was an instance of honesty. Smith (and many others) are likely to confuse cause and effect in these situations. If I think that a certain act is morally required in a given situation, then I will, ceteris paribus, feel pleased with myself if I do it, and guilty if I don't. But it by no means follows that my motivation is desire for self-approving feelings, or aversion to pangs of guilt. My moral evaluation of the situation is the source of the feelings, not vice versa. I feel good about having performed the action (or ashamed of not performing it) because, antecedently to any expectations of benefit, I think the action the right one.

If (and to the extent that) I am an honest person, there will be a psychic cost to me if I knowingly fail to correct the cashier's error in my favor. But if psychic costs and benefits were the point, I could

quite reasonably work on decreasing the costs by attempting to become less honest. (We all know how to do that - keep repeating things like "everybody does it" and "they've got insurance to cover it" to oneself.) But if (and to the degree that) I am in fact honest, I will reject this method of psychic benefit maximization as corruption. Honesty and altruism, are not matters of expected psychic benefit.

Altruistic actions are those motivated by concern for another's good. This simply explicates the meaning of 'altruism'. Professor Smith believes that altruism, as I have explained it, is impossible. Does genuine altruism really exist? Yes.

THE EXISTENCE OF ALTRUISM

Does anyone ever act altruistically? That is, is there a single case of a single person acting in a way motivated primarily or solely by concern for the good of others? The answer is obviously (to anyone not firmly in the grip of some theory) yes. Soldiers throw themselves on grenades to save their comrades, widows give mites, businessmen contribute to charities. Many of these acts are genuinely altruistic. Of course I would not defend the ludicrous thesis that every prima facie altruistic act is in fact genuinely altruistic. Of course there is an immense amount of more or less pious fraud, deception and, above all, self-deception involved in many superficially altruistic acts. My claim is a very weak one, it is simply that there are some (at least one) cases in which some (at least one) person acts altruistically.

I regret that I cannot analyse a really striking case, such as a soldier throwing himself (or herself) on a grenade. I've never done that or seen it done. I will attend, instead, to a much more pedestrian case, but one about which I know quite a bit.

I buy life insurance. In fact, I spend a substantial amount of money on life insurance (though not as much as I would like to be able to). Now why do I do this? The answer is quite simple. I care for (the good of) my family, and want them to be able to get by if I should die. That is my motivation. I believe myself to be morally obligated to make some minimal arrangements for the support of my wife and daughter (I am clearly not legally so obligated). More important, for me, is the fact that I care about, in fact I love,

my wife and daughter. Their welfare, in itself, is of value to me.[1] I buy life insurance because I care about my beneficiaries, not because I derive some sort of psychic benefit. I may in fact obtain some psychic benefit or (more likely) avoid some psychic costs as a concomitant result of paying for the life insurance, but to assume that these benefits or costs are the motivators of my action is to get the cart before the horse. Why sould I feel guilty if I failed to provide insurance for my family? Because I believe that I ought to make such provision. Why does consideration of their future welfare please me and the thought of their distress depress me? Because I care for them.

Smith, since he believes that all human action is fundamentally selfish, must think that I have some self-referring motive. What could it be? Could it be my desire for the esteem of my colleagues, or of society at large? No, for these groups have no way of knowing, and scant interest in, whether or not I have life insurance. My wife knows about my life insurance. Is keeping her esteem and affection my motivation for spending all this money? How much of this 'psychic benefit' would I lose if I dropped my insurance policies? A bit probably, for a while, but not much (maybe not any) in the long run, especially if I were judiciously (and selfishly) to spend say a third of the money saved on items likely to please my wife. Even without such an attempt to manipulate, the emotive cost of foregone psychic benefits is likely to be less than the value of the goodies obtainable with the money saved. But these computations are irrelevant, since I am not motivated by benefits for myself, but by the prospect of benefits for others, to wit my wife and daughter. My life insurance purchases (and probably yours, too) are genuinely altruistic.

One last attempt might be made to find a selfish motive for my insurance spending. "You expect," someone might say "that after your death you will be able to look down from Heaven on your family prospering, and derive psychic benefit therefrom." But as a matter of fact I expect no such eschatological satisfactions. I do not expect to survive death in any form. The benefits of my life insurance policies will appear only when I have ceased to exist, and thus cannot possibly be benefits for me. My actions in purchasing and paying for (incurring the costs of) these policies cannot possibly be selfish.

Actually, the fact that I do not expect (really, expect not) to survive death is not truly germane to the point at issue. Suppose, counterfactually, that I did indeed expect to be able to look down from Heaven (or up from Hell) and derive pleasure from the flourishing of my survivors. Why would that give me pleasure? Only because I care about their welfare. I care about their welfare, and therefore their flourishing gives me pleasure. What would Smith say about this? Could he say that I care about their welfare because their flourishing gives me pleasure? If so, then why does their flourishing give me pleasure? Because I care about their welfare? Then why ...? (Plato scholars will note the similarity of this argument to a central line of the Euthyphro.) I can derive even posthumous psychic benefit from their benefit only because I antecedently care for them.

We have here one case of a person acting on the basis of expectation of another's good, i.e., one case of genuine altruism. Therefore altruism is possible and Smith's claim that it is impossible has been shown to be false.

Altruism does exist. Obviously it is sometimes hopelessly entangled with, and sometimes swamped by, other sorts of motives. There is not as much of it as many of us would wish; but it does exist, and it isn't even particularly rare. The great majority of life insurance policies are purchased for motives that are, on balance, altruistic, and the American life insurance industry does very well indeed. Most of us fairly frequently, and probably almost all of us sometimes, act for the good of others.

Now what about the motivation of volunteers?

ALTRUISM AND VOLUNTEERS

People are motivated to perform volunteer work by a variety of incentives. Clearly two volunteers doing essentially identical work may be motivated by very different incentives, clearly one's incentives to volunteer activity may be mixed, and may be hidden from oneself and/or others. None of this is peculiar to volunteer activity, and none of it should be surprising. Professor Smith is quite right, I think, to insist that all of us, much of the time, have mixed motives, and that there is nothing at all inherently wrong with that.

If we consider participation in volunteer organizations it soon becomes clear that 'purposive' incentives are generally not sufficient to motivate the continued activity of most of us. Most of us will not persist in this sort of activity if there are no (or negative) material or 'solidary' benefits. No matter how much I agree with the purposes of the League for the Preservation of Petunias, I am unlikely to maintain active participation if I find the meetings unpleasant and the other members uniformly hostile. For most of us, most of the time, some sort of 'solidary' benefits are a necessary condition for continued voluntary group activity. So far I am (I think) in agreement with Professor Smith.

But it does not follow that altruistic (and other 'purposive') incentives "play only a minor role" in motivating volunteers. I wouldn't want to live in Virginia if it rained there continuously, and I wouldn't want to belong to a group all the other members of which shunned me. It follows neither that my major incentive for residence selection is moderate rainfall nor that my major incentive for voluntary group membership is 'solidary' benefits.

I can fulfill my 'solidary' needs within a wide range of groups. If I choose to support the League for the Preservation of Petunias instead of the Kazoo Klub despite the greater 'solidary' rewards of the latter, it is for 'purposive' reasons. Many of us make many choices of this sort. That some acceptable level of 'solidary' benefit is necessary does not entail that 'solidary' incentives are more important than 'purposive' ones.

Are all volunteers always motivated exclusively by altruism, and never such things as the desire for business or romantic contacts? Of course not. Are many volunteers frequently motivated by mixed incentives with a substantial altruistic component? Of course.

GIVING THE 'RIGHT' ANSWERS

If one tries, in a "simplistic, unsophisticated" way to determine the reasons for volunteer activity by just asking volunteers why they volunteered, one may sometimes get a significant number of "altruistic responses." But "such responses are most appropriately interpreted as reflections of people's perceptions of

an acceptable 'vocabulary of motives' for volunteering. ... Altruistic reasons are given ... mainly because people believe the interviewer ... will view the respondent more positively...." (p. 26) Surely for some respondents, and perhaps a substantial proportion of some groups of respondents, what Smith claims here is correct. But as a general claim I think that it is false.

Let us grossly oversimplify and assume that those interviewed can be clearly divided into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive classes, those with (preponderantly) altruistic motives and those with (preponderantly) non-altruistic motives. Let us also assume that their responses can also unambiguously be sorted into professions of altruism and non-altruism. Then there are four possible sorts of respondent.

Person:	Altruistic	Non-altruistic
Response:		
Altruistic	1	2
Non-altruistic	3	4

If we assume that none of our respondents are self-deceived, then those of type 1 and 4 and sincere, and Smith is warning us that a significant number may be of type 2, giving insincere altruistic responses. But he says nothing about type 3, those who, while actually motivated by altruism, give non-altruistic responses.

I believe (on what Smith would probably call ('anecdotal' evidence) that type 3 responses are not at all unusual. In many circles it has for many years been quite unfashionable to admit to tenderheartedness. The business schools teach one to "take no prisoners", Ayn Rand and the Libertarians are more articulate and more extreme than most, but the aversion to and suspicion of 'sticky' motives and the value placed on being 'tough' is quite widespread. (Probably this is somewhat stronger and more prevalent among males than among females, but only somewhat.) Many people actually find themselves ashamed to admit altruistic motives. I know this was the case among my college generation in the late 1950's. That it was also the case to some extent much earlier is indicated by A.J. Ayer's remark in his autobiography that when canvassing for the Labour Party in working-class neighborhoods in

the early 1930's he was sometimes asked why he was doing so. His motives were in fact (he believed and believes) altruistic, but he was unwilling to admit it.[2]

The proportion of respondents of each type no doubt varies from group to group. Taking response at face value will distort one's picture of motivation unless both sorts of insincere responses are negligible. Smith's point is that type 2 responses may be significant, and thus we should discount the rate of altruistic answers. My counter point is that type 3 responses may be significant, so we should discount the rate of non-altruistic answers. In some sorts of groups, particularly of English-speaking people over 30, I am sure that type 3 respondents significantly outnumber type 2 respondents, but I certainly couldn't prove it.

Thus even if we assume the absence of self-deception, we have no reason to believe that the tender-hearted always represent themselves as such. But of course self-deception is as common as sunshine. Some who are selfish think themselves generous and altruistic, and some who are altruistic think themselves selfish.

My conclusion is, in a way, a pessimistic one. We cannot correct the results of survey research by reducing the 'right' answers, since we have no general way of knowing what answer is taken to be right.

Notes

1. It is not the satisfactions of others that are generally the point in altruism, as Smith seems to believe (p.32), but the welfare of others. That welfare and satisfaction are distinct concepts will be clear after a moment's reflection on the case of a heroin addict in need of another fix.

2. Sir Alfred Ayer, Part of My Life, Oxford, Oxford University Press (1948), p. 180.

THE RIGHTS OF VOLUNTEERS

Richard E. Flathman

What rights should volunteers have? I will begin by interpreting this question as the query whether volunteers simply as such should have certain rights: whether the status and role of a volunteer is a sufficient condition of, an adequate entitlement for, at least some rights. An affirmative answer to the question so interpreted would not only have virtues philosophers prize, that is great generality and even a weak kind of necessity, but the great practical advantage of providing guidance across the whole range of volunteering. I find that I have to argue, with one possible exception that I will take up by way of concluding, that no such answer can be given. But interpreting the question in this way is provocative and examining it will take us into some of the important issues in the theory of rights. It may also shed some light on the perhaps less daunting but nevertheless vital question of what rights people who are, among other things, volunteers in various kinds of organizations, ought to have.

VOLUNTARINESS, RIGHTS AND VOLUNTEERS

A notion closely related to "volunteer," namely voluntariness, has of course been salient in the most influential thinking, particularly post-17th century thinking, about rights. From Locke (perhaps from Hobbes) through Kant and on to contemporary rights theorists such as John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Alan Gewirth, the capacity to act (and refuse to act) of one's own volition, out of intentions and purposes, for reasons, that are in some sense one's own, is at least a necessary condition of being a bearer of the most fundamental rights. Certain legal rights, it is true, have been held to attach to creatures who are no more than sentient or perhaps self-activated (who are possessed of energeia as Aristotle called it) and even to inanimate things. And we have lately seen what to me are surprising and unsettling extensions of this latter tendency of thought (see Stone, 1974 and Singer, 1975). But the elemental connection between the substantives "a right" and "one's rights" and such verbs as "assert," "exercise," "stand up for," "insist upon," and "waive," to say nothing of more refined considerations (Flathman, 1976; especially chs. 3 and 4), suggests that voluntariness deserves at least the place assigned it by the theorists just mentioned.

Voluntariness is not an easy notion to explicate systematically. Some of the difficulties that surround it carry over to its cousins "a volunteer," "a voluntary association" and related notions. As a means of bracketing most of these perplexing difficulties, I propose to treat holding the status and more especially playing the role of a volunteer as a paradigm of voluntariness. This procedure, along with quiet acceptance of the tendency of thought mentioned above, leaves me with the view that being a volunteer is likely to be a necessary condition of having certain rights. From this not very elevated platform of understanding, I propose, as indicated, to inquire whether holding this status and playing this role might also be a sufficient condition of having, or rather of being entitled to have, some number of specifiable rights.

Of several imposing difficulties with this idea we may begin with a moral objection to it. Rights are always other-regarding (or perhaps other-relating or other-involving) at least in the sense that my right to X places some limitation or imposes some duty or liability on other parties.[1] Prior to the appearance of Friday, Crusoe had no one to assert rights against. Hence the idea of his having rights is just a confusion.

If this is so, the question of what rights Able should have can hardly be given a justifiable answer without attention to the implications or consequences of those rights for Baker--for the persons against whom Able holds and exercises them. The idea that Able should have certain rights just by virtue of being a volunteer, just by virtue of this fact about Able, ignores this consideration. Baker will certainly and rightly object that this reasoning is partial or biased in a way that violates his rights, does him an injustice, or the like.

This moral objection to the idea we are considering is in fact a special version of a much more general and deeper difficulty that attends it. The question whether Able's rights as a volunteer are justifiable in the light of their consequences for others presupposes that the idea of a right and the idea of this particular right are intelligible to those others. The distinctive notion of a right, and the notions involved in the particular right that Able as a volunteer is asserting here and now, must be established in

what Wittgenstein called the language games and the form of life of the parties to the rights relationship. I might have expressed the moral difficulty with which I began by saying that it takes (at least) two to do that distinctive tango that is a relationship in terms of rights. But that expression, while not inaccurate, may mislead. This relationship requires not only partners but the highly complicated notion of a dance. It requires, that is, partners plus an array of established rules, conventions and understandings that the partners follow in doing the dance.

We can perhaps bring these rather abstract considerations a little closer to the particulars of our subject if we turn our attention to some notions that have been salient in thinking about rights at the level of the nation-state. Doing so will have the further advantage of presenting us with the circumstances in which the idea of rights for volunteers as such has its greatest initial plausibility.

John Adams argued that America was, politically speaking, a state of nature. Adams' particular objective was to discredit the claims of Great Britain and especially its claim to the authority to decide who could and who could not come to America. Because it was a state of nature, Adams contended, the right to come and go was sufficiently acquired just by doing so voluntarily. In Adam's view, the American society actually was a voluntary association in the strong sense in which contractarian philosophers argued that political societies ought to be voluntary if their governments and laws were to be legitimate and their citizens to have genuine obligations to obedience.[2] As a consequence, voluntariness in the sense of deciding voluntarily to do so, was a sufficient condition of having the right to "join" the society.

The next to the last sentence reminds us that the notions of voluntariness and voluntary action are swords with double deontic edges. If it has sometimes been argued that holding a status and playing a role voluntarily entitle me to certain rights, it is at least as common to hear the contention that voluntary membership, participation, and so forth subject the volunteer to various duties and obligations. "You came (joined, entered,...) voluntarily and you can leave (resign, quit,...) if you see fit. But as long as you are here (are a member, a participant, keep your feet under my dinner table...) you must...."

Indeed it is not unknown for voluntary accession, participation and so forth to be treated as a reason for allowing few if any further rights to the volunteer. Hobbes' theory is a classic case of this argument in political philosophy, "America, love it or leave it" displays one of the often ugly undersides of the idea, and the proverbial "you made your bed now lie in it" reminds us that something like this sentiment can not only be unpleasant but is quite widely held. One can imagine this argument being applied to volunteers in the narrower senses more often used in the field of volunteerism. "Because you volunteers, unlike those of us who are employed here, are free to come and go as you see fit, we employees will make the rules and decisions and you abide by them or leave."

The latter argument will require further attention below. But first let us pursue a bit further some of the difficulties lurking in John Adams' view. It was fine to say to the British that America was a state of nature that people could come to and depart from without asking anyone's leave. I would add that the fact that something like this notion has sustained at least a half-life in America's thinking about and discourse with outsiders has been one of the admirable, indeed one of the noble and stirring, features of our national experience. But it wasn't the sort of proposition those who had settled here were likely to assert to one another or to those coming down gangplanks on this side of the water. (The proposition was indeed asserted to "Native Americans"--usually as part of justifying the denial of all rights to the latter.) In the latter setting America became, almost instantly, a civil society fitted out with the full paraphernalia of governments and laws, duties and obligations, and courts, police and jails for the edification of anyone who took the state of nature notion to mean that they had rights which had not been approved by those affected by their exercise. Nor was it long, Emma Lazarus to the contrary notwithstanding, before this civil society began sharply to qualify the understanding that the decision voluntarily to do so was a sufficient condition of the right to come to and depart from the Eden that was America. The recent experiences of the Haitians, Mexicans, and so forth are hardly unprecedented.

The initial, intuitive appeal of Adams' conception was at least enhanced by the fact that, "savages"

aside, America had been entirely unoccupied within something close to living memory and was still largely unsettled. Owing to this circumstance, the notion that newcomers were joining a going society as opposed to forming or creating a new one was thin at best. Put another way, there was no more than a short and readily contestable history (tradition) of claims, rights, authority and other prescriptions that could be brought forward to challenge Adams' view. But with pretty much the entire globe under the more or less effective control of some government or other, the notion of an entire political society (nation-state) that is voluntary in anything so strong a sense is by now highly implausible. When we claim that present-day Canada or the U.S.A. or Denmark are voluntary societies we mean not that any very substantial proportion of their populations have come or joined voluntarily in anything approaching a literal sense but rather that relatively few of those who find themselves in these societies develop--or can be justified in developing--serious objections to the arrangements established in them. People who do develop such objections may be permitted --sometimes they are strongly encouraged--to leave. But if they remain, the voluntary character of their presence counts for little in disputes over the particulars of their rights and duties.

Something closer to the conditions that Adams had in mind can still obtain as regards voluntary associations below the level of the nation-state. If some number of persons are overtaken by fascination with non-twist-off beer bottle caps they may form a society to exchange, preserve, and lament the passing of, these devices. Within the confines set by the rules of the larger moral and legal order, the association is likely to be, at least initially, voluntary in something at least approaching the sense Adams had in mind. Just as with Adams' America, however, this situation will certainly be short-lived. From the moment the "charter-members" have lived up to their name, the charter they create will establish the rights and duties of members as such. Membership may indeed remain voluntary as opposed to coerced, obligatory or required. But there is likely to be some sort of procedure, ritual or performative that is constitutive of joining. If a dispute does prompt someone to roll out the heavy conceptual artillery of "rights," our theme of "at least two parties plus more or less established rules and conventions" will quickly assert itself. The rights will be against some party or parties and

the disagreement will be adjudicated in terms of such rules and conventions as have become available. Right claims that cannot be supported by reference to rules and conventions already in place will be treated either as based on conventions established in the larger society or as proposals for new rules and conventions.

We are now in a position to appreciate a further difficulty with the notion that volunteers as such do or should have certain rights. With some marginal exceptions that I will note, the notion of a volunteer in the narrower senses of specific concern to us has no application in the situations we have been discussing (that is, in the situations in which it is initially most plausible to think that voluntariness is a sufficient condition of being entitled to some rights). It is a condition of my volunteering to work for the Red Cross or the United Fund that these organizations exist. And in most cases my status and role as a volunteer are defined and understood by distinction from and comparison with the status and role of the professionals, staff, paid personnel, and so forth. Settlers may have come voluntarily to the geographical entity that was John Adams' America, but it is something close to a conceptual truth that no one could come as a "volunteer" (except perhaps as a volunteer in the British, French or Spanish armies--if they had had such) until a more or less settled society was in place. In this conceptual sense volunteers are, if I may use deliberately loaded language, parasites. (My fifteen-year-old daughter, who is both a volunteer and a student of biology, tells me that in the sense I am trying to articulate volunteers are heterotrophs not parasites.)

As obvious as this point is, focusing on it brings out the normative basis of the idea that the rights of volunteers ought to be acceptable to the non-volunteers. However welcome the volunteers may be, however valuable their contributions, their rights will affect the circumstances of the non-volunteers. Many of the rights will of certainty be against, will create obligations for, the non-volunteers. When we understand that this situation is not altered by the benign or even admirable sounding fact that the volunteers are there voluntarily, we will realize why the non-volunteers are likely to insist on this view.

It will be instructive to cast a glance at those marginal situations alluded to above. Let us under-

stand the exercise of doing so as an attempt to get as close as possible to Adams' state of nature notion despite thinking in the context of a settled civil society. Imagine that an unexpected downpour is swelling the waters of a stream. The first passersby have begun to improvise a barrier to contain the rising waters. Neither civil authorities nor professionals of any sort have arrived. The design of the barrier, the division of labor, the work routine in building it, and so forth have emerged without central authoritative direction out of the cooperative interactions of those involved in the effort.

Possessed of neither office of authority nor special expertise, I arrive at the river bank and decide to help. Do I, can I, "volunteer" my assistance? Am I, can I be, a "volunteer" in these circumstances? My assistance is given voluntarily in the sense of being of my own volition, out of intentions and for reasons that are my own, not coerced, obligatory, or induced by deception or manipulation. The media, moreover, may well report that volunteers saved the day by improvising a dike, indicating thereby not only that the dike builders as such were not coerced or conscripted but also that they were not employees of the Corps of Engineers, the city, county or state government, a manufacturing firm whose plant was threatened by the flood, were not members of the National Guard, and so forth.[3] Thus the notion "a volunteer" does have something of a foothold in these circumstances. The foothold, it seems to me, is nevertheless tenuous--it is tenuous just because there is no established organization, association or other entity to which the volunteers volunteer their services and within which they can be distinguished from employees, professional staff, and the like.

The tenuous character of the notion in such circumstances may prove to be revealing concerning the idea that volunteers as such have at least the right to quit their volunteering. But first let us consider whether there are other rights which attach to the status and role of volunteers under these circumstances.

Does volunteer Able have rights against other members of the impromptu work party? Of course Able has those rights which he holds against all members of the moral and political community. But these rights Able has without reference to his status and role as a volunteer in the effort at hand. Are there additional

rights that Able has against the other volunteers? If Able makes claims based on this status and role he must recognize that all of those to or against whom he advances them are occupying the same status and playing the same role. Any rights grounded in these attributes will hold for Able's fellow volunteers as well as himself. Because there are no differences between Able and the other volunteers that are relevant to the rights he is claiming, there is no reason that they should have less voice in the matter than he does. The rights he claims vis a vis other volunteers must be approved by the community of volunteers of which he is one member.

In this circumstance, then, the fact that Able is a volunteer entitles him not to this or that specific right but to standing to have whatever rights (if any) come to be established in the community. It does not entitle him to an inventory of specific rights, it establishes that he is eligible to be a right-bearer in this community. And because, by hypothesis, the constitutive or defining feature of this community (as distinct from those communities or associations discussed above which consist of a mixture of volunteers and non-volunteers) is just that it is composed of volunteers, to say this about Able is just to say that he is a member of the community. Just as becoming an American citizen entitles me to such rights as may be established in the political association that is the United States of America, so joining, by volunteering, the community of volunteer dike builders entitles Able to such rights as may be established in that community. Identifying the rights, if any, that he in fact has is a further step that can be taken only by examining the conventions of that community.

I conclude that there are no rights that adhere to volunteers as such. In communities, if any, consisting exclusively of volunteers, the status and role of volunteer entitles the volunteer not to rights but to eligibility for such rights as may be established. In communities, organizations and associations consisting of a mixture of volunteers and non-volunteers (and in which, therefore, the common status "member of the community" must rest on attributes shared among volunteers and non-volunteers) the sub-class or group consisting of volunteers may be accorded distinctive rights. But because those rights will be accorded by the community or association and established in its conventions, rules and laws, the information that a

person is a volunteer in that community cannot be a sufficient basis for saying that the person has these or those particular rights.

RIGHTS AGAINST VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS

These conclusions leave us with two questions. The first is whether communities and associations, whether a mixture of volunteers and non-volunteers or consisting exclusively of volunteers, ought on moral grounds, or would be advised on some other grounds, to decide to treat the status and role of volunteer as a basis for according at least some rights. The second question is whether the conclusions I have drawn need to be qualified in at least the one respect mentioned at the outset, namely to recognize that volunteers as such have at least the right to take their leave of the community, association or organization in which they are volunteers. Because examining the first question will shed light on the second, I will take them up in the order given. Because the notion of a community consisting exclusively of volunteers borders on the suppositious, I will say no more about it in discussing the first question. But the supposition will be of some small further utility in respect to the second issue.

The rights of volunteers, as with all rights, are in part convention-dependent. For this reason we can expect to find that the rights volunteers have in fact been accorded have varied importantly from one society to another and from organization to organization within societies. Volunteers work for political parties, charities, hospitals, churches, schools, avocational associations and many other types of groups and organizations. It would be astonishing to find that all of these had in fact established identical or even strongly analogous conventions in respect to volunteers and their rights. It would be scarcely less surprising to discover extensive similarities among the rights (if any) of volunteers working for such diverse political parties as the Republicans in the U.S.A., the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Gaullists (UDR) in France, such diverse churches as the Roman Catholic, the Congregationalists and the Mormons, and so on. Generalizations on this subject are perforce inductive, and most of our experience suggests that they will be few in number and limited in scope.

But perhaps there are moral, instrumental, or other

considerations which, even if they fall short of the universality and incontrovertibility we sought but failed to find in earlier deserve to be regarded as good reasons for according certain rights to large classes of volunteers in numerous types of organizations. Perhaps the diversity we encounter at the level of practice reflects a failure to grasp and appreciate the considerable unity that obtains at the level of duly considered normative theory.

My own understanding of the theory-practice relationship biases me against this expectation. The concept of a good reason, it seems to me, is itself convention-dependent in ways that militate against this possibility. But I cannot argue for this view here.[4] In any case, the view I hold does not and cannot altogether exclude the possibility of reasons for or against certain rights for volunteers that ought to achieve a very considerable generality, that ought to be considered weighty, properly convincing reasons in just about any organization or association in just about any circumstance. Hence I have tried to think of such reasons. For good or for ill, of those that have occurred to me or come to my attention, the most convincing are reasons against volunteers having rights. Or rather, and the difference is important, the most convincing are reasons against giving the concept of rights any very prominent place in our thought and action about volunteering.

We usually think of volunteering as an admirable, a praiseworthy mode of activity. But there are a variety of reasons for accepting this view and it is a matter of some consequence which reasons we find convincing. Some may think volunteering valuable because volunteers get important tasks performed at comparatively low cost. We needn't compel their services--and thus needn't pay for them indirectly--as with conscripts, but neither do we have to pay for them directly as with employees and mercenaries. Insofar as such "economic" considerations are our reasons for valuing and encouraging volunteering, we may indeed decide to accord a great many rights to volunteers. Such a policy might be expected to maximize the number of volunteers available, perhaps without greatly increasing the cost to those who benefit from their services. The somewhat distasteful efforts of the United States government to attract young people to its "volunteer" army may be an example of this understanding at work.

On the other hand, volunteering is commonly portrayed as admirable because of the high-minded motivations characteristic of those who volunteer, because volunteers make their contributions without compulsion or obligation and without the expectation of material reward. Although perhaps performing the same tasks as the conscript or employee, volunteers take a distinctive form of satisfaction and deserve a sepcial kind of admiration for just these reasons. If viewed in this perspective, to accord rights in order to attract volunteers might be to sully the phenomenon and perhaps to destroy it. Of course people who are volunteers do and should have rights. But they should have them not as volunteers, not because they are volunteers, but as members of a civil society.

At a theoretical level there is a good deal to be said for a somewhat revised version of the second of these two sets of reasons. It would be crude to think of the rights that volunteers are likely to demand or expect as inducements, payments, or rewards in any straight-out economic sense. (It is because the government seems to think of them in this way that some of their programs are unsettling.) Even if we set this thought resolutely aside, however, injecting rights (over and above the rights they share with other members of the society) into the activities and relationships of volunteers does (would) work a significant alteration in them.

Serving as a volunteer and exercising (most) rights share one feature: voluntariness is a condition of both. But it has been the burden of much of my discussion that both modes of activity involve important additional elements, elements that are not easily harmonized or even combined. To have a right to do or have X is to be entitled to X. Others are expected to respect the right, to discharge the obligations, accept the liabilities, disabilities, etc. that the right entails. When they do so, I owe them no debt, need feel no gratitude to them. If they refuse or fail they not only do wrong but do wrong to me, thereby licensing my indignation and often my demand for retribution or compensation. It is therefore understandable that relationships conducted in terms of rights are often guarded, wary, and litigious; at least competitive and frequently conflictful. As vital as numerous western societies have come to regard them, rights and rights-relationships can scarcely be viewed as among the heart-warming features of those societies.

These attributes of rights and rights-relationships, I suggest, stand in what is at best any uneasy relationship with the distinctive and distinctively attractive characteristics of volunteering. It is incongruous, deeply and conceptually incongruous, for volunteers to contribute their services out of obligation or in the hope of material reward. It is also incongruous for them to think of their activities as the exercise of rights. Their circumstance is not one of fending off limiting or threatening actions by competitors for scarce opportunities or resources but one of gladly offering their own personal energies and abilities out of the conviction that the cause in question is worthy and good. Insofar as they conceive of themselves, or non-volunteers in the organization conceive of them (qua volunteers) as persons exercising rights, this mentality is at least qualified and perhaps destroyed.

I hope that I will not be interpreted, however, as arguing that volunteers as such should have no rights or as few rights as possible. The intent of my argument can be made clearer by returning to the distasteful idea, mentioned earlier, that because volunteers come and go at their discretion, any rights in an organization should go to the non-volunteers. It may indeed be true that the non-volunteers should possess rights that the volunteers do not have. But they should not have these rights against the volunteers any more than the volunteers should have rights against them. The point is that, whether I am or am not a volunteer, I should not think of volunteers as such as persons standing in rights-relationships--whether with other volunteers or with non-volunteers. For reasons analogous to those that support the same conclusion in respect to family members as such, the conceptualization of rights is inappropriate to the status and role, and hence the relationships, or volunteers.

This result needs to be qualified in two ways before taking up the concluding question anticipated at the outset.

The first qualification has already been entered and need only be reiterated with emphasis. Persons who hold the status and play the role of volunteers in organizations will also occupy other statuses and play other roles. The conclusion I have drawn concerning volunteers as such in no way implies that such persons should cease to be regarded as bearers and exercisers of rights in these other roles or that the

rights they have in these other roles should be in any way diminished. Rather, it is an implicit assumption of my argument that the status of volunteer exists, and the role of volunteer is performed, in a setting in which certain moral, legal, and political rights are shared among all members of the society in question. The fact that a person is a volunteer warrants no one in denying or infringing that person's moral or civil rights.

Secondly, my argument is an argument "in principle" or "in theory," not a prescription offered to any assignable organization or association. The impetus to think of volunteers as bearers of rights can come from many quarters. If the professionals or officers or employees of organizations that attract volunteers are abusive of the latter, the volunteers may be faced with the choice of withdrawing their services or of demanding rights over and above those they have as citizens or in other roles. Faced with such a choice, the very mentality that characterizes volunteering at its best may not only explain but justify an insistence upon further rights. A second glance at the partially analogous case of family relationships may be appropriate here. One hopes that the members of a family will think of and act toward one another primarily in terms of love, affection and mutual concern. In the setting of a family with these characteristics, the peculiar combination of defensiveness and assertiveness distinctive of the discourse of rights is discordant and jarring. But there is little doubt that in some families relationships in terms of rights, while worse than one might wish, are better than what experience has given us good reason to fear.

These qualifications are of some relevance to the final question on my agenda, the question whether volunteers as such should have at least the right to withdraw their services and take their leave of the organizations and associations with which they have voluntarily associated themselves. At one level this question can be answered in terms of the rights that persons who are volunteers have, not qua volunteers, but simply as members of a civil society. It can be answered, that is, in terms of the law of contract and the rights and duties that are created by moral analogues to contract such as promising and agreeing. It is of course of the essence of contracts, promises and agreements that persons who enter into or make them therefy qualify the liberties they otherwise enjoy.

If volunteers contract, agree, or promise to serve an organization on a fixed schedule or for a definite period of time, they thereby acquire a legal or moral obligation to do so. That obligation, under most circumstances, can only be dissolved by the other party or parties to the contract or agreement.

Not all volunteers enter, either explicitly or tacitly, into contracts or agreements. Where they have not done so, it is tempting to think that they have a right to take their leave at their discretion, that is without owing justification or even explanation to anyone. If we succumb to the temptation to think in this way we will do well to give at least some attention to one of the important but recently neglected features of the logic of rights, namely the fact that it is perfectly cogent and sometimes entirely correct to say "Able has a right to do X, but it would not be right (it would be wrong) for Able to exercise that right in this circumstance." Rights are and must be potent warrants for action. If they do not "trump" (to use Ronald Dworkin's [1977] language) a considerable number of other cards in the moral and especially the legal deck they are simply not rights. But we do not and should not treat rights as trumps in the strict sense of a card that "takes" all moral and legal tricks in all circumstances. If in fact I do have a moral and/or legal right to walk away from the dike builders just when my contribution is crucial to the success of their efforts, it is surely wrong for me to exercise that right just because I have it.

I am inclined, rather, to return to my general theme and to the second qualification I entered concerning it. If we find the parties to a volunteer relationship thinking of it in terms of rights, even if only the right to break off the relationship, that will be an indication that something has gone wrong, that the arrangement has deteriorated. The deterioration may be such, the explanation for it may be of such a character, that a shift to the thought and language of rights is the least unsatisfactory remedy available to the parties. It will not be an occasion for congratulation or celebration.

Notes

1. I regard the notion of a right against myself, and its brother, a duty to myself, as confused. At best these are metaphorical notions. Indeed

they are doubly metaphorical in that they depend for such sense as they have on the metaphor of a divided self with one of the selves having rights against or duties to the other.

2. Adams makes this argument in his Novanglus. I am indebted to my colleague John G.A. Pocock for calling it to my attention.

3. This may be a convenient juncture to distinguish the sense of "volunteer" involved in the notion of a volunteer army. Such an army consists of people who join voluntarily rather than being conscripted. Having joined, however, the recruits are paid employees with specified, contractual obligations that include a fixed term of service. The National Guard is a voluntary army in this sense, but if the dike had been built by the Guard the media would no more report that it had been built by volunteers than if it had been built by employees of General Motors--a voluntary organization in the same sense--posted to the scene for the day.

4. I have done so in Flathman, 1976 and 1980.

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THE RIGHTS OF VOLUNTEERS: A RESPONSE

Florence S. Schwartz

In November of 1980, the newspaper in my community reported that the local volunteer firefighters were asserting their "right" to have a training center. They believed that they were entitled to such a facility, that they had the right to participate in the decision making process regarding the formal establishment of this facility, and that these rights should be acknowledged within the formal structure of the fire department as an organization as well as in the broader community. I agree that they do have such rights.

Flathman ("The Rights of Volunteers") would disagree. In his thoughtful, philosophic essay, he offers several reasons. He believes that assertions of rights by volunteers indicates a deterioration of the relationship between individuals who volunteer and the organization they serve. Since volunteers make their contribution without expectation of material reward, to accord rights might sully and perhaps destroy this phenomenon. He also believes that since the assertion of rights requires that others respect these rights, such an attitude is 'typically insistent and assertive," and relationships conducted in these terms are often "guarded, wary and litigious, at least competitive and frequently conflictful." Since volunteers gladly offer "their own personal energies and abilities out of the conviction that the cause in question is worthy and good, "....insofar as they conceive of themselves, or non-volunteers in the organization conceive of them (qua volunteers) as persons exercising rights, this mentality is at least qualified and perhaps destroyed."

Flathman summarizes his position: "the conceptualization of rights is inappropriate to the status and role, and hence the relationships, of volunteers." On the other hand, it is implicit in the thesis that professionals, staff and other paid personnel of organizations do have rights, rights which apparently arise out of the financial relationship between those individuals and the organization.

Why do I believe that the volunteer firefighters and other volunteers--have rights?

Rights within an organization, in my view, are not primarily derived from the fact of paid employment.

There is a more fundamental element in the relationship. The individual has rights because of a valued service rendered to the organization. The important relationship is not that of employee-employer; it is contributor-beneficiary. A further characteristic of members of organizations which entitles them to rights, is the acceptance of responsibility. Again, the fact of payment for employment is irrelevant.

These two characteristics are illustrated by examining the role of the Board of Directors of the typical community organization. A Board performs valued service and accepts considerable responsibility. It is universally acknowledged that the members of that body have the right to determine policy for the entire organization, to engage professionals and staff personnel and to dismiss them, and to determine the disposition of funds. Yet they are volunteers. In fact, it is because they are not dependent on the organization for their livelihood that their exercise of such rights is acceptable and trusted.

Participants in the work of an organization are sometimes paid and sometimes unpaid. They may or may not be professionals. Their work may be managerial or operational. All of these variations are irrelevant to the question of rights. Insofar as they participate in the work of the corporate entity, perform a valued service and take responsibility for some part of the organization's mission, they are entitled to certain rights.

Paid employees have special rights, of course, but these to a great extent grow out of the contractual relationship and are largely based on rules established by external forces; they include the right to a living wage, to a clean and safe work place, to fair treatment and proper conditions of work.

But all members of the organizational system--paid or volunteer--have another kind of right, in my view: the right to participate in the decision making process. Such a right might very well involve the right to be critical, insistent, assertive, competitive and conflictful, attitudes which Flathman deplores as destructive of the organization. Quite the contrary! Such attitudes are likely to lead to constructive results precisely because they are 'conflictful,' indicating that the issues are important and meaningful,

and that those who take such attitudes are serious and concerned.

Modern organizational theory involves the concept of an organizational system, a network of interacting parts all of which relate to one another in carrying out the mission of the organization. Every part plays a role in some unique way and interacts with every other part; the successful accomplishment of particular functions by each part combined with successful interaction among all parts causes the total organization to succeed. To isolate one part of such an organizational system and give it a name (e.g. volunteer) and as a consequence to deny that part rights that adhere to all the other parts is a limiting device which weakens the entire system and makes it more difficult to achieve the organization's goals; indeed, it may very well interfere with them.

The concept of rights for volunteers is a recent development related to other rights movements. Groups not afforded full rights, even though covered in the Constitution, needed special legislation to assure those rights. Civil rights legislation required positive acts of government designed to protect persons against arbitrary or discriminatory treatment by government, individuals or organizations, rights guaranteed by the Constitution: freedom of religion, speech and press, the right to due process of law and to equal protection under the law. Civil Rights Acts have been enacted in order to guarantee these rights to groups which have not been fully covered: e.g., blacks and more recently, women.

Civil rights pertain to the law, but there are rights not necessarily legal in nature. Funk and Wagnall defines a right as "that which is right; moral rightness; justice." It defines the adjective "right," as "done in accordance with or conformable to moral law or to some standard of rightness; equitable; just; righteous." I submit that volunteers' rights are to be viewed in this moral context rather than the legalistic sense.

The movement to identify volunteer rights is also a reflection of the fact that volunteers have not been afforded the protection or the conditions offered to others who contributed to the welfare of the organization. Flathman seems to feel that since volunteer-

ing is altruistic, if it is not satisfactory, the volunteer can always solve the problem by leaving.

If this altruistic emphasis were ever true, it is no longer. Today there is a "new voluntarism," as Stuart Langton said. "At the core of the new voluntarism is the critical sense of the fallibility of the modern state and corporation, the new meaning of the voluntary sector therefore is conditioned by our sense of alienation, centralized and depersonalizing features of contemporary government and business."

It is indeed a new voluntarism. No longer do we have the "Lady Bountiful" of yesterday who volunteers out of noblesse oblige--altruism is no longer the major or only motive for volunteering.

People who volunteer do so for a whole series of reasons, many of which are self-interest needs. Women are testing out possibilities of returning to work; teenagers are looking for experience; men are thinking of second careers; our growing single populations are seeking relationships and opportunities for socialization while doing something they consider worthwhile; some are using it for credit references. The National Association of Social Workers, in its historic resolution of 1977 on Voluntarism and Social Service Systems, says, "In the last decade applications of the principle of maximum feasible participation brought a sharp upsurge of volunteer activity by the poor and the consumers of service. Volunteer participation continues to provide a way of applying democratic principles and individual responsibility in an increasingly complex society." The Board member/volunteer frequently contributes financially. Citizen and consumer are moving into more areas of decision making.

In the direct social services we are aware that we are only treating a tip of the iceberg in terms of the needs of children, families and communities. There never has been or will be enough professionals or funds to deal with the members of our society who are deprived, dependent, neglected or delinquent. Therefore the community share is an important one, combined with that of the professionals and staffs who carry the accountability for the services. I therefore see the volunteer/citizen participants as integral parts of the social delivery team. As such they have real responsibilities with accountability to the clients

and the community, responsibilities that the citizen participants and/or volunteers need to accept. With the responsibilities go certain rights, both for the organization and for the volunteers.

Once a person volunteers, the rights on both sides have to be circumscribed, as Flathman quite accurately suggests. If the organization is to fulfill its functions and if volunteers are to provide specific services, those services must be delivered. This requires the volunteer to conform to certain acceptable practices. As with paid employment, when the relationship is not satisfactory, volunteers retain the right to leave or to resign. But short of that, both sides have other rights. What we are talking about is a contract of some form--more or less formal. Exact definition of these rights is a subject for a further exploration, but at the least I propose that they include the right to participate in some aspects of the decision-making process of the organization. What remains is to examine more fully the nature of such rights.

CLIENT RIGHTS, ADVOCACY AND VOLUNTEERISM

William W. Vosburgh

The complexity of rights of recipients as a subject has been increased by the accelerated pace of change in the last decade. Because progress made in one area is quickly transferred to others, it is even difficult to talk about different groups or classes of recipients in isolation. This paper cannot trace the evolution of the rights of recipients in detail nor even catalogue, except in a general way, what those rights may be. Nor will it review the series of court decisions which have done so much to assert and establish these rights in the last decade. What it will do is attempt to (1) create a context for recipients' rights, (2) see their successful assertion as a result of several interlocking social movements, (3) relate the exercise of these rights to general problems people have with systems which deliver social services and treatment, and (4) explore the roles which have opened up for voluntary activity because of these developments and some of the pressing issues which remain.

After the development of a background it will become obvious why speaking with precision about the rights of a particular group of clients is not only difficult but, perhaps, undesirable. As the paper proceeds, the terms "recipient," "client," and "patient" will be used almost interchangeably. This will be done in full recognition that some groups, such as prisoners or children, have special circumstances which must be taken into account. All of these groups have enough in common, however, to merit a generalized discussion.

BACKGROUND

The earliest stirrings relating to the present clients' rights movement can probably be found in the deinstitutionalization drive. Although there is still controversy as to exactly when and precisely why this movement began (Scull, 1977), there is little doubt that it has proceeded at an accelerated pace across the past two decades and has brought with it change of the most fundamental sort in such fields as the treatment of the mentally ill and even the definition of who is a patient.

Deinstitutionalization (Bachrach, 1976) arose from various critiques of large, sequestered institutions as treatment vehicles, especially for the mentally ill. In common with prisons and other such institutions, as described by Goffman (1959), the classical mental hospital was highly effective in a number of respects: it sequestered persons with mental illness from the general population and the community at large; it operated a system of custody with a high degree of security and accountability; it was able to deploy its inmates with a high degree of precision, moving them through a daily routine with a minimum of difficulty. These advantages are possible only if the patient's basic liberties are severely compromised. If the patient received treatment, it was decided upon without consulting him and compliance could always be insured by force. It must be emphasized that custody was the necessary precondition to achieving all the advantages listed above, and that it is little wonder that insuring effective custody played such a large part in the life of mental hospitals and other institutions.

A number of developments in the mid-50s made the return of large numbers of patients to the community an attractive alternative. Among these were the constant expansion of institutionalized populations and facilities, increasing costs, questions about the delivery of treatment and its efficacy, and the development of drugs which showed promise in controlling symptoms. The return of the patient to the community necessitated a complete thinking through afresh of the patient's responsibility for his life and treatment for his difficulties simply because the totally dependent, heavily disciplined and ultimately irresponsible patient assumed by the total institution would not serve as the basis for release and for community treatment. The patient had to be reconstituted as an individual and accorded various rights.

In the case of institutionalized populations, this series of developments coincided with the high noon of the civil rights movement.[1] America in the sixties and early seventies saw rapid developments in the use of the courts to secure basic liberties for deprived groups. These two movements--deinstitutionalization and civil rights--had largely separate origins and their coming together at this particular point was fortuitous. It has greatly accelerated the process of finding the boundaries of the rights of

patients. Further, the total institution, at least as represented by the mental hospital, turned out to be a one-horse shay. Defining and securing the rights of patients as members of the community also resulted in a revolution of similar proportions in the rights of those who remained within the institutions. The relative priority of custody and treatment was simply reversed. Securing the right to treatment inverted all the assumptions and procedures of the classical mental hospital with the exception of those persons who could be shown to be "dangerous."

Many of the developments of the sixties moved in the same direction. The client's surrender of control over his life for benefits in the welfare system and the difficulty experienced in getting that system to provide people with their entitlements culminated in the work of the National Welfare Rights Organization (Steiner, 1971; ch. 8) and others and the steady attack on repressive practices and a redefinition of the client as an individual with substantial rights. This movement went on against an institution, the administrative bureaucracy, which was less than total; but it was a push in the same direction, and rights won in one arena exerted pressure for similar developments in others.

LISTING OF RIGHTS

It would be possible to make a number of classificatory schemes for the various rights which have been secured. In some instances they have been codified as "Bills of Rights" (Pa. Dept. of Health, 1980). It should be noted that they interlock and reinforce one another so that these divisions are by no means hard and fast. Further, there is litigation still in progress which is continuing to add meaning and definition to earlier decisions. The scheme presented below is offered, then, as a summary to advance discussion rather than a definitive listing:

1. Treatment: A right to treatment has been firmly established. This includes a right to prompt and effective treatment as well. If no treatment is available or known, the individual cannot be denied his liberty unless he can be shown to be dangerous. Physical and chemical restraints may not be employed instead of treatment. Unnecessary treatment is

forbidden. This latter prohibition has implications for experimental routines as well as ordinary treatment.

2. Participation: This is, to some extent, the social worker's "right to self-determination." The individual is entitled to participate in treatment planning involving him, and has a right to knowledge and access to records in pursuit of this more general right. A natural follow-on to this is the right to refuse treatment, that is, to refuse to become a patient at all. Interwoven with this is the obligation to obtain the patient's informed consent to therapeutic routines and to provide information on all effects--short and long-term, beneficial and harmful--which may be anticipated.

3. Privacy: A general right to privacy is the kingpin which holds a number of other rights in place. The patient, for instance, is entitled to treatment in the modality which will place the least restrictions on his freedom. The form of treatment which is least intrusive must be chosen. The right to refuse treatment may also rest on grounds of privacy. Strict confidentiality must be observed in all record-keeping and discussion of a given case.

4. Respect for the Individual: Routines which are degrading or offensive to the dignity of the individual must not be employed. Unless determinations to the contrary exist, a patient will be treated as though he were competent, and accorded all usual rights accorded competent persons. Any labor performed in connection with treatment must be compensated at an adequate level. It must also be noted that, due to widespread changes in commitment procedures, individuals in non-emergency situations can check in and out of institutions quite freely. Enforcement of routines through strict discipline is thus no longer possible on a large scale.

5. Fair Procedure: The legal emphasis on due process and fair procedure has found expression in the installation of review procedures' routines in such a way that all changes of status of patients are under review. Rights to seek redress for grievances and to representation and advocacy have been asserted. Attempts have been made to insure that rights of persons in institutions are prominently posted and explained to them.

The general effect of much of this activity has been a greater codification and specification not only of rights, but also of routines and procedures, as the legal idea of due process has been applied more and more broadly. Ironically, this may have led to an enhancement of some of the more objectionable features of bureaucracy and a greater tendency toward pettifogging in attempts to fend off challenges to actions.

While most of these rights have been asserted in connection with institutionalized populations, they do apply broadly to other populations as well.

CLIENT ADVOCACY

More than a decade ago, at the height of the surge of interest in client advocacy in the late sixties, Drew Hyman and I devised a scheme for broadly categorizing the problems people encountered in dealing with large-scale organizations (Vosburgh and Hyman, 1973). The focus was on how a citizen advocacy agency might help disadvantaged people secure services to which they were entitled. This classification still seems to be a good way to sort out major problem areas and possible arenas for activity of volunteers in behalf of clients.

Problems were seen as falling into four main categories: (1) Access, (2) Responsiveness, (3) Response Time, and (4) Dignity. Each of these will be defined in some detail and then used to focus consideration of the client rights particularly affected, as well as the possible role of volunteers in helping service delivery systems and agencies accommodate to and insure those rights.

The first major difficulty is access: the client

has difficulty entering the system, identifying incorrect points of entry or not being able to identify any such points; once in the system, difficulty in moving around it effectively may be encountered; the client may continually reach dead ends, be spun out or ignored. Information and Referral (I & R) systems are, of course, a long-standing attempt to counter these problems. Many of them have been the scene of volunteer effort for many years. Automatic data processing equipment and computers have added further embellishments to their operations and exemption from the Title XX ceiling has endowed them with a special kind of importance and encouraged their further development. Many referral systems, however, are essentially passive: they provide the client with suggestions about services to utilize and may engage in referral activity; but it is then up to the client to carry out the activities of getting to the helping agency, following through on its intake routines, helping to articulate the problem, conforming to agency expectations about treatment activity, and, very possibly, pursuing several further referrals in the same fashion. The opportunities for something to go wrong multiply as the complexity of the activity increases. At a time when the client needs help, preventing the sheer weight of these performances from becoming discouraging and fostering negation and withdrawal assumes importance.

Many service systems have attempted to meet these problems with client advocates, persons who closely monitor the client's progress through the system, help with explanations and arrangements, assist in explaining proposed routines, alternatives and choices to the client, help maintain morale in the face of frustration, make arrangements for such services as day care which will allow the client to carry out the help-seeking routine, and, last but not least, provide a constant point of reference in the midst of a bewildering round of activities. Only the most advanced I & R systems have staff to spare for activities of this sort, and this means that it is up to the agencies themselves to arrange for advocacy. This presents several classical problems: (1) To what extent can an advocate be expected to press the interests of the client against opposition in an agency which sponsors all these activities? (2) To what extent should the advocate understand and attempt to justify agency expectations to the client: when does this degenerate into mere cooling out or apology? (3) If the advo-

cates are sited outside the agency, what sort of organization do they have; how does it command the attention of service providers; on what grounds can it insist on access to agency records or personnel which may be necessary to do an effective job? (4) How is this activity financed in a way which will reinforce its independence? (5) How does the advocate work easily across agency boundaries in order to be able to pursue a case through the service network?

None of the problems listed here is insoluble. The particular solution adopted, however, must be the result of a series of conscious choices, and the final package will be more or less effective depending on what those choices have been. What role volunteers might play depends in large part upon the pattern of choices made. Suffice it to say that a group of volunteers who were willing to devote time to learning the complexities of the service system at the local level and to devote time to making contacts within that system, on the one hand, and learning to understand the client's needs and difficulties, on the other, could amplify many-fold the effectiveness of an I & R system. Their independence would be of advantage in many situations.

A word should be said about the utility of such a system in working with deinstitutionalized populations as well as with other clients within the community. Not only do deinstitutionalized populations frequently require supportive services of one kind or another from the community network, but many of them move about on what is essentially a continuum of care, running from more restrictive to less restrictive treatment modalities. Implementing treatment decisions which require movement along this continuum and working with clients in adjusting to such changes is a possible focus of volunteers' activity. Finally, although deinstitutionalized persons may be supposed to relate to such organizations as Community Mental Health Centers which are in the major institutional category which is the focus of response to their problems, things often work out otherwise, and they wind up being attended to by other institutions altogether such as, in the case of the mentally ill, the police or hospital emergency rooms (Bonovitz, 1980). These organizations encounter a good deal of such traffic as a natural part of their work, and it is not easily displaced onto the mental health network.

While police and others receive some training in this respect and are, as Bonovitz has discovered, amazingly effective in dealing with some of these populations, there is a great deal of work in support of their activities which could be done effectively by volunteers. Volunteers have several advantages in working with marginal populations which are being returned to the community: they are themselves part of the community; their freedom from "official" status endows them with flexibility and independence..they can, for instance, stay with a client across organizational and even across major institutional boundaries; they can serve as a community coordinating force by assessing the service network from the client's point of view and identifying opportunities for even unlike agencies to work together.

Denial of access to the service system altogether or arriving at an incorrect destination will, of course, compromise the client's right to treatment. Less obvious is the fact that flurries of essentially meaningless activity or runarounds may simply mask the fact that no one knows how to define the client, to diagnose him or to provide a solution to whatever his problem may be. Whether or not any of these situations obtains is, of course, a matter for informed technical judgment and not, in itself, a reasonable sphere for volunteer activities. A volunteer can be highly useful as a client advocate in connection with these matters, however, for he may be the only person with all the pieces of the puzzle. While it may not be possible to specify what the barriers to treating the client are, a volunteer may be able to sense the fact that a client is getting the runaround and make inquiries on a procedural rather than a substantive basis. In similar fashion, the advocate will often be in a position to query whether other client rights are being respected, such as rights to effective treatment and least restrictive treatment.

In addition to informing clients of rights they may or may not be aware of, the adovcate can also become adroit with the appeals procedures which have become an increasingly common feature of service delivery systems. If a round of activity results in the client being spun out of the service system, this fact alone is often enough to launch an appeal. The proceedings of many such appeal mechanisms are informal and designed for ready access, opening the way to assistance from advocates who may lack formal legal

training.

One of the most promising fields for volunteer advocacy efforts grows out of the assertion of a right to informed consent and to participation in treatment decisions. The activities which are often prerequisites to treatment, such as extensive information-gathering routines, will often require interpretation. The right to know what the information will be used for, and what the intent of client participation in various routines may be, can become the objects of inquiry. Although this right may be thought of in connection with physical procedures, it is advisable to look at other service requirements, such as referrals, in the same light. There has to be enough information forthcoming to make decisions about participation, including such items as exactly how effective a particular line of action may be expected to be. A client in trouble may very well be reluctant to assert these rights with persons who may be seen as the only source of help. An advocate, on the other hand, can be alert to confusion or reluctance on the part of the client and may assume that an explanation which seems unclear is also unclear to the client.

In addition to watchdog functions, however, a volunteer advocate can play a positive role in indicating to the professional what things about the course of diagnosis and treatment the client has found to be unclear or has developed doubts about. Helping to secure explanations and interpret them is very much in the spirit of informed consent, and facilitation here would be a most welcome contribution.

Responsiveness is the extent to which the service system engages the client's problem, makes it the focus of effective activity and achieves results. There are a number of reasons why this is a difficult problem to manage. The individual may have accessed the system correctly and been engaged in a gread deal of activity with it over a considerable period of time, but without any acceptable outcome having been achieved. In areas such as social services and mental health, there is enough uncertainty both in the areas of diagnosis and treatment to make such a situation a feature of a number of cases. It is impossible to determine just what is wrong; it is possible to determine what is wrong, but there is uncertainty as to what to do about it, an uncertainty that represents not an inad-

equacy on the part of the individual practitioner, but the state of the art at that moment. Situations such as these have, of course, been the object of court activity around the issues of the right to treatment and the right to effective treatment, as well as a range of other advocacy efforts (International Ombudsman Institute, 1980).[2]

Again, the service system may simply misfire; its reaction may be irrelevant or ineffective. Social service practice is often speculative and requires a certain amount of trial and error activity. When this is justified and when it simply represents putting the client through meaningless activity is a matter for professional judgment; and it is simply not possible to say whether failed attempts at treatment might have had other outcomes in many cases.

The situation where there is no known answer to the client's situation poses a further dilemma. Does the practitioner at this point simply tell the client this and resign from the situation; does he make a referral to another agency or type of service or professional; or does he himself stay with the case for a while, hoping some opportunity to serve effectively will unfold with time? The ethical problem here is compounded by the fact that services are a scarce resource, and time spent on one case cannot be spent on others.

All these difficulties mean that a determination of whether or not a service system has been responsive is no simple matter. Once again, those who would monitor such a system must find a way to handle the questioning of professional judgment and experience and must often do so largely on the evidence of a client who knows he has not been helped, but lacks much further understanding of what has been done. The decision must also be made as to whether an on-going adversary stance is the most effective in the long run for assuring responsiveness to clients.

This suggests that the first line of defense on responsiveness lies in quality control and quality assurance procedures such as professional review panels. There is a role for volunteers in connection with this type of activity. Advocacy efforts may be furthered by careful eliciting of information from the client. It must be remembered that the advocacy worker here is dealing with the client's perceptions and,

while these are a datum, they represent but one point of view. An inability of the client to articulate what happened and what was intended in a treatment process, however, can call into question the extent to which he has been made a participant in treatment planning and choices and the extent to which rules about informed consent have been attended to.[3]

If a client has been denied an entitlement, there will generally be an appeals procedure such as the fair hearing in public assistance. Most such proceedings are characterized by informality and simplified procedure so that a client can present his own case. Once again, it would be possible for volunteers to act as advocates in such situations for clients who were unable to present, or preferred not to depend upon, their own presentation. In order to qualify for this type of advocacy, a volunteer would have to achieve a detailed knowledge not only of the appeal procedures, but also of the rules and regulations governing the service activity. This role has been played successfully by persons associated with such client advocacy organizations as the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO).

In a more general way, volunteer client advocates have been useful in mediating client problems with office staff in service agencies and giving advice on alternative sources of help or on the rights of the client. These activities also raise some further questions, however. For example, is such a service most useful if it is part of the agency being monitored or if it is exterior to it? While NWRO is generally viewed as an independent organization, it also has "inside" aspects and would not be nearly as effective as it has been if it were unable to secure cooperation and access from welfare offices. Different kinds of pressures can be brought from each of these locations, and the desideratum is ultimately probably both, rather than one or the other.

Intertwined with the interior-exterior problem is that of the general type of advocacy needed. Larry Hill (1976) has made a highly useful distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" advocacy. The first of these aims to secure something from the system which it is withholding. The second involves preventing the system from doing something to the client which it appears determined to do. If the matter involves a legitimate expectation of the system,

offensive claims are probably best pressed from within, for legitimacy can always be asserted. If new ground is being broken, however, such as an attempt to assert a right which is presently uncodified, this may well have to be done from an external base. If the internal system of rules and regulations of the service agency is involved, defensive advocacy may well be carried on from within. The case of appeals procedures and fair hearings mentioned above are examples. If the grounds for a defensive action lie in more general realms of law, depend upon precedents in other agencies or fields, or involve breaking ground in putting a check upon what has been a customary activity, an outside position would seem to be indicated. The role of volunteers, either inside or outside, is most clear-cut in the more routine situations. Here the agency may be perfectly accepting of disinterested help for its clients.

In fields such as mental health, care has become the function of an entire spectrum of treatment modes, ranging from total institutions to minimal contact with a mental health center in the community. Patients are expected to move back and forth across this spectrum during courses of treatment and during their careers as patients. With the right to the least restrictive mode of treatment consistent with the patient's safety and progress firmly established in law, the matter of movement from one treatment modality to another, and of preventing patients' getting "stuck" in the system, opens up a further field for activity. Keeping track of patients, querying their status at various times and easing their transition from one point to another on the spectrum are activities well within the ambit of volunteer workers. Some kinds of work with third parties, such as the family or the community, are appropriate as well.

A number of the key rights which civil liberties law suits have established in recent years relate to responsiveness. The right to treatment, to participate in decision-making during the course of treatment, to effective treatment, to treatment in the least restrictive circumstances and rights to various kinds of procedure are all at play here. In some instances they are established in one field, but not necessarily in others. As noted earlier, however, it is better to think of these rights as applying broadly, rather than narrowly, and arguments to other fields will come in due course. Assistance in asserting these rights is an ongoing process and has required highly skilled and

technical legal and other professional help. Maintaining these rights, however, must eventually become a matter of routine and the volunteer's role as a sensing agent and a source of counsel and advice to the client, and also possibly as a transmitter of information and even a formal advocate, may undergo rapid expansion as the new status of various client groups becomes firmly established.

Response Time: While it may be argued that response time is simply an aspect of responsiveness and does not deserve a separate status of its own, a timely response is so important to an individual in difficulty or in pain that it deserves this sort of emphasis. As the old saying would have it, "justice delayed is justice denied." It is possible to secure access and even to obtain the correct response from a service system; but, if this occurs in a context of endless delays, important rights of the client have still been violated.

Most service delivery systems recognize a distinction between crisis situations and more routine treatment demands. It is by no means safe to assume, however, that fast-acting responsive routines are necessarily available on a continuous basis in a given community to deal with problems of this sort. There is a great deal of displacement of mental patients and others in acute situations to other institutional resources, such as the police or hospital emergency rooms (Bonovitz, 1980). The central service delivery system involved may, in fact, have very little to do with large groups of emergency cases because of an inability to respond rapidly. Within the community, the spectrum of treatment mentioned earlier is not so much extended by the involvement of other resources as it is paralleled by them, presenting a service disjunction which may not be bridged for a number of patients.[4]

Judging whether or not a delivery system is acting within normal expectations of promptness in a given case is a difficult matter; but a knowledge of how long procedures usually take will at least endow the observer with grounds on which to raise questions. It should also be noted that a feature of many of the landmark patients' rights decisions of recent years has been some idea of prompt treatment as a normal expectation. Incarcerating people, while delays in treatment occur for whatever reason, has been viewed

as a violation of individual rights.

Volunteers acting as aides or in other capacities within the service delivery system are often among the very few persons in a position to view the client's experience as a totality and thus to evaluate the extent to which unnecessary delay may have been operative across an entire episode. To take but one example, the time spent processing a client's papers at each single reviewing station in a bureaucratic organization may be perfectly reasonable. The time spent transferring the work from one station to another, however, can add an unconscionable amount of time to the entire process, creating a situation in which each link in the chain prides itself on rapid response, while clients suffer what appear from their perspective to be lengthy delays.

From a position outside the delivery system in question, pressure can be brought for change in overall policies which make for delay in service delivery. Not only lobbying groups, but boards with citizen members can focus attention on such problems. Under more recent developments, those parts of the service system which come into initial contact with a client in trouble are also the link between clients and the continuing support they draw from the service system to sustain them in the community. If the system is not responsive or acts too slowly, this assumed support by the system will be missing and any treatment assumptions based upon it will not hold.

Not only must the cases of individuals be monitored, but program data on the length of time various treatment activities take must be monitored as well. Citizen contribution to such activity may easily lie in insisting that such information be produced and raising sophisticated questions about it when it is.

Client advocacy and program assessment around timely delivery of services bears directly on an established right to prompt and effective treatment. If delay results in loss of freedom, a further set of issues is raised. The employment of drugs or chemical restraints for essentially custodial purposes--to put a patient on "hold"--is an instance of delay of treatment just as much as ignoring him for a similar period would be.

Among the issues concealed in advocacy around

rapid response is the question of queue-jumping and fairness. One response to complaints is simply to accelerate the case of the individual complained about or to move that person to the head of the line. This means success in the individual case, but leaves the service system untouched and results in unfairness to others within it. This can be recognized as a specific instance of the more general problem of advocacy in behalf of individuals and its relation to advocacy for general system reform. That these two things are not identical, and that each may, in fact, be a flawed vehicle for accomplishing the other, is a problem sometimes lost sight of in a legalized age which tends to reduce broader issues to single cases for advocacy purposes.

Dignity: It is not surprising that much of the assertion of clients' rights has centered not upon the nature or quality of treatment and services delivered alone, but also upon the circumstances under which this has taken place. As projected earlier, deinstitutionalization has meant not only the return of the client to the community, but has made necessary his reconstitution as an autonomous self-directing individual possessed of liberties and capable of participating in choices, including those involved in a course of treatment.

Violations of dignity are among the easiest difficulties for other lay persons to discover. They would seem at first glance to be easy to deal with because the fact that everyone is treated the same way can be viewed as an aggravation rather than a defense. In practice, however, such matters require careful and tactful handling, involving, as they usually do, nuances of behavior and personal sentiments. Most human relations agencies avoid summary behavior and stress informal resolutions. It is wise to bear in mind, however, that difficulties in this area are among the most serious possible.

The assertion and establishment of rights through legal channels has raised a series of problems around the question of particularism. Particularism, in the sense in which it will be discussed here, refers to the adaptation or adjustment of general procedures, rules, benefits or activities to permit their application to the cases of individuals. It involves the use of discretion in interpretation. Particularism cuts two ways. It may tend toward favoritism, on the

one hand, and result in unfair privilege based upon extrinsic criteria or even upon prejudice. In the other direction, it may tend toward justice or equity by allowing interpretations of given sets of circumstances which allow the rules to be applied to the benefit of persons whose situations are clearly within their intent, but which fail some technicality or introduce some further problem not contemplated when the rules were made. The legal insistence upon universalistic rules, the treatment of all cases uniformly, coupled with insistence upon fair procedure, exactly similar treatment of persons in similar situations, has led to the codification and specification of rules and procedures which formerly had some latitude built into them. This, in turn, has spawned defensive bureaucratic behavior in the direction of strict construction and close attention to keeping administrative practice uniform.

This reaction bears upon the question of treatment with dignity to the extent that it works against individuation and turns a deaf ear to the unique situation of the individual. Much of the job of the front-line workers in service organizations consists of mediating between the formal system and the individual, adapting each to the other. To the extent that the effort to adapt the system to the individual is diminished, there is a gap which must be filled by some additional effort. The client must be able to locate someone who is on his side, who will listen to his problems and take action to make the system produce for him. This is, of course, an extension of the advocacy role identified earlier, but with the additional element of having to deal with a system which has been forced to acknowledge rights and procedure, on the one hand, but which has been driven into defensive bureaucratization, on the other.

The axis of privacy bears on dignity in important ways. Not the least of these centers on the treatment of individuals and information about them. Both of these are viewed as a trust which must be preserved from casual treatment (Rivlin and Timpane, 1975).

Individuation demands not only privacy, but the concession that persons' ordinary means of communicating are to be respected and employed in dealing with them. Clients must not be palmed off with explanations couched in technical terms. Foreign language speakers must be dealt with in their own

language. The intermediary roles here are greatly expanded and open all kinds of possibilities for participation by helping third parties. Very often, health and service professionals lack the time to work with clients toward understanding and are faced with the choice of making extraordinary efforts or compromising such requirements as that of informed consent.

Interestingly enough, a right to access to an advocate is included in some patients' bills of rights. Leona Bachrach's cataloguing of inadequate community support systems for the deinstitutionalized as an issue points to the problem. Together they establish the necessity for the presence of someone on the client's side. That person could easily be a volunteer.

SOME ISSUES IN VOLUNTEERISM

The considerations above have raised a number of issues which affect the situation of volunteers in important ways. This paper has assumed possible roles for volunteers such as those of advocate, mediator, expeditor, monitor or human relations specialist. It has been suggested that the increasing emphasis on rights, in fact amounting to the reconstruction of the patient or client as a responsible individual, has been responsible for greatly enhancing these opportunities. The course of the discussion has also identified certain problems as well, and inventorying some of these as a stimulus to discussion may form an appropriate conclusion.

1. In asserting many of their rights, such as the right to effective treatment, to informed consent or to refuse treatment, not only clients but their advocates may be found in a position of appearing to question professional judgment. How can this problem be dealt with while preserving freedom to exercise these rights?

2. How can the advantages of particularism for the client be preserved in the face of increased bureaucratization and defensive practice provoked by increased attention to universalistic rules and greater specification? Are delays and reduction in service from this source an inevitable part of the price for asserting and establishing rights?

3. Mediation and advocacy often involve a highly detailed knowledge of the organization, rules and procedures of a service delivery system. Such knowledge is within the capacity of many volunteers; but how shall they be trained? Who is responsible?

4. Should volunteers be bound by a code of ethics? How would this be enforced?

Notes

1. It had always been recognized in Scandinavia and elsewhere (Gellhorn, 1967) that the civil rights of institutionalized persons require special attention (one of the Swedish ombudsmen, for example, spends a great deal of time systematically visiting institutions and making himself available to the inmates).

2. The annual surveys published by the International Ombudsman Institute provide a means for keeping track of the extent and scope of all kinds of advocacy efforts.

3. The right to a presentation in languages other than English is sometimes asserted and is an example of a role in which volunteers with special skills might serve as mediators and interpreters.

4. The development of specialized crisis intervention services across the past decade shows a recognition of this problem.

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SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: THE GROWING PARTNERSHIP OF BUSINESS AND VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Kerry Kenn Allen

In his now famous speech at Duke University in 1977, John D. Rockefeller III summed up what he saw as the essence of our multi-sector society: "The business community and the third sector are rooted in common ground, the preservation and strengthening of individual initiative and private enterprise. To me, there is no question that the future of the third sector and of American business is inseparable." In his view, corporate philanthropy -- the giving of charitable dollars -- is not, alone, sufficient. Rather, business must seek to mobilize its human resources -- "tested leadership, talented people, organizational know-how" -- to assist the voluntary, "third sector" to regain its vitality and to preserve its importance in American society.

That speech, and the many rather crudely bastardized offsprings of it, formed the rallying point for increased efforts to bring together these two non-governmental sectors, focusing the financial and technical resources of the corporation on the needs of non-profit organizations and rallying those organizations' volunteers and staff around the need to maintain our system of "free enterprise." While some may argue that it is still too early to see success in such a global undertaking, some evidence indicates that virtually no progress has been made. Corporations steadfastly refuse to increase the level of their charitable giving, even to within 20% of the allowable limit for contributions of pre-tax earnings, and for the most part remain unresponsive to the needs of new, emerging organizations and citizen action efforts. Voluntary organizations, while increasing their requests for corporate financial and volunteer support, retain their historic unwillingness to take on complex issues in the forum of public policy-making and, so far as can be determined, are doing little to enlighten their volunteers or consumers to the supposed virtues of increased corporate freedom or to alternative economic strategies.

What then is the status of the relationship between the corporate for-profit and the voluntary,

not-for-profit sectors? Are they, in fact, acting collaboratively to preserve their "common ground?" Have they sought ways to increase their interdependence and to develop an agenda of common issues and concerns about the third leg of our society, the governments?

This paper approaches these questions by examining a microcosm of that relationship, the growth of corporate efforts to involve employees in volunteer activities in the community. Beginning with the concept of "corporate social responsibility," it reviews the current nature and scope of corporate volunteer efforts, identifies those factors that may be most important in shaping these programs in the future and discusses the implications of these trends for both corporations and voluntary organizations. The paper concludes with a formulation of the ethical question of the acceptable level of interaction between these two related, yet quite different, organizational forms.

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

There can be little doubt that business has played a major role in shaping American communities. Through their very existence, corporations have become powerful forces, their decisions impacting on employees, consumers and neighbors as well as on shareholders and owners.

But to what extent is the corporation obligated to act in a way that is "socially responsible," to place the concerns of the larger community on a level equal to or greater than the self-interests of the business? Indeed, in an increasingly complex world with few "easy" moral or ethical choices, how will business or its evaluators decide what is responsible and what is not?

Questions such as these go to the very heart of the debate over "corporate social responsibility," a relatively recent term describing a concept that has existed in some form since the issuance of the first corporate charter. J. Richard Finlay has traced the concept of business social responsibilities as far back as 1916, to a paper presented by J.M. Clark, "The Changing Basis of Economic Responsibilities." Finlay has estimated that since the beginning of the 20th century, some 640 books, papers, and periodicals have in some way addressed themselves to the role of the corporation in society. (Finlay, 1977).

But for most of us, the term has a much more contemporary meaning, dating from the social protests and urban upheavels of the 1960's, when corporations were challenged to direct their resources to the solution of immediate human and social problems. Writing in Fortune, Norman Kurt Barnes, pointed out: "Beginning in the mid-1960's and spurred powerfully by the sight of American cities in flames, a fair number of senior executives became persuaded that business had both a moral obligation and a compelling need to deal with social problems -- that just making money wasn't enough." (Barnes, 1974)

The effort to define the term "corporate social responsibility" began as early as 1953, when Howard Bowen described it as the obligation of a corporation" ... to pursue those policies, to make those decisions or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in terms of the objectives and values of our society."

A decade later, Clarence Walton spoke of social responsibility as an evolution from a greater sense of corporate responsibility toward claimants within the business enterprise to the gradual assumption of greater obligations to claimants outside the firm. He also pointed out that while there is an obvious difficulty in defining "a term as imprecise as the range of interests subsumed under the rubric of 'larger society,' such imprecision "does not mean unreality." (Walton, 1967)

But perhaps the clearest definition comes not from an academician or a theorist, but from a practicioner. Stanley G. Karson, director of the Clearinghouse on Corporate Social Responsibility, begins his definition with "the four C's: the corporation, the community, the consciousness, the commitment." From it flows his definition of corporate social responsibility:

> It is the commitment of the corporation, conscious of its interdependence with the community, to use its available resources in such a manner that they will impact positively on society. (Karson, 1975)

In practice, corporate social responsibility may be played out in at least four distinct ways. The first, and most important, is the acceptance by the corporation in all of its activities of the notion of

responsibility to the community as a whole . Such an acceptance can be put into practice through such activities as investment in inner-city revitalization or in minority enterprises, halting practices such as redlining, undertaking aggressive affirmative action programs, adding consumer and worker representation to the boards of directors, basing decisions on plant closings or relocations on potential impact on the community, voluntarily adhering to or surpassing environmental protection or consumer safety regulations, etc.

Second, perhaps, most common, is the direct contribution of corporate dollars to charitable causes, whether through participation in a federated fundraising campaign, establishment of a corporate foundation to make grants to non-profit organizations or by matching employee contributions to selected educational or charitable institutions.

Third, corporations can be "institutional volunteers" in the sense that they undertake community service projects as a part of their total activities . Examples of this might include the construction of a playground on company property for neighborhood children or sponsorhsip of educational or recreational programs for young people or retired workers.

Finally, corporations can encourage and assist their employees to become active as volunteers in the community.

The relationship between the corporations and voluntary organizations in each of these cases is schizophrenic. Voluntary organizations and informal groups of concerned citizens are the natural catalysts for the acceptance of policies and practices that institutionalize a measure of social responsibility in the total life of the corporation. Similarly, corporate contributions and the mobilization of employees as volunteers may be in direct response to demands of voluntary organizations. When such demands are met, the voluntary organizations must become grateful recipients of support and bear at least minimal obligation to their corporate benefactors. It is that dynamic -- the voluntary organization as monitor, advisory, catalyst versus the voluntary organization as dependent recipient of dollars and volunteers -- that is the central focus of this paper.

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT

In 1978, the National Center for Voluntary Action (now VOLUNTEER: The National Center for Citizen Involvement) undertook the first comprehensive study of the nature and scope of corporate efforts to encourage and facilitate employee involvement in community volunteer activities. Through written surveys and personal interviews project staff attempted to define, describe and analyze the various models of employer involvement. The study resulted in a book, Volunteers from the Workplace, a national conference of corporate volunteer coordinators and a continuing relationship between VOLUNTEER and a number of corporations with active volunteer programs. These were the primary conclusions of the study:

. Employee volunteer programs are an increasingly important aspect of overall corporate efforts to act in a socially responsible manner.

. Corporations are increasingly viewed by voluntary organizations as a primary source for volunteers.

. Despite this growing importance, most programs are not given serious attention by management and do not have resources necessary for success.

. The "best" programs are those that are mutually beneficial to all the actors -- the community, the corporation, the employee volunteers.

. The most critical element in the success of these programs is the interest and support of top management, including the Chief Executive officer.

Each of these conclusions is discussed briefly below.

Increased Importance -- Some 330 corporations responded to the study with an indication that they in some way encouraged employee volunteering. The vast majority of these efforts had been begun in the five years immediately proceeding the study. Of those efforts organized into "volunteer programs," virtually all are products of the 1970's . The only existing

comparative data is that of the Clearinghouse on Corporate Social Responsibility. In its first report in 1973, the Clearinghouse identified 131 insurance companies with volunteer efforts; in 1978, they reported 187.

Likewise, attention to the importance of employee volunteering has increased: VOLUNTEER has been able to sponsor three highly successful fundraising "salutes" to corporate volunteer programs, the Corporate Volunteer Coordinators Council in New York has been revitalized, regional groupings of corporate programs have sprung up in Chicago, Houston, Philadelphia, Milwaukee and San Francisco. In November 1980, VOLUNTEER, in cooperation with the Johnson Foundation, sponsored a special "think tank" institute for experienced corporate coordinators. While perhaps not a statistically valid observation, it remains true that there are more corporate people willing to talk thoughtfully about employee volunteering now than ever before.

Increased Demand -- Likewise, more voluntary organizations are interested in tapping corporate resources, for both financial support and volunteers. With the growing perception that the return of women to the work-force will decrease the available pool of volunteers, organizations are advocating for released time policies in numbers of loaned executives, opportunities to recruit volunteers on company premises and access to rosters of retired workers. Similarly, tightening budgets have increased the need for highly skilled volunteers and for short-term technical assistance volunteers. Corporations are seen as the obvious source of both. In many ways this focus on corporations is analogous to the growth of college student volunteer programs in the 1960's, when volunteer-involving organizations looked to the campus because they saw a large pool of talent waiting to be mobilized.

Lack of Support -- Ironically, as interest and demand is increasing, it is also true that, for the most part, employee volunteer programs in most companies are not taken seriously, are given relatively low priority and do not have the resources to be successful. Consider these observations:

. Only six per cent of the companies interviewed have full-time staff assigned to the volunteer program.

. Virtually no company keeps records on the number of employees who volunteer or the amount of time contributed.

. Companies with released time programs generally have little idea about how much such time actually costs the company.

. Few companies have well articulated goals for their programs that tie them back into the overall purpose of the company and even fewer can describe criteria through which they will evaluate those programs.

It is safe to say that if businesses were managed in the same way as their volunteer programs, most would be on the brink of disaster. Indeed, in a time of worsening economic conditions, it is by no means clear that employee volunteer programs can continue to demand even the relatively meager resources they now receive.

Mutual Benefit -- The benefits of corporate volunteering to the community are immediately obvious: more volunteers, potentially greater skills, better educated and socially aware citizens. Employees, like all other volunteers, benefit as well through emotional satisfaction, relief from routine work, the opportunity to try new skills, etc. The corporation certainly benefits from an enhanced public image and, potentially, the improved view of its employees. Likewise, many companies report that employees participating as released time volunteers are more highly motivated, more productive and more responsible. To the extent that it is possible to evaluate a corporate volunteer program, it is clear that the "best" programs are those in which all three of these elements are present.

Management Support -- Without a doubt, the most critical element in maintaining a high quality employee volunteer program is the support of top management and particularly the Chief Executive Officer. The largest, most comprehensive and most enduring volunteer programs are those sponsored by companies whose CEO's have taken a personal, continuing interest in the activity and have committed their own time to recognizing and reinforcing employees who participate. It was clear from the interviews done in the Volunteers from the Workplace study that chief executives are also the ones most likely to understand and be able to articulate the long-term benefits of such involvement: more produc-

tive workers, healthier communities in which to sell their goods and less need for complex human service delivery systems. They are also most likely to echo John D. Rockefeller III's call for a greater collaboation between business and voluntary organizations to offset the growing power of government.

Each of these conclusions represent a major force in defining the shape and focus of corporate volunteer efforts: community and internal corporate pressures for greater involvement, employee needs and expectations, conflicts between social responsibility and the basic profit-making purpose of the corporation, the philosophy and expectations of top management. Other factors that will affect corporate volunteering in the future are described in the next section.

TRENDS INFLUENCING THE FUTURE

Perhaps the most definitive statement possible about the future is that it is unlikely to bear great resemblance to the present. Be that as it may, it can be helpful to identify some of the major trends and factors in society that may influence the future nature of corporate volunteer programs. For the purposes of this paper, three sets of factors have been identified: those in the society as a whole, those in the volunteer community and those in the corporate sector.

The most obvious changes in society in the next ten years are likely to relate to demography and the economy. On the former, several trends can be predicted with some certainty: the population as a whole will get older, with an increase in the numbers of elders and stabilization in the youth population; there seems to be an irreversible movement to the Sun Belt; there clearly is a trend toward increased numbers of women in the workforce. The future state of the economy is clearly much less certain. Inflation, if not controlled, may eat away all fixed incomes, forcing elders either back into the workforce or into object poverty, while at the same time crippling the capability of either public or private agencies to respond adequately to human needs. Inflation will most certainly perpetuate the growth of 2-income families and force youth either to seek employment in lieu of an education or more schooling in lieu of a job they can't find. While it is unclear how the search for personal growth and job enrichment will fare if the economy

continues to worsen and competition for jobs increase, it is virtually certain that there will be growing suspicion of big business, high corporate profits and exorbitant salaries.

Many of the expected changes in the volunteer community will grow directly from these larger trends. Inflation will surely reduce agency budgets, deplete staff resources and increase the demand for public service employees and/or volunteers. Increased competition for scarce dollars and volunteers may exacerbate efforts at collaboration. Volunteers may find a "sellers' market" and be in a better position to demand expense reimbursement, support services and meaningful participation in planning and resource allocation. Hopefully there will be continued progress toward recognizing the mutuality of the helping relationship, to service volunteer moving to advocacy activities and in the growing legitimacy of such so-called "non-traditional" volunteering as self-help and neighborhood organization.

For corporations, the future may well be a continuous state of siege as they are trapped in the chaos of inflation, depleted energy resources, worker demands, government regulations, consumer revolt and community expectations. Already there are pressures to move away from stringent environmental standards and affirmative action programs in favor of "productivity" and the "reindustrialization of America." Corporate social responsibility may be seen, alternatively, as a needless luxury or as a palliative against public criticism. Workers may be caught in a similar dilemma. Concerned with job security in a highly competitive labor market, on the one hand, they seem unlikely to sacrifice hard-fought gains in safety, income and personal development, on the other.

Where will employee volunteering stand in this world of conflicting needs and values? Perhaps it is better to wonder about the future of the very idea of volunteering and citizen involvement in the 1980's. We have survived the media-declared "Me Decade" but it is by no means certain that privatism has been replaced by a new commitment to involvement. Some will argue persuasively that the creation of an alternative economic system and the transition to reliance on renewable energy services will bring greater interdependence and a recognition of citizen responsibility. But that time is far off and there will undoubtedly be our own version of the "dark ages" to live through. Many will continue

to volunteer certainly. But will the primary values of volunteering -- caring, problem-solving and empowerment -- be dominant during this period?

IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE VOLUNTEER PROGRAMS

Mindful of the dangers of predicting, it is nonetheless tempting to attempt to identify some of the implications of these potential changes. There is no doubt that the "bottom line" of corporate volunteering has yet to be realized. They may wither and die, especially if there are major dislocations in the economy. Or, they may emerge in the vanguard of change in corporate lifestyles and in full institutionalization of the values and ethical practices inherent in the concept of corporate social responsibility. Some potential future roles and challenges for these programs are explored below.

First, the volunteer community will increasingly view corporations as a primary resource. Certainly there will be growing demands for more corporate volunteers and concurrent demands for greater financial support. Also, there will undoubtedly be efforts to draw corporate volunteer coordinators into a closer relationship with the organizations and structures of the broader volunteer community. While this may offer the opportunity for greater collaboration, it may also lend to domination of these structures by those who control the resources, in this case, the corporate coordinator.

Second, the value of employee volunteer programs to the company may increase. As public concern about corporate practice grows, management may look more and more to the "good news" represented by community service activities. The involvement of employees in the community may become one mechanism to educate the public to the interests and needs of the corporation.

Volunteering may also be a means for easing transitions within the company, either offering the opportunity to learn and practice new skills or as a route into retirement. For some companies, retired workers may return as volunteers to help with public outreach, as they now do at American Airlines in Los Angeles, or to aid in training younger workers, as is done in the People's Republic of China.

Third, there will be increasing temptation to

mobilize corporate employees around corporate "causes." Already some corporate political action committees are emphasizing personal involvement as well as financial contributions. In others, employees play a major role in public education as speakers. One may argue whether or not such activities fit into a taxonomy of volunteering. Such questions, interesting as they may be, may fail to capture the attention of embattled management seeking to respond to external pressures.

Fourth, there is the potential for a broad array of new volunteer opportunities, independent of community agencies, which can serve the corporation's institutional and human interests. For example, employee volunteers might provide crisis intervention, counseling or educational services for other employees and their families. Volunteers might also organize employee self-help groups or even employee cooperatives. There may be opportunities as well to mobilize the energies of employees' families. Employees might also be mobilized around the corporation's area of specialty: energy, transportation or nutrition, for example.

Fifth, there will be increased demand to evaluate and justify corporate volunteer programs. There is already some evidence that corporations are tightening their community affairs belts. No matter what some of us may wish to believe, the primary missions of the corporation are products or services and profit. Even the most enlightened executive may have difficulty maintaining programs with poorly articulated or nonexistent goals, few measurable objectives and little apparent relation to those primary missions. This is not to say that the justification cannot be developed. Employee volunteering does have demonstrable benefits to the corporation, the employees and the community. Corporate public affairs staff increasingly must become advocates for the programs, collecting the data and setting the goals so necessary to building support. Parenthetically, it should be noted that this advocacy may be difficult because staff in such positions seem to be relatively short-term, using the volunteer program as a brief stopping-point in their careers. Thus they may have a short, albeit strong, commitment to building and defending effective programs.

Sixth, there will be increased pressure to create programs that are available to all employees, not just executives, management and office workers. This will

necessitate the spreading of programs from home office to production facilities and the adaptation of released time policies for line workers. This latter need may necessitate direct negotiation with organized labor over the role of union members in company-sponsored community service activities.

Seventh, employees may demand corporate support for their participation in "non-traditional" volunteering. This is a natural evolution to expect, based on the common experience of direct service volunteers moving easily into advocacy roles. Corporate volunteer programs thus may be forced out of the protective cocoon of service delivery. At the same time, employees involved in neighborhood, social change or consumer organizations may find themselves as adversaries to the corporation's institutional interests. One would not be surprised if such conflicts were to be resolved in the company's favor.

Finally, there is potential danger in the growing relationship between corporations and volunteer-involving organizations. As currently constructed, corporations are largely suppliers, not consumers, of volunteers. The position of corporate volunteer coordinator is much more closely analogous to that of director of a Voluntary Action Center than to that of coordinator of volunteers in an agency. In this role, corporations and their employees serve, rather than dominate, community needs. As the relationship grows, there is a potential for this balance to shift, for the tail to wag the dog. Such a shift may threaten the independence of community organizations and place inappropriate expectations on corporations.

IMPLICATIONS FOR VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Many voluntary organizations, especially the "traditional" human service agencies, have been eager in recent years to tap corporate resources, both money and volunteers. As noted, this trend is likely to grow as organizations fight inflation, are confronted with growing community needs and must compete for volunteers. Certainly some implications of this trend are positive.

First, corporations are a potential source of both dollars and volunteers. So far there have been only minor breaks in what appears to be the continued growth of employee involvement programs.

Second, a few voluntary organizations may be able to provide technical assistance and training services on a fee basis to corporations in the area of community service and volunteering. It is unlikely, however, that this will form either a large part of the work of a Voluntary Action Center or similar organization or that it will provide secure, continuing revenue.

Third, employee involvement may offer some particularly adept voluntary organizations the opportunity to "infiltrate" corporations, educating workers about community needs and alternative forms of problem-solving or service delivery. Unfortunately, as noted below, those opportunities may be most available to the large, well-established organizations and not to new, emerging groups.

Fourth, active involvement with a corporation may offer a source of prestige in the community, alleviating the feelings of powerlessness that agency staff and volunteers may have. Working closely with corporate coordinators and employee volunteers can give an illusion of status to beleagured workers and elevate their organization in their own eyes.

To date, most voluntary organizations have focused exclusively on these obvious potential benefits. It is equally important to give attention to possible negative implications. There are at least three.

First, there is the danger that voluntary organizations will give in to the tendency to create and maintain programs for which human and financial resources are readily apparent. Certainly in the 1960's, the "golden age" of student volunteering, many human service agencies undertook some programs simply because there were student volunteers available and willing to staff them, not because those programs were most needed or most effective. May not the same thing happen with corporate volunteers? How many organizations will risk losing the resource by insisting on full control over the activities undertaken? Isn't it easier to accept a "paint-up, fix-up" campaign in hopes that it will lead to the resources that are really needed, rather than insist from the outset on what is most appropriate and, in so doing, risk losing everything?

Second, there is the danger of being in awe of corporate talent and abrogating leadership to those who may be ill-prepared to handle it. Corporate

management techniques, business and personnel procedures and productivity measures may not be appropriate for some voluntary organizations. Skills in widgets may not be helpful in accounting for volunteers. Similarly, staff and board members may misperceive the role of the corporate executive volunteer, assuming a primary loyalty to the organization's interest when it in fact may remain with the corporation's. The time may arrive that instead of the executive volunteer choosing between company and organization, the organization will sub-consciously be choosing between its own cause, interests or consumers and the continued involvement of that volunteer.

Third, voluntary organizations may become overly dependent on corporate resources and, ultimately, be co-opted by the corporation. What is the position of a health care organization that discovers that the ill-nesses it is treating are the result of pollution by the same corporation that provides volunteers, in-kind services and cash contributions to support the agency's work? Will organizations retain their commitment to the needs of their consumers or will they bend to the institutional interests of their corporate supporters? Let us hasten to add that these problems are by no means exclusive to the relationship with corporations. More and more, it is recognized that reliance on any primary means of support -- government, foundation, corporate or individual gifts -- carry hidden costs, unspoken obli-gations and a loss of independence.

THE PROBLEM

Voluntary organizations point with great pride to their independence and to their ability to innovate and experiment. In the past year such leaders as John Gardner have pointed with alarm to the potential for shifting those attributes through an over dependence on federal funding and the bureaucratic requirements and regulations that seem invariably to accompany those dollars. Such concerns are valid and must be addressed. But they are rooted to too great an extent in the belief that the future vitality of our society rests primarily on redressing the perceived imbalance between govern-ment and the private sector.

There is another imbalance, potentially as great and as harmful. That is the growth of corporate power and influence. An increasing number of observers and critics are calling attention to what they see as the

inherent weaknesses in our current economic system. Similarly, consumer and citizen action groups are devoting increased energy to identifying and combatting those weaknesses. Without judging these views or efforts, it is fair to believe that the battle over the most appropriate economic system for the future has yet to be joined. That battle will be as important and as draining on our intellectual, financial and political resources as that with the government.

Voluntary organizations may share some of the values, goals and practices of both government and corporations but they are neither. They are independent, largely autonomous alternative to the other sectors. To a limited extent, they may be arbiters between the other two. But most importantly, they are the primary mechanisms through which citizens get involved in the life of their communities. That involvement can empower citizens, can solve pressing community problems, can build a sense of interdependence and mutual responsibility. That involvement is the surest balance against domination by the government, business or any other force that seeks to subvert the public interest to its own ends.

Is this to say that corporate volunteer programs are inappropriate? That voluntary organizations should not seek corporate support or involvement? Of course not. To do so would be to deny the reality of the potential needs-resources match of corporations and voluntary organizations. Worse, it would deny the possibility that voluntary organizations can influence the values and behavior of individual workers and of the corporation.

Rather, we pose here the dilemma that faces us all, the recognition of the contradictions of life and of the unintended negative consequences of what we are attuned to proclaim as progress. The issue of the relationship between corporations and voluntary organizations first must be recognized as an issue by both sides of the partnership. There must be a willingness to discuss it openly and to build into the partnership safeguards to offset the potential harm. For corporations, this will mean seeking to develop a new sensitivity to and respect for the needs, rights and independence of voluntary organizations. In turn, the organizations must seek to broaden the base of their financial and voluntary support, clearly articulate

their values and goals, reaffirm their primary commitment to the needs of their consumers. But most importantly, they must simply understand that, in this case, the price of their independence may actually be eternal vigilance.

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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH VOLUNTEERISM-- ITS APPROPRIATENESS AND EFFICACY: A REPLY TO ALLEN*

Richard E. Wokutch
Alex F. De Noble

Allen's paper raises a number of important points concerning the appropriateness and efficacy of corporations discharging their social responsibilities through undertaking or supporting volunteer activities. It seems however to the authors of this paper that unwarranted optimism is expressed in Allen's paper about the potential extent and effectiveness of corporate volunteerism. Developing this view, this paper attempts to: (1) clarify the notion of corporate social responsibility by considering some of the various definitions of and viewpoints on this concept; (2) consider whether, given a corporate goal of being socially responsible, volunteer programs are the most appropriate mechanisms to discharge this responsibility; and (3) suggest some approaches for more effective implementation of volunteer programs, given a corporate commitment to such programs. It is particularly important that these issues be examined at this time since the Reagan administration has coupled its reductions in funding for social services with a call for increased personal and corporate volunteerism.

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Corporate social responsibility is one of the most overused and misunderstood terms around today. Depending upon one's values and assumptions about the nature of the economic system, "corporate social responsibility" can be view as anything from profit maximization by business within the "rules of the game" (Friedman, 1970) to a cynical attempt by the capitalist class to maintain a basically unjust economic and political system (Marxist view described in Perrow, 1972). A more typical definition of the term is the obligation of decision-makers "to take actions which protect and improve the welfare of society as a whole along with their own interests" (Davis and Blomstrom, 1975). Most definitions of the term stress two points: (1) the general harmony of interests of the corporation

*A previous version of this paper appeared in Volunteer Administration, Summer 1981.

and society and (2) the occasional disharmony of these interests.

The harmony of interests argument is advanced by all but the Marxists. Conservatives such as Friedman would say that the firm is acting in a socially responsible way, when motivated purely by the pursuit of profit, it efficiently produces those goods and services desired by people. Others with a more mainstream view of corporate social responsibility stress the notions of "enlightened self-interest" or "long run profit maximization" to explain the harmony of interests between society and business (Davis, Frederick, and Blomstrom, 1980; Steiner and Steiner, 1980). They argue that in addition to the efficient production of goods and services, firms should (and often do) undertake certain activities pertaining to product or workplace safety, pollution control, equal employment opportunity, and various volunteer activities because it is in the long run best interest of the firm to do so. It is asserted that such activities benefit the company by enhancing the corporate image (perhaps leading to increased sales), by improving employee morale and productivity through eliminating unnecessary costs (e.g. accident prevention), and by contributing to a better economic and social environment for the firm to operate in. It is further argued that if business does not voluntarily undertake certain of these activities, they may be forced by the government to do so in a more restrictive and costly way.

Many however would argue that the interests of society and the interests of corporations will occasionally diverge. We've all heard the assertion that what is good for General Motors is good for America; but concern in recent years about so-called "obscene profits" of oil companies suggests that many people do not think this applies to Exxon, Mobil, and Texaco. Even among those who feel that corporations should act in a socially responsible manner, few believe that firms will undertake significant and costly activities (e.g. limiting pollution) unless there is an economic incentive or legal requirement to do so. This is partially explained by economists' notion of the free-rider problem. This holds that while it might be in the interest of society or of the entire business community to provide some public benefit or to eliminate some social problem, it will usually be most advantageous for any one individual or firm to let others bear the costs of accomplishing this and still derive

the benefits (i.e. be a free-rider). This of course explains why the Internal Revenue Service does more than request voluntary contributions to fund public goods like national defense, roads, and parks.

Another way of looking at the corporate social responsibility issue can be depicted through the three concentric circles shown in Figure 1. The innermost circle refers to the efficient production of goods and services. Performance on this dimension would essentially correspond to Friedman's notion of corporate social responsibility. The second circle refers to social/ethical problems that arise from the basic production activities. These would include issues like product and worker safety, pollution, discrimination,



Figure 1

truth in advertising, and so on. Friedman (1970) suggests that firms will and should be concerned with alleviating these problems only to the degree that it is profitable to the firm, otherwise the corporate managers are overstepping their authority and using stockholder's money to do something stockholders do not necessarily want. Traditional social responsibility advocates would probably argue that there are more activities on this level that contribute to a firm's (enlightened) self-interest than would Friedman; but when there is no economic or legal incentive for such activities, they would be equally skeptical that these activities would be undertaken (irrespective of whether or not they think they should be).

The third level of social responsibility activities is concerned with corporate assistance in the solution of general social problems. Most corporate volunteer programs would be grouped into this social responsibility category. Our expectation of a low level of corporate involvement in volunteer activities stems from a belief that there is less likelihood of activities in this dimension being profitable or being required by law. The free-rider problem is also particularly significant on this dimension. Without some mechanism for ensuring cooperation by other firms, the costs of a given firm's efforts to alleviate general social problems will probably exceed the benefits it derives.

Even social activists appear to be less concerned with activities on this dimension than those on the second level. In a study of "ethical investment" activities of religious groups conducted by one of the authors (Wokutch, 1980), respondents were asked to rate the importance to them of corporate performance on a variety of social dimensions as well as an economic dimension. Of the ten dimensions listed, philanthropic activities ranked last.[1] Volunteer programs were not listed separately but only 1 of 106 respondents specified these in the space provided for "other dimensions."

The low priority given to corporate volunteer programs can be explained by a dichotomous view of moral obligations in general and corporate social responsibility in particular: (1) the responsibility to avoid harming society or individuals, and (2) the responsibility to aid society or individuals. In general most people feel that it is more important to avoid doing harm than it is to do good. For whatever reason we

feel it is much worse to kill or murder someone than it is to fail to help him/her from starving to death.[2] While most would agree that the efficient production of goods and services is indeed beneficial, there is little pressure for corporations to go beyond this in satisfying (2).

Because of the above arguments, it is the opinion of the authors that corporate support of volunteer programs will remain (and rightly so) only a secondary social responsibility concern. However, as noted above it is clear that there are some benefits which accrue to the company as well as the employees from participation in these programs. Because of that, volunteer programs will continue although they may never exceed their current modest level of activity. In recognition of these conditions we will address ourselves to the issues of (1) how volunteer agencies might encourage further corporate participation in volunteer activities; and (2) how the effectiveness of these volunteer activities might be increased by the introduction of strategic and operational management techniques.

THE MANAGEMENT OF CORPORATE VOLUNTEER PROGRAMS

Allen has noted various problems in the management of corporate volunteer programs which provide further evidence of the weak corporate commitment to these programs. These problems include lack of full-time staff, poor or non-existent record-keeping, and vague goals and evaluation criteria. It is ironic that the management expertise volunteer agencies often seek from businesses is so evidently lacking in these corporate volunteer programs. As Allen points out, if a corporation conducted its other activities with similar disregard for standard management practices, it would not be in business very long.

It only makes good business sense for a company to get something usable and of comparable value in return for the price they must pay. This is the essence of any economic transaction. A volunteer program may cost a given company a great deal in terms of time and resources devoted to the project. If management allows these resources to be used inefficiently, then it is not acting in the best interests of any of its stakeholders, i.e., the stockholders who forego the profits that could have either been reinvested in the business or distributed to them as dividends, the employees who may be deprived of wage increases and the customers who

will eventually have to pay for this inefficiency through higher prices. A poorly managed program may also provide only marginal benefits to the general public and the participating employees.

At this point, it should be noted that it is entirely possible that the sole aim of some of these programs may simply be to generate public relations benefits. In this light then an effective program is not essential, but only one that is highly visible and shows that the company is a good corporate citizen. The authors uncovered some evidence of "P.R. hype" in an impromptu survey of some companies with volunteer programs that had received attention in the media. In one instance, it was learned that a company rescue squad program that had been cited in several publications involved only one individual who was permitted to answer rescue calls during some working hours one day a week. When the company agreed to let him have this time off from work, this was publicized as the company's volunteer program.

While the above is perhaps an extreme situation, it is reasonable to assume that other companies also look for ways to maximize their return while minimizing their investment. It may be that corporate executives reason that volunteer activities above a certain de facto industry norm will not produce any additional benefits. Allen et al (1980) cite the figure of 1% of before-tax profits contributed to philanthropic causes as the point beyond which corporations appear to resist moving. (Corporations have been able to deduct from their federal taxes up to 5% of their before-tax profits as philanthropic contributions. This limit was recently raised to 10%; but given past contribution patterns, the effect of this is dubious.)

Still even the current level of corporate support is crucial to the volunteer agencies/programs which receive this assistance. Thus it seems incumbent upon such parties to ensure that whatever current incentives there are for corporate participation in volunteer activities are recognized; and that incentives for participation over and above industry norms be developed. Efforts such as the Phillips Foundation's awards for outstanding corporate social performance (Phillips, 1980) and the publication of the book, Volunteers From the Workplace (Allen, et al., 1980),

can provide national recognition to firms which are truly deserving. Community voluntary action centers can likewise provide such recognition on a local level. By the same token, corporate involvement below this norm could also be identified. Certainly this would need to be done with great care to avoid any legal entanglements. The safest approach undoubtedly would be to simply not include such corporations in lists of "award nominees" or "corporate benefactors."

Other professed corporate benefits should also be documented and, where possible, enhanced by volunteer agencies receiving corporate support. For example, some evidence of the frequently-cited volunteer motivational benefit should be provided. Also, the volunteer agencies could work with corporations to demonstrate that volunteers gaining experience in dealing with alcoholism, drug abuse, mental health problems, etc. can be utilized to assist other employees with these problems and thereby increase company productivity.

Let us assume that sufficient incentives exist such that it would be in the interest of the corporation to develop an effective volunteer program. In such a situation the success of this effort will be dependent on management's evident commitment to the program and its utilization of those strategic and operational management techniques which have proven so successful in their traditional business activities (Blake, 1974; Wortman, 1980). Figure 2 is a simplistic model of corporate strategy formulation and implementation consisting of goals, structure, performance, and information feedback. Following are the steps necessary for adapting it to a corporate volunteer program:

1. SPECIFY THE COMPANY'S GOALS FOR THE PROGRAM. The importance of goal setting in business is exemplified by the business axiom that "if you don't know where you're going any road will get you there." This appears to be particularly applicable to corporate volunteer programs. Included in any goal statement should be a rationale explaining how and why this program fits in with the overall mission of the company. A statement of what management feels is the social responsibility of the firm would also be useful in the planning and implementation of volunteer programs as well as other social programs. In addition to setting overall program goals, specific measurable objectives should be set. Depending on the nature of the program

FIGURE 2

SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF STRATEGIC PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT OF CORPORATE VOLUNTEER PROGRAMS



these could be specified in terms of number of projects undertaken, levels of satisfaction of affected parties, or other suitable measures on both input and output dimensions. The setting of goals and objectives for the voluntary program should be part of an overall strategic planning process which is supported by steps number 2 and 3.

2. DEVELOP AN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE RESPONSIBLE FOR SEEKING THE GOALS. It is important that individual responsibility be designated and that an incentive system be developed to encourage effective participation. With volunteer programs which are typically small, decisions must be made on whether to utilize a full-time or part-time coordinator. With the latter option, the individual should be clear how important this assignment is in his/her overall evaluation so that he/she can devote an appropriate amount of time and effort.

3. DEVELOP A MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM. This would provide information in the following categories which would be used as feedback for the management of the program:

Program operating data.

This would consist of company inputs and program outputs. All direct and indirect (e.g. overhead) expenses should be accounted for in a budget. Employees who are only participating on a part-time basis should have appropriate percentages of their salaries budgeted in. Outputs should be measured on the goal dimensions previously set. This operating data together with a goal analysis would essentially constitute a social process audit (Bauer and Fenn, 1973; Blake, et al., 1976). This operating information is necessary to compare performance with goals and to utilize the incentive system suggested above.

Environmental information.

To determine the most appropriate use of corporate volunteer resources, an environmental information system should be developed and maintained consisting of scanning, forecasting, interpreting, and integrating external environmental information for use in the strategic planning process (Verdu and Wokutch, 1979). This function could, for example, identify and predict the most important and cost-effective needs to which

corporate volunteer resources should be devoted; as well as the particular program(s) to which they should be directed.

Program image information.

If indeed the primary goal of volunteer programs is an enhanced corporate image, the corporation should measure the public's perception of the program. It is possible that a poorly run program might actually do more harm than good for a corporate image. In such a case a decision would need to be made whether to modify or to disband the program.

Information on the same or similar dimensions will be needed by management to fulfill its traditional strategic planning/management function (Fahey and King, 1977) so collecting this information would not likely require a significant resource expenditure. Ideally, however, for this information to be integrated into the strategic management/planning process of the volunteer program, personnel from that program should participate in the implementation of the environmental information system (King and Cleland, 1978).

SUMMARY

In this paper, we have argued that corporate support of volunteer programs and agencies is not the most important social responsibility of the firm. However, recognizing that these activities are extremely important to the programs and agencies receiving this assistance and that benefits accrue to other involved parties as well, we have suggested several approaches to enhance the effectiveness of such programs. These basically consist of: (1) the volunteer agencies which receive such support taking a more active role in rationing and indeed enhancing the public relations benefits to the truly deserving corporations; (2) the volunteer agencies documenting other alleged corporate benefits of these programs; and (3) the involved corporations utilizing their traditional operational and strategic management techniques which have proven successful in the past.

Notes

1. In order, these dimensions were ranked: (1) economic return, (2) equal employment opportunity, (3) operations in countries with repressive governments, (4) fair labor relations and bargaining, (5) non-involvement in munitions manufacturing, (6) the value of the product or service to society, (7) pollution control, (8) consumer issues, (9) employee safety, and (10) philanthropic activities.

2. We owe this example to Thomas Carson, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

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PART II

PROFESSIONALIZATION, BUREAUCRACY, AND VOLUNTEERISM

PROFESSIONALIZATION OF VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS AS A "PROBLEM" IN THE THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION*

Orion F. White, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

One of the paradoxical qualities of the contemporary social world is the prevalence of both large hierarchial organizations and professionalism. On the one hand this pattern seems plausible enough, in that professionalization seems to go hand in hand with the development of the technical knowledge that characterizes rational bureaucratic societies. (Vollmer and Mills, 1966). On the other hand, however, it has just as frequently been pointed out that the very concept of professionalization stands in logical contradiction to the structure of bureaucratic organizations.

The hallmarks of professionalization are expertise, personal objectivity, and the independent exercise of authority. As such the professional is both at home in bureaucratic organizations and at odds with them. The expertise and personal detachment of the professional are congruent with bureaucratic style. Also, bureaucracies tend toward imposing adjustment on clients such that a more or less homogeneous and stable social order is brought about. Neal Cheek (1967) has pointed out that professionals also wish this.

Hence there are important ways in which professionalism is compatible to the bureaucratic form of organization; where they stand at odds with each other is on the critical issue of authority. Just as the professional is seen as essentially independent of the client, so is he or she to be independent of hierarchial or line supervision. In a word, the very idea of professionalism is logically inconsistent with the concept of hierarchial authority that epitomizes bureaucracy.

*A paper prepared for presentation at the Conference on Philosophical Issues in Voluntary Action, November 14-15, 1980, sponsored by the Department of Political Science, Center for Volunteer Development, Virginia Tech and Virginia Foundation for Humanities and Public Policy, Donaldson Brown Center for Continuing Education, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia 24061.

This contradiction in the theory of bureaucracy goes back to Weber's ideal type, and while it has been remarked upon to the point of becoming a cliché, it has not been resolved either in theory or practice. The idea of a politics administration dichotomy, were that idea workable, would resolve the issue, of course. The fact that the "dichotomy" is universally rejected (as a conceptual illusion) yet continues to serve as a major guide to and rationale for our actual administrative behavior in the government, and that we take this state of affairs for granted, is a strong sign that we have about given up on the issue as theoretical problem.

The rise of voluntarist, "third sector" organizational forms provides insight and hope for this issue at both the theoretical and practical levels. At the practical level, it seems that voluntarist forms of organization, which typically are more mission and less authority oriented than bureaucracies, provide a place for experimentation with structures and processes that might resolve the question of how effectively to organize professionals. From such experiences, we might then be able to reconceptualize both our notions of professionalism and the bureaucratic form. It seems clear that our bureaucratic institutions are having difficulty coping with the complexity and change, increasing scarcity, and disillusionment arising from widespread perception of public program failure. (Jun and Storm, 1973). Some have argued it is exactly these conditions that account for the rising interest in voluntary forms of social action and organization. Specifically, we might hope that voluntary forms of organization can provide the opportunity to learn new ways of applying the professional's expert knowledge to social problems.

The reality of the matter, however, seems more to be that it is just as difficult to fit professionals into the work process effectively in voluntary organizations as it is in large, institutionalized bureaucratic settings. The compatibility of the more "open," lateral, or non-authoritative setting of the voluntary organization only apparently provides a happier home for the hierarchy shy professional.

The main objective of this essay is to address this issue and suggest a starting place for moving beyond it. I will begin by describing a specific problem in achieving a compatible relationship between profes-

sionals and volunteers in third sector organizations. I take the position that the problem of professionalism in voluntary organizations goes back to the generic matter of the philosophy on which we currently base social action. There has been movement recently toward development of a new philosophy of action, and I review this progress. The main thrust of the paper, however, will be toward reorienting our understanding of how social change occurs and recentering this understanding such that human action can be seen in a rather different light. The center of the theory of action proposed here will be on the matter of how energy for action is evoked at the level of the individual, including how social structures and processes operate at this level.

THE PROBLEM: "PROBLEMS"

The problem of professionalism in the voluntary organization is primarily one of how to maintain an operative system of control, communication and coordination. Reduced to its barest terms we can understand the problem with the scheme presented in Diagram 1.

What the diagram is intended to depict is that the "third sector organization" (here for the sake of convenience meant to designate those organizations that are not-for-profit and are staffed by both full time professionals and part time volunteers--a rape crisis center is a typical example) are characterized by a dual and ambivalent goal commitment. On the one hand, there is the commitment to define and pursue goals in the manner dictated by the current "state of the art expertise" in the policy area of the organization. On the other hand, there is a stronger than usual mission orientation in the organization--a commitment to define and pursue goals in the manner dictated by the ideology that currently prevails in the policy area in which the organization operates. These goal commitments are complementary--at least ostensibly--in that professionalism draws inspiration from social commitment and social commitment finds expression in the rational, expert pursuit of solutions to social problems.

This dual orientation is manifest in an organizational design that is somewhat less formal and more participatory than traditional organizations. While

DIAGRAM ONE



Dynamics of Dissonance in Line of Control of Voluntary Organizations

the participatory view deemphasizes structure and tends to create some role ambiguity, this is mitigated by the provision for having professional staff in management positions and responsible for day-to-day operations.

Such a design, in turn, creates a bifurcating emphasis in the channels of control and communication in the organization. This problem shows most visibly in key matters of organizational integrity such as work load and finances. Volunteer or even professional workers who tend toward zealous goal commitments will respond to those cues in the organization that legitimate and direct their energies toward more ideological, client centered lines of action, while those who are more task oriented will key their behavior to those signals that tend to distance them from clients and that ensure the long run survival chances of the organization--especially in the areas of controlling work load and financial solvency.

As this occurs, the staff will tend to go in different directions, then at some point cross and conflict. Typically the first sign of conflict will be between professional staff managers and volunteers or zealous professional staff subordinates. When conflict situations multiply and dissonance in the organization spreads, appeals will go out from the lower levels of the organization to those at the top--where the two differing goal commitments are usually represented. These appeals tend to exacerbate the difference in commitment while at the same time driving the real issue--of the dual orientation of the organization--underground. That is, there appears to be no framework for discussing the desirability of the mission orientation in relation to the professional expertise orientation. Both seem desirable and good. The organization's problems therefore are treated rather as an issue of "personality clash" or individual performance--with all the attendant bitterness and blockage that often accompanies management problems defined in this manner.

The question that seems to present itself is how to make volunteers and staff who are mission oriented compatible with volunteers and staff who are more professional oriented. (Typically, this issue divides along volunteer-professional staff lines, though by no means exclusively). How can they be brought to

understand one another better? How can the staff be made more humanistically oriented and the volunteer group more professional or organization minded?

The position taken here is that no headway can be gained on this problem by attempting to answer such questions. Rather, the approach here will be to go back to the matter of how it is that we all agree that zeal for mission and professional expertise are both laudable and desirable. They both seem to be important ingredients of right and effective action, and it seems just as clear that it is insufficient to say simply that the problem is too much of the one or the other. We know that moral orthodoxy and committed action have produced both high acts of human altruism and horrible atrocities. The same can be said of professionalism--while its evils are objectively administered, they are nonetheless as real. Yet at the same time we know that the rise of professionalism has brought about some major social advancements. The question, then, seems not to be what is the proper role of zeal and expertise in action as much as how the paradox arises from the theory of action that underlies it. I take the position that there are intrinsic difficulties in the theory of action we currently employ in operating organizations, and that the issue of how to make professionalism compatible to third sector organizations can be better approached through examining the issue at this level.

The theory of action that currently seems to frame our thinking is what I have called elsewhere the "problem-solution schema." (White, 1973). The core idea of it is that all action arises in response to a problem, a need, a perception that some deficiency exists that must be filled in or remedied. This theory while it carries great plausibility, is beset with serious difficulties both logically and in its ability to describe how people do in fact act.

The logical problem is that the theory contains a paradox of a most puzzling sort. That is, the theory implies that where there is no problem, there will be no need for and will in fact be no action (i.e., no solution). On the other hand, where there is no solution or possibility for action, the tendency must be to conclude that there is no problem. As the aphorism goes, "If there's no solution, it's not a problem." This leads us to the implication that

action probably in fact begins with an idea for "solution"--i.e., something we want to do. Possibilities for action occur to us (such as to fight a war against poverty) and we then construct the problem to which this line of action is a response.

It takes little consideration to see that this conundrum goes back to the fact-value issue that has so much plagued the development of a philosophy of social science in recent decades. The crux of the matter is what "ontological status" we are to accord to problems. A claim for independent, objective existence seems to be inherent in the very idea of problem. When we say we have a problem we imply that we are experiencing directly a condition that must be acted toward or resolved. This action is seen to be caused by problems or external conditions and as such becomes "behavior." The problem-solution theory of action is as prevalent as it is because the empiricist attitude is as prevalent as it is; the one implies or contains the other.

At the other pole are the varieties of anti-empiricism or subjectivism. These generally hold that action arises from the intentions of the actor, intentions which form a "project" or goal and through which the meanings of the line of action are then created by the actor. The view here is that external conditions do not exist objectively in the manner that empiricists claim they do and hence cannot constitute problems that in turn can "cause" human activity.

This picture is, of course, stark and oversimplified. There are many positions within each camp and these positions stand, frequently, in rather tense relation to each other. Nonetheless, taken as wholes, they do constitute two internally congruous and conflicting camps of thought about how activity occurs. (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). This essay states a position that responds to this debate but goes beyond it.

The Underlying Continuity of the Positions.--If we look at the issues of the philosophy of social science as constituting the issues that are entailed in a theory of action, we can gain a number of valuable insights into the problem of understanding it. For one, we can see that the idea of goal occupies a similar position in both schools of thought. That is, while empiricists see goals as desired unproblemmatic states, and while the subjectivists see goals as the

point of orientation for subjectively formulated projects, both see human activity as aimed at abstractly conceptualized future states.

In sum, the idea of action as oriented toward goals is essential to both perspectives, and the differences between the two are rather superficial on this point. While goals to empiricists are "given" by the necessities of dealing with an objective reality, goals to the subjectivists are created by the intending actor. What both perspectives share is the notion that goals, insofar as they specify a set of conditions to be realized in the future, are real or at least refer to an external reality, either subjectively, intersubjectively or objectively formulated. The idea of goals as specifiable future states is the generally prevalent one in our culture. Nonetheless, there is a conceptual trap implicit in the idea of goals as thus stated. What the idea of goals construed in this way means for a theory of action is that action will always seem reactive, difficult, or, in short, as striving. In this light action itself becomes oppressive, and this is an unacceptable condition for a theory of human action, for reasons that will be specified shortly.

If we consider that the underlying orientation for all action is the matter of bringing about human emancipation, we can then see that one requirement of an adequate theory of action is that it must show action as liberating in itself, a conclusion that denies the legitimacy of the idea of "goal." That is, if this is not true, if action is held to be only instrumental to freedom and can thereby bring it about only through instrumentally creating a specified set of conditions, then it seems implied that liberation is a condition of non-action, where, since there are no problems or goals, there is nothing to do. Hence to act would be to oppress oneself--since all we need to be free is to do nothing.

The Underlying Concern with Emancipation.--Why is it legitimate, though, to see all action as involving the issue of realizing human freedom? To answer this, let us note that the long and continuing debate over what is a proper philosophy for social science has carried a dual emphasis. One emphasis has been on the obvious problem of what ontological status can be accorded the social world and hence what statements about it can be given the status of scientific knowledge or truth. At the same time, however, this

dialogue has been seen to carry direct and important implications for the issue of human freedom. How we philosophically define social reality substantially defines the relations of individuals with it. Hence, the role of social scientists in the regulation or liberation of people is set by how we answer the questions of the philosophy of social science. So, for example, some social scientists reacted to functionalism (in spite of the fact that many regarded it as an excellent conceptual framework) as an oppressive paradigm that emphasized order and control over social conflict and individual freedom. Hence, many have sought other paradigms, ones that would show social reality in a light that allowed for more human freedom and that showed social scientists as helping the project of realizing this freedom.

This duality of concern has become most vivid in the recent attempts to find in the work of the critical theorist Jurgen Habermas both an approach to social issues (of human oppression) as well as a frame of reference for social science work. The undisclosed premise in this debate seems to be that the essence of what is human is the capability for original, creative, or free action and hence any philosophy of social science that does not show the social world in an ontological light that reveals this essentially human capability for free action is inadequate because it will obscure the distinctively human elements of the social world. In addition, the philosophy will tend to produce social science that works against the human principle of freedom because it denies or is unable to see that it exists. As such, it will be inadequate as a philosophy that can guide understanding of the social world through research and it will be reprehensible in moral terms because it works against human freedom.

It seems that to understand the human world we must understand freedom and by understanding it further it. Thus we return to the implication noted in the preceding section: an adequate theory of human action must be one that shows action as affirmative, emancipatory, fructifying, in itself. It seems a rather large but nonetheless binding conclusion that an adequate theory of human action, therefore, simply cannot include instrumental activity as human action properly construed. Human action as opposed to behavior must be free and hence unbound by a controlling objective purpose. There are no good ends and

bad ends, only freedom used well and freedom used badly.

This seems to be where the discourse is carrying us. If we are to be concerned with human freedom, we must find a way of conceptualizing action as intrinsically emancipatory, not as emancipatory only through the bringing about of abstractly conceived conditions at some time in the future. To settle for anything less is to resign ourselves to a Sisyphian, carrot and stick image of human life, where to be alive means to struggle against oppression, since without our oppression there would be nothing to do (and we would be dead). Hence we return to the starting point. The problem with the present theory of action is that it begins from the idea of "problem" or its twin, "solution," and orients us to see our actions only as the means for reaching goals.

When we review the development of thinking on this issue, which can be summarized as beginning with various forms of social science empiricism, then proceeding to the essentially phenomenological reactions to empiricism, carrying us now to the contemporary concern with critical theory and its interest in emancipation, we can see that the dialogue has proceeded to just short of this sort of position. (Bernstein, 1971, 1976). We have gone from the empiricist position (that understanding and freedom are to be gained from apprehension of the causal laws that govern the operation of the objective world so that we can "use" these laws) to the view that understanding and freedom are to be gained by taking the viewpoint of the intentional human actor in the social process, to the view, with Habermas, that understanding and freedom are found in micro processes of communication. (Habermas, 1970). Still, though, we are casting the dialogue in the terms of the goal of overcoming or removing something--at this point it is the factors that distort communication processes. (Indeed, this slant in the work of Haberman seems inevitable given his reliance on Freud as the inspiration for his method of emancipation). The next step, one that seems strongly implied by our dissatisfactions with the current state of the dialogue, is to move to a teleological view of emancipation that finds realization of the human design potential in each act of the person--a view that is affirmative rather than reactive. By moving in this direction, toward a

theory of action based on enthusiasm rather than the aggression that attends the idea of attacking problems, we can find potential for reducing the conflicting ideological zeal of the volunteer and the technical zeal of the professional.

SOME CONCEPTUAL SHIFTS ENTAILED BY THE REVISED THEORY OF ACTION

Taking the conceptual step suggested above entails an important reorientation of our perspective on human action. We can identify here at least three of the conceptual shifts that must be made if we are to move beyond the traditional reactive approach to action.

Seeing the Focus of Action as Within the Individual.--The primary one of these shifts is moving the focus of our attention in understanding the process of human action away from what we now consider to be the social world and the physical world to the intrapsychic world of the individual. This means taking as our issue how energy for action is evoked inside the human person. (Ingalls, 1976; McSwain, 1980). In this perspective the basic paradigm of human action rests on the idea that all action depends on the transfer of energy from its reservoir in the unconscious mind over to channels of activity that are under the direction of the conscious mind.

A good deal is known about this process from our studies in analytical psychology, and these findings and insights help us understand more clearly some of the ambiguities of the traditional view of action as stemming either from physical necessity or socially created meanings. (Whitmont, 1969). Drawing from analytical psychology we can construct this picture of the psyche: the preeminent factor in determining whether energy flows effectively from the unconscious into activity is the relationship of the conscious attitude toward the unconscious. A proper relationship, one that facilitates this flow, is one that is reflexive--in somewhat the sense that Schutz used this term. Here we go beyond Schutz by grounding social actors in the reality of the unconscious rather than in social reality. (Schutz, 1967). This is a relationship where the conscious attitude maintains some distance from the unconscious but nonetheless continuously acknowledges it and attends to its con-

tents in conscious ways. Doing this means that the conscious attitude must avoid (1) over-asserting itself and dominating the unconscious, (2) ignoring it, (3) attempting to deny its existence or importance, or (4) becoming too closely involved with it and thus having it dictate actions directly--without conscious mediation. This sort of relationship requires that the conscious attitude, which is contained in the ego, be well developed and strong. Such development is gained through the process of relating to the unconscious, which is to say, the process of living and doing. (Edinger, 1973). By living and doing reflexively, that is, by continuously reflecting about our actions and seeing how we are encountering ourselves, our own unconscious and the collective of which it is a part, we see that as we shape our environment through action and are shaped by it we assimilate energy from the unconscious and thereby develop greater capacity for an effective and proper conscious attitude. Hence, consciousness tends to build on itself.

A central point in understanding this process of energy flow is that the conscious attitude must become comfortable with the fact that it cannot know the contents of the unconscious in its own terms--that is, in the terms of consciousness. In fact, the demand to specify exactly what is the unconscious and what are its contents is itself an act of hubris which if carried too far can have destructive consequences. The way we do encounter the unconscious, given that we do not know it explicitly, is through symbols, or more specifically, the analogues that attend symbols. That is, the energy flow through individuals is governed in large part by the availability of external physical analogues to the patterns of energy that exist in the unconscious. (Progoff, 1953). These analogues, which are constituted by literally everything that exists outside the person, can be either appropriate or inappropriate: they can attract the energy in just the right way, they can block it completely, or they can draw it out too strongly. What we commonly consider to be "problems" at both the individual and the social level are events that result from the absence or eruption of unconscious energy in the affairs of conscious life.

The most important implication of taking this focus for our understanding of action is that it takes our attention away from the matter of what conditions

ought to be brought about in order to facilitate action or the flow of energy (or to refer to our earlier discussion, emancipation). While it is true that symbolic analogues can be appropriate or inappropriate, consciousness can never understand exactly how to make them appropriate--i.e., how to reshape external conditions so as to evoke energy. This can only be done through the process of reflexive action--i.e., by continuing responsible action which allows appropriate symbols and their analogues to appear. The responsibility of consciousness is to maintain an attitude of openness sufficient to achieve the reflexivity required for symbols to appear and then to acknowledge or recognize such symbols. What it cannot do, indeed, what it seems is irresponsible to attempt, is to design or plan for the creation of external conditions that are appropriate to the unconscious.

This does not mean that we cannot carry on conscious activities such as designing or planning things. What it means rather is that such activities must be carried out in a way that allows for the expression of (thereby creating the potential for the integration of) unconscious material.

Seeing Goals as Nominal.--Building on what we have just described as the general dynamics of the flow of energy in the psyche, we can identify a second important conceptual shift, vis., from seeing goals as designating actual conditions which we desire to bring about at some point in the future to seeing them as having a purely nominal importance. That is, because the unconscious is unknowable, we cannot plan explicitly. What "ought" to be done can only be revealed in the process of doing. However, this does not mean that action is to be aimless and based totally on "feedback" or reflexive processing of feedback. Indeed, action must begin with an inspiration, and goals in this light, as the expression of inspired consciousness, they can play an important role in facilitating action. What we must not do is take them seriously and base our assessment of success or failure on point-in-time assessments of how well we have attained them. To do so is to go too far in the use of the conscious attitude and assume that we can evoke the unconscious through purely rational, instrumental means. If we look at goals as simply labels for what we are doing rather than as direct guides for our actions, they can act as important symbolic analogues for drawing out our energy, which through the process

of reflexivity can be turned in appropriate directions --such that things will go in a way that is pleasing to us.

Seeing the Social as Psychological and the Psychological as Social.--The idea of symbolic analogues requires perhaps the largest of all the conceptual revisions we must make in seeing action in the way being proposed here. It demands, literally, that we see what we now consider to be the realm of the social (people and relations between people) in essentially psychological, indeed intrapsychic, terms. That is, what it indicates is that the person, in regarding the external world, especially the social aspects of the external world, encounters the elements of their personal and the collective unconscious.

This means that in a quite real and profound way the social world is part of each of us. It also means that from the point of view of any given individual's conscious attitude the social world will seem essentially mysterious, in need of development, and not "rational." Social development will never catch up with individual development because social development enhances individual development and vice versa. The position of each relative to the other, however, remains the same. In sum, there is nothing arcane, exotic, or esoteric about the unconscious. It is right there in front of us all the time, as ubiquitous and ordinary in our experience as the air we breathe: it is literally represented in other people, the social world we create and the physical world in which we move.

The implication for a theory of action is straightforward. All the requisites for reflexivity in one's relation to the unconscious at the intrapersonal level hold just as strongly for one's social relations and, indeed, for relations with the physical world. Everything we encounter becomes imbued with the energy of the unconscious by the very act of our regarding it. It is for this reason that the question of emancipation (which here of course means the resolution of unconscious energy into conscious activity) is at question in every act we perform.

The Nature of the Telos in this Theory of Action. It should be fairly clear at this point that what is being constructed here is a process approach to

action, one that seeks to be proactive by rejecting the rationalist concept of goal as a desired, realizable future state. It is essentially a teleological view, one that sees the meaning of action in its contribution to the attainment of a transcendental design. The modern rationalist mentality has tended to shun such perspectives because they seem to leave little possibility for rational action. Rejecting this view, modern man has been drawn instead to the idea that the possibility for action exists in the form of rational designs and instrumental forms of implementation. According to the current sensibility, action is only possible in the pursuit of goals. How then are we to make sense out of a view that rejects the conventional idea of goals and places the essence of action in the act itself? Must not this view turn back to the appeal to teleology as its reference point for meaning in action? Yet does not the teleological perspective tell us that we are caught up in something larger and more powerful than ourselves, such that personal action is not possible or is meaningless?

There is a middle position and it is the one taken here. It can be found in the works of thinkers such as Teilhard de Chardin, who saw the individual life lived well as contributing to the evolution of something collective, larger than, and beyond all of us. (Bugental, 1967). This view shows us that the teleological perspective does not imply that we as individual actors have nothing to do. It says rather that, while we cannot know the grand design, the end, or the purpose of our collective existence as human beings, we still face the responsibility to develop ourselves through our actions and, as we do this, the social world. The idea that action does not hold meaning unless we know precisely where we are headed and what we are accomplishing is simply a (the main) prejudice of the rationalist point of view. Indeed, it is probably more true that meaning is only given us to the extent that we acknowledge that we can never apprehend consciously and explicitly the meaning of our lives or of human existence. The final implication of this point is that the flow of energy through each of us into conscious activity is how the ultimate "end" represents itself to us. Hence to be interested in living, to be enthusiastic (the meaning of which originally is "to be filled with God") in living, is the only point we need pursue. Life goes wrong when our actions become flat and instrumental.

Hence we come to a process concept of telos: interested activity right now is the goal or end toward which we are moving.

AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL "CHANGE"

In addressing ourselves to the matter of how to accommodate professionalism to third sector organizations we are of course speaking of an issue of social change--an issue of major social change, in fact, since professionalism is such a widespread phenomenon in our society. In approaching this matter philosophically through a critique of the present theory of action, we have a paradox if not a contradiction. Is not the position being taken here, because it starts from a complaint about the problem of adapting professionalism to organizations trapped in the same problem that it is attempting to resolve? In other words, is it employing the same theory of action it attempts to criticize and transcend?

In order to untangle this matter, it is necessary to sketch briefly an alternative framework for viewing processes of social change, one that will allow us to locate the effort being made here outside the paradox we have just noted. In order to do this I will set out a perspective on social dynamics, to specify various types of alternations in the social order that can occur, and the levels of social reality at which these can occur.

Three Types of Social Dynamic.--We have witnessed, over the past twenty years, a good deal of confusion about how transitions from one state to another can and do occur in a social order. The counter culture movement of the sixties seems to have faltered seriously because of such confusion, and much effort at radicalism has been misdirected or diffused--as it seems is the case with the women's movement and possibly the whole of the civil rights movement. In these cases there is indication that frequently those who work and hope the strongest for basic, fundamental or significant social progress end up through their efforts bringing about conditions that seem no substantively better than prior conditions.

One major reason for this confusion is that frequently we have based progressive efforts on too

narrow a perspective. We have taken the currently dominant general paradigm for social existence, namely civilization, as the only, or the only desirable, framework for human life. Hence, we have tended not to see that many of the complaints of the various movements for progress are endemic to civilization itself rather than a given society.

The view espoused here is that the general or episodic paradigm (again, currently it is civilization) is the governing framework within which all social dynamics take place. Three such dynamics, or processes of transition, can be identified: social change, social regulation, and social evolution.

The most prevalent and ordinary of these is social change. Examples would be the civil rights movement, the women's movement, the labor union movement, technological innovation, economic development and on and on. Within a given episode social change is the primary constant, because the episodic paradigm contains a core logic which leads to an elaboration of social forms that eventually fulfill it. This core logic is initially represented in certain concrete circumstances and symbols. (In the case of civilization the main circumstances and symbols are urbanization, social control by white males, and proliferation of living designs based on technical knowledge). In fact, however, the core logic exists below these externalities as a mode of consciousness. It seems rather obvious that at this point in history there is a basic way of thinking about life that is reflected in the principles of white male dominance, technician, and urbanization. It is this way of thinking or mode of consciousness that is the primary stake to be furthered through civilization. Social change within civilization in turn, for the most part is simply the elaboration of the more and more nuances of the underlying mode of consciousness. With civilization, this mode of consciousness seems to be one that emphasizes the rational, particularly the abstract thinking capacity of the mind.

Over time we would expect to see, as the mode of consciousness which sets the paradigm of the episode is played out, that issues of social change are only technical matters which are consistently resolved through the homogenization of the elements involved in the issue in the direction indicated by the episodic

mode of consciousness. Hence, women, minorities, or any group currently left out of the system will be brought into it as soon as they can adopt the dominant mode of consciousness. Social group differences are incidental and superficial; the only real issue in social change is getting various groups who are marginal to the dominant consciousness to learn how to express it. Ultimately, all social distinctions will be obliterated and the social order, assuming that the episode is played out to its logical conclusion, will become completely homogenized. In the case of civilization, the form will be a rational technocratic system dominated either by a political machine (1984) or an actual machine (the computer in THX-1138, Logan's Run, or Hal in 2001). Either outcome is possible because the dominant consciousness can be enforced in either manner.

On the other hand, another dynamic is possible: social regulation. Some elements in a social system may become attached to the particular symbolic analogues of a given moment in the unfolding of the episodic paradigm. Some men and women, for example, are attached to the current patterns of male and female roles and the relations between them. These people will resist the movement toward full expression of the episodic paradigm and seek to hold the form of the social order in its present shape, i.e., with the currently prevalent analogues. These processes can become quite active and can be designated as the dynamic of social regulation. So, while these efforts are essentially what we would call conservative, because the baseline tendency in the social systems is toward change, regulative processes must be quite dynamic. Even so, they will have difficulty working effectively.

A third type of dynamic are those tendencies in the social order toward movement to a different episodic paradigm. This dynamic we can designate as social evolution. What happens when episodic paradigms change is an alteration in the basic relationship of the conscious attitude to the collective unconscious such that the mode of consciousness is changed. Our understanding of this process must necessarily be mostly speculative, in that the very frame for understanding things is always going to be dominated by the currently controlling episodic paradigm. However, we can see something of what such transitions are like by

researching areas like the mode of consciousness of the primitive--since the primitive way of life was set within a different episodic paradigm. (Levi-Strauss, 1962). Another example is the consciousness of the megalithic peoples. (Hitching, 1977).

Such changes seem to come about either rapidly through the chance emergence of extremely powerful symbols or through something like the "pow" effect that often accompanies technological innovation, where a seemingly innocuous artifact appears on the scene that subsequently has fundamental reverberating consequences throughout the social order over time. (Michanowsky, 1977; Burke, 1978). It would take supernatural prescience to see such processes while they are happening. We can make guesses, however. It may be that, for example, even though its thrust is only toward social change, in that it will bring into our institutions through essentially mechanical processes some women, blacks and other minorities who are substantially marginal to the dominant mode of consciousness but who can find ways of avoiding ostracism. The effects of having such alternative consciousnesses operating within our institutions could be quite fundamental in the longer run. Another example might be the environmental impact statement as a new format for decision making. This innovation looks on the surface to be simply rationalism extended. In fact, however, since the traditional model of rationalism is founded on the premise of limiting the variables considered in the decision, the effect of the impact statement is profoundly radical--to the point that it might virtually stop traditional lines of rational action where it is employed.

Having made these designations, let us now return to the original puzzle of how to escape the trap of moving beyond the present theory of action because it is problem centered by attacking it as a problem. First, let us note that since the traditional theory of action we have been discussing is implied directly by the episodic paradigm of civilization, to attempt to change it is to attempt an evolutionary movement. This is a tall order; it is much like wanting to argue for the rejection of the English language on the grounds that it is an ineffective way to communicate--when the only language that you and your audience know is English. It seems that about all one can do is start talking and hope that something will happen

in the process that will lead to the creation or learning of a new, as yet unknown, language. However, knowing what we do about evolutionary change we can look for those areas of the language that have multiple meanings and implications and use them as models for creating others, hoping all the while that something new would begin to happen that would give us a fresh sense of direction.

This is what is being attempted here, and the "problem" of professionalism in voluntary organizations afford (as shall be argued more elaborately later) special opportunity for making the effort. We begin with an immediate practical issue and instead of approaching it as a change problem, we approach it as a possibility for social evolution. This means that the "solution" that we suggest for it will carry a double meaning: it must be sensible both as a response to the problem and at the same time it must carry implications for altering the dominant mode of consciousness around which the current paradigm is organized. Let me proceed now to set further the context for the practical suggestions that I will later make about the issue at hand, so that we can more easily see any evolutionary potential that these suggestions might carry and thereby capitalize on them.

TYPES OF SOCIAL PROGRESS STRETEGIES AND THE LEVELS OF SOCIAL REALITY

We can understand much better what we are doing with our interventions in social dynamics if we explicitly identify how these dynamics are related to strategies for social progress and what the basic potential is for bringing about given outcomes in each type of strategy. Though I can present only the broadest overview of them here, I count at least four types of progress strategies.

Perhaps the most familiar of these is structural alteration. An example would be administrative reorganization. Here the emphasis is upon using institutional authority to redefine role expectations such that the system functions more in accord with what it purports to be its goals. A great deal of such activity is essentially <u>regulative</u> in nature.

A second type of strategy quite familiar to us is reallocation of values through political and economic

means. Creation of welfare state institutions is an example of this type. Most all of this sort of process brings about social change.

The same is true of a third strategy: revision of values or "normative reeducation." (Chin and Benne, 1976). Changes in value preferences are almost always only adjustive since the idea of social values is intrinsic to the currently prevailing episodic paradigm. Examples of this strategy, at the macro level, some aspects of the women's movement, the civil rights movement, and the mainstream of the organization change movement.

A fourth, less familiar strategy is the process orientation to change. Here the emphasis is upon turning one's attention directly to the issue of modes of consciousness. Examples of this sort of thing are some aspects of the women's liberation movement and the Gestalt and Transactional Analysis approaches to organization development. (Huse, 1975). A good deal of this sort of activity involves social evolution. However, due to its typical lack of official sanction or access to leverage points in the current institutional setting, the alterations that are brought about are contained mainly at the micro level. Diagram Two depicts these four strategies and indicates what sort of social dynamic occurs typically as related to each type. In addition, however, we can note that the potential for evolutionary change exists in all four of these strategies, in that it is possible for symbolic analogues to occur in any sort of activity. All activity is to some extent (or carries the potential) to be reflexive. This potential exists to different degrees for the different types of strategy, however, as is indicated by the area defined by the diagonal lines in Diagram Two.

In addition to designating these strategies, and the potential each carries for evolutionary development, we need also to understand how the various levels of social reality relate to the possibility for change. The "levels" we designate here are the usual ones: the level of society and culture, the level of social institutions, then organizations, then the group level, and finally the person. While the meaning of these is mostly obvious, here I would add onto our usual sense of them by specifying how each is tied to the objective unconscious (since it is seen here, after all, as the source of all innovation).

DIAGRAM TWO



Types of Change Strategy As Related to Social Dynamics

(1) About society and culture I can say simply that here we find the summarization of the type of relationship that a given society has established to its collective unconscious. (2) At the level of social institutions we find the specific myths (the modern word would be "paradigms") that govern the various sectors of social activity. While all of these myths are derived from the socio-cultural level, they each express the general relationship to the unconscious in a specific way. In the case of the United States, for example, the socio-cultural level is characterized by the idea of progress and the heavy assertion of the conscious attitude that it entails--whereby consciousness is supposed to make things better. Hence in educational institutions we find didactic, instrumental, and technical knowledge being inculcated in students so as to cure their ignorance. In health institutions we find the allopathic medical treatment of disease. In religious institutions we find a concern with combatting evil. And so on. (3) At the level of organization we find a world of masks, where people present the formal aspects of themselves and where interaction is more or less mechanical, through what we call in social science jargon "roles," "role sets," and "role relationships." (4) At the level of the group we find people directly encountering the personal aspects of the unconscious in face-to-face relations with others. (5) At the level of the person we go full circle back to the matter of the basic quality of the relationship to the unconscious. The socio-cultural level simply summarizes what exists as the norm at the personal level.

Those interested in social evolution need consider two aspects of this picture: (1) the degree of potential each level has for social evolution and (2) the amount of leverage afforded in each level on the factors that allow symbolic analogues to emerge and attract energy in new directions broadly throughout the social order. Diagram Three depicts the levels as they are related to each other by: (1) the degree of generality that each possesses, (2) the area of potential for evolution, and (3) the amount of leverage for evolutionary change afforded in each.

We can gain the important insight from this picture that the potential for evolutionary change and the leverage for such change stand in inverse relation to each other. That is, were we able somehow to act

DIAGRAM THREE



Potential for Evolutionary Change and Leverage for Change in Relation to Levels of Social Reality

at the level of socio-cultural level and do so in a consistently reflexive manner, powerful new symbols might appear that could, if we attended to them responsibly, make major evolutionary impacts across the social order. Unfortunately, few programs we undertake as a society express its culture in any specific way. The space program's moon flights program was one such instance--from it did emerge an important new symbol (the "moon rise" picture and the spaceship earth picture) to which we have chosen not to attend. From this example, we can see that attempting change at this level is mostly impractical. At the other extreme, it is probably true that evolutionary change at the personal level--i.e., major leaps in consciousness--is quite practicable. The individual has the wherewithall to deal reflexively with his or her environment, to thereby evoke new symbols and their analogues, and to let personal energy flow in these new directions. However, such change will be mostly idiosyncratic and has very little possibility for broader impacts.

All of these levels coexist in every social situation, as is obvious to us from everyday experience. However, in any given situation one level will be salient and the others will be subordinate to it. In some situations events emerge as they do mainly because of interpersonal relations (the group level), in others because of the myth of the institution (as with hospitals), and so on. To intervene effectively we must locate the intervention strategy in the level of social reality that is dominant in the situation.

The optimal place for attempting evolutionary change, however, is at the organizational level, where the intersection of potential and leverage creates the greatest area for operation. It is a happy circumstance, then, to approach a problem from the evolutionary perspective when the organizational level is the salient one. This, as shall be noted later, seems to be true of the issue we are dealing with here--professionalism in third sector organizations.

Summary.--What I hope to have accomplished in setting out this perspective on social dynamics is to enable us: (1) to be clear about what is the nature of the issue faced here--i.e., that it is one which derives from the episodic paradigm of civilization under which we are living and (2) to indicate what

sort of change process is required for addressing this problem--i.e., that it is a matter of evolutionary change.

THE SOLUTION: "RESOLUTIONS"

The extensive conceptual backdrop I have just set out allows us now to turn our attention back to the practical issue with which we started--viz., how to make professionalism more compatible to third sector organizations. Drawing from what has been said above about the nature of social dynamics, I can make the following stipulations as we do this: I am taking this practical objective in a nominal sense, as a label for what I am doing. I make no pretense to having a solution to this problem. Rather, what I intend is to suggest some steps that, if followed, might start a reflexive process through which some new, evolutionary directions could be found. Hence what is offered here is more in the nature of resolutions than solutions.

Also, it needs to be noted that here the issue will be approached as a matter of organizational change, one that involves most of all a redoing of the persons that are carried by the members of third sector organizations. At the organizational level of social reality our attention is focused on the more or less formal aspects of interpersonal relationships (most of this is the role presentation of the person). Thus the issue is one of redoing organizational masks so that a more reflexive interaction is allowed for both between the mask wearer and the mask as well as between people as they wear masks. Taking this as my method and framework, I can identify two sorts of resolutions: short run and long run.

Short Run Resolutions.--The first step we might take is to set up or extend processes within third sector organizations where teaching relationships are established between professionals and volunteers--teaching relationships that go both ways. All people have resources which are valuable to others and these can be identified and structures can be arranged such that these can be made available through teaching. It is important that the teaching methods not be purely didactic, which is of course the least reflexive learning situation. The more participative and experiential the methods can be made, the more likely it is that the serendipity through which new symbols appear can

be achieved.

This last point indicates the next resolution: Both open ended, totally participative as well as closed, hierarchial modes of organizational structure should be avoided. Both deny reflexivity. In the terms we have set out above, to allow for completely open ended participation is to immerse the organizational process in the unconscious. On the other hand, strict hierarchy is one of the worst forms of overassertion of the conscious attitude, whereby the unconscious elements in the organization would be repressed into eruption. Structured modes of participation, of much the sort that have developed in the field of organization development, offer a middle, reflexive, alternative. Organization development itself is not being suggested here; rather, the idea is to use what we have learned from it to make the sort of techniques it employs into means for carrying out the everyday business of organizational life.

Turning our attention specifically to the matter of respective organizational personas of professionals and volunteers, we can note one main point: All matters of persona in an organization should be consciously designed through a process of structured participation that allows for input and broad assent. Such things as what, if any, uniform members shall wear, (as well as other matters of clothing policy), the language used between organizational members and with clients (e.g., shall jargon be allowed, shall jargon be translated, if so, how, etc.), should not be presumptively set by tradition or by the role posture that organization members bring with them to the organization. It is perfectly possible and appropriate for all organization members to have a say in designing the masks that they shall wear and that they will be interacting with as they live out their work lives in the organization.

With the emphasis on participation in the above three resolutions, it might seem that the picture being sketched here omits authority of any sort from the third sector organization. On the contrary, one of the clearest themes in what we know of reflexivity is that a strong system of authoritative role relationships is essential to attaining it. The use of authority and the issues involved in complying with it, indeed, present perhaps the major issues of encounter with the unconscious that one faces in life. Authority is an essential, inevitable, indeed, archtypal

part of all arenas of life, especially organizational life. However, modern management practice seems to misunderstand authority and how it properly comes into play in the organizational process. This is probably because most organizations are pursuing programs that are collective in nature and authority in them is used to enforce a "crowd mentality" on organization members so that the collective program can be carried out. The proper use of authority is to employ it mainly for matters where hubris, arrogance, ego inflation, or other such issues of individual personal development are involved. Summary evaluations of persons against objective standards that are authoritatively enforced have little point. They do not enhance performance in the long run and they do not fructify the person even when they are positive. Problems of performance are best dealt with through the devices of learning through the provision of timely and accurate feedback or through mechanisms of appropriate placement. These are formative judgments and as such are helps to reflexivity. (McSwain and White, 1979).

Summative judgment, the use of authority for confrontation, must be a personal act and as such it carries a personal responsibility. It simply cannot be made "objective." It works best where a negative personal state has developed. Authoritative confrontation around such issues (alcoholism and zealousness are typical manifestations) is difficult and fraught with hazard for both the authority wielder as well as the subordinate, but if they are handled correctly they can be made episodes of significant development. In most cases the sort of distinction between the use of authority for issues of performance versus issues of personal inflation or hubris is simply not made. The result is great misunderstanding and sometimes damage to individuals and to the mission they are pursuing in their organizations.

Long Run Resolution.--We can probably say that the main problem with the persona or mask of professionalism is that it presents the person behind it as pompously rigid, such that they are unable to attend to others "as people." How can we account for this dysfunctional inflation and rigidity of persona?

One plausible explanation for it seems to be found in the process by which professional training and accreditation takes place. We are familiar with the standard model: Professional training occurs in

graduate schools at universities. There trainees take courses for which they receive a general summative evaluation. Most of these courses stress rather abstract material and require the generic performance skills that are characteristic of academic work.

This process of authorization (which is what credentialling of course is) involves a personal transformation--a movement of energy from the unconscious to the conscious side of the psyche--of a major order. When energy moves over to the conscious side through the device of authorization rituals it will tend simply to inflate the ego unless the process is managed quite carefully. In order to avoid inflation, the authorization process must provide for the strengthening of the ego as consciousness is given this new energy. This strengthening is accomplished by making the ego aware of the responsibilities that attach to the new powers, and by granting the new energy in the form of concrete, specifiable capacities and skills such that the ego is aware of becoming more competent in a definite way. When this is not done, the energy simply goes toward holding up what we call a "front."

Authorization as it is described here is rarely a part of professional education, taken as a whole. Save for some medical people, lawyers, engineers, and such, who work in institutional settings that specify required practices relatively clearly, beginning professionals have little sense of what they can actually do with their new credentials. It is the lucky ones, indeed, who are even later afforded the opportunity to develop professional egos that have the authenticity, toughness, and flexibility that come with the acquisition of concrete capabilities and skills.

An approach to this matter might be found in the competency model for professional education. Use of this model requires that the material taught to aspiring professionals be presented, at least nominally, as a set of generic capacities (strengths) and skills (specific practices) that add up to a well defined professional persona. It would further require the use of a learning model that deploys the authority of the academic teaching role in the manner suggested above for third sector organizations, viz., where performance issues are dealt with through feedback and appropriate placement and where summative judgments are reserved for issues of personal/professional matura-

tion. Such a change would involve a reorientation of our present approach to professional training. It would however, perhaps start a process that would produce a new, more reflexive form of professionalization than we currently have.

CONCLUSION

It has been noted a number of times in the dialogue above that what is being aimed at here is evolutionary change, since the problem being addressed cannot be gotten past by the change orientation. Evolutionary change, by its nature, goes beyond the scope of current modes of consciousness and hence it cannot be adequately imagined or foreseen. But it can be glimpsed because it is hinted at in the continuous process of symbol generation that occurs in the process of social action.

If we look at volunteerism in this light, and see its growth as the emergence of a new and important symbolic analogue, what portent does it seem to hold? How does it seem to point beyond professionalism as the currently predominant symbol for social action? It could be that the rise of volunteerism is asking us to move toward a revised version of amateurism as a new symbol. Let us recall that the current idea of amateurism--that amateurs are people who are simply less competent or less knowledgeable than professionals and thus less able to act effectively--is a statement purely from the point of view of professionalism. As such it is beset with a binding prejudice. Another, perfectly legitimate sense of amateurism (the one that we have forgotten) is that it means to love what one is doing. It is from the point of view of professionalism, an idea that derives from an episodic paradigm that splits the heart and the mind, that it appears that knowledge and objectivity can be attained only from the suppression of affection for the act one is carrying out. Such suppression forces actors to submit either to a moral orthodoxy or an empirical imperative as the only guide to action. Both of these guides are always external to the action situation and hence produce actions that are to some extent alien to it. While the professional is divorced from what he or she does (in principle) the amateur is directly involved in his or her actions and sees personal transformation as a central part of it. The amateur experiences himself or herself as a personal actor and

as such we could expect that others would be experienced in the same way. It is this human connection that might afford the device of regulation of social action that we all acknowledge is essential and which we invented professionalism (mostly) to insure. What we have found is that by forcing professionals to restrain their actions by the device of objectivity we have reduced the client to a "case" and thereby have produced a new type of inhumaneness--as equally undesirable as unrestrained charlatanism.

This concluding statement is simply to the point that we can have both reasonable expectation and hope in attending to the new symbol of volunteer action in organizations. This movement indeed may turn out to be a crucible where true social evolution is made--change beyond the current episodic paradigm. While this may seem scary, we can be assured by the fact that such changes happen rather slowly and can be mediated through our own sense of humanity if we ground our actions in ourselves as free entities rather than in empirical necessity or moral orthodoxy. We need not fear the emergence of new symbols as long as we attend to them consciously and responsibly. As we do, our evolution as a species will take care of itself.

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VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION THEORY

John A. Rohr

Orion White has written a serious and demanding essay that links volunteer organizations to broad currents of thought in contemporary social science and philosophy. In my critique of White's work, I will first touch briefly on two minor points and then move on to what I consider the most significant aspect of his position.

The two minor points are one of logic and one of language. The logical problem concerns White's criticism of what he calls the "problem-solution schema," which he finds flawed by "a logical problem... contain-[ing] a paradox of a most puzzling sort." (p.130) The problem-solution schema posits that all action arises in response to a problem. White correctly observes that "the theory implies that where there is no problem, there will be no need for and will in fact be no action (i.e., no solution)." He errs, however, in maintaining that the aphorism, "if there is no solution, it's not a problem," is logically connected to the problem-solution schema. The schema can be represented by the proposition "if no A, then no B;" where A represents problem and B action. From this proposition one cannot logically conclude "if no B, then no A." The point is a minor one, however, because White's attack on the schema does not rest on a logical connection between problem and action. A merely existential connection is all he needs and this he has.

The language problem concerns White's understanding of what a professional is. On pages 127 and 129, it seems as though professionals are simply full time employees. Such an impoverished idea of professionalism would belie the "hallmarks of professionalization" given at the beginning of the essay. How, for example, do we characterize an attorney who volunteers his service one evening each week at the rape crisis center White mentions?

If there are problems with White's discussion of professionalism, they are not crucial to his argument. The professional is only the foil for the hero of the piece, the volunteer. It is White's discussion of the volunteer that makes his essay a significant contribution. White's volunteer is freighted with historical meaning that links routine community activities

with such profound social movements as the transformation of consciousness. His redemption of the word "amateur" is particularly important. To make White's point explicit, let us recall the etymology of amateur; it is from the Latin verb "to love." Amateurs are lovers. They act because they love what they do, not because there is a problem "out there" to be solved. In this way, they break out of the problem-solution schema and offer a new and deeper sense of human freedom.

White sees in volunteers-as-amateurs the harbingers of a new social order. He has looked upon this order and found it good. From the limited glimpse he has given us, we must agree. However, the implications of White's discussion of consciousness go far beyond volunteers and their actions. He casts a wide net and I am not at all sure that everything he catches will be as attractive as the profound symbol of the volunteer-as-amateur.

What I find most disturbing in White's essay is his statement on page 133: "human action as opposed to behavior must be free and hence unbounded by a controlling objective purpose. There are no good ends and bad ends, only freedom used well and freedom used badly."

White fails to give adequate guidance on how we can know whether we are using freedom well or badly. On page 137 we are told that the "responsibility of consciousness is to maintain an attitude of openness sufficient to achieve the reflexivity required for symbols to appear and then to acknowledge or recognize such symbols." This is helpful; but do we simply acknowledge the symbols or do we judge them as well? If we do not judge them, what is the meaning of "appropriate and inappropriate" symbols? (p.137) If we do judge them, what is the basis of our judgment if there are no good ends and bad ends?

I believe the weak link in White's argument appears on page132 where he maintains that goals reduce action to "striving" and thus render action "oppressive." Surely one could argue that man is the only creature capable of striving and this is because he alone is free. His capacity to strive is an expression of his dignity. He has rights because he has duties and these duties co-alesce in the over-arching duty of

"realizing" his nature; that is, of making his nature real, or reducing it from potency to act. This is not to be oppressed but to be human.

To be sure, I do not expect White to accept this line of thought, but neither do I believe it can be simply ignored. My point is that White's connection between goals and oppression is facile. It overstates his otherwise sound critique of contemporary rationalism and needlessly disturbs some metaphysical ghosts slumbering in the recesses of his argument.

White closes his essay with an acknowledgement that his talk of "true social evolution" and "change beyond the current episodic paradigm" may be a bit "scary." As a rather timid fellow, I am inclined to agree. Nor am I particularly assured by White's upbeat exhortation to "ground our actions in ourselves as free entities." To whom is he speaking? All of us? If so, what is the basis of this egalitarian optimism? If not, to whom among us are his remarks addressed?

White's answer seems to be that if we attend to the emergence of new symbols consciously and responsibly, "our evolution as a species will take care of itself." There is a powerful attraction in White's cosmic vision, but the attraction is grounded in the beauty of faith. The thought of action transforming man's consciousness in a way that enhances man's freedom and benefits the species is inspirational. In this sense, White's essay is itself a symbolic statement. As symbol, it points beyond itself. White's confidence in the benign character of the evolutionary process is virtually a demand for revelation from an Author of the species who is mighty and gracious. It is no coincidence that White links his position with that of our century's most prominent theologian-scientist, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.

A RADICAL SHIFT FROM BUREAUCRACY TO STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Max S. Wortman, Jr.

Organizations influence our lives today as they have never done before. From the economic giants encompassing many different types of manufacturing and services to small corner drugstores, from large construction companies to the independent newspaper contractor, from the Red Cross to the local performing arts group, and from the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts of America to the county fair, these organizations control and influence each of us. In these organizations, managers are called upon to run them efficiently and effectively regardless of whether they are paid professionals or not. For many years, problems in hospitals, public agencies, urban agencies, voluntary associations, and educational institutions have been handled on a bureaucratic basis. Today these same problems call for a significantly different posture--namely an operating management-strategic management posture (Hodgetts and Wortman, 1980; Ansoff, 1972; Irwin, 1974).

Strategic management today is one of the key buzz words used at top corporate levels in organizations. Although strategic management is beginning to be considered by many profit-making organizations today, it is seldom considered by voluntary organizations. When you think of organizations that are poorly managed over the long-term, have few or no long-range goals or goal structures (or ones that are ill-defined), and have different constraining characteristics than profit-making organizations (Newman and Wallender, 1978), you probably think of organizations such as not-for-profit hospitals, colleges and universities, welfare agencies, urban housing authorities, and churches. Few of these can be acknowledged as being creditably managed in either the short or long term (Wortman, 1979a).

Although many voluntary organizations have goals, these goals frequently are short-range and poorly defined. Some organizations such as those in the performing arts have not only ill-defined goals in both the short and long range, but they are different. Some officials in public organizations are interested primarily in being re-elected and may not be concerned

with the establishment or the attainment of long-range goals of the government. Some public executives are interested primarily in retaining their jobs, not in established goals (short or long term) of their agency. As a result of these differing perceptions of what long-term goals of an organization ought to be, how they should be analyzed, how they should be formulated, how they should be evaluated, voluntary organizations probably can be helped even more than profit-making organizations through the utilization of strategic management (Wortman, 1979a).

Not only have voluntary organizations not reached the strategic management stage of development, but many of them have not even reached the strategic planning stages of fifteen to twenty years ago. In fact, even the planning efforts in voluntary organizations are at very elementary levels. For example, some of the common planning frustrations in voluntary organizations include: (a) plans and planning lack credibility; (b) plans are not actionable; (c) planning activities are straitjacketed by tradition; (d) producing plans is usually a sterile exercise; (e) planners try to decide too much too soon; and (f) plans frequently do not deal with what is really important in the organization (Barkdoll, 1976). These frustrations tend to indicate the level of planning in voluntary organizations. Planning of this type tends to be reactive rather than proactive. If voluntary organizations were able to make the quantum jump from little or no planning to strategic management, these organizations would be more likely to meet their goals (Ansoff, 1976).

Therefore, this paper will discuss: (a) differences in managing voluntary organizations and other types of organizations, (b) bureaucracy in voluntary organizations and its actual posture in such organizations; (c) development of strategic management in voluntary organizations; (d) the use of strategic management in voluntary organizations; and (e) the implications of strategic management for voluntary organizations.

DIFFERENCES IN MANAGING VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

Although some would argue that the goal structures of voluntary organizations are significantly different than the goal structures of profit organizations, there are few or no major studies indicating that this is the case. While the goals of profit and voluntary

organizations are different, the establishment of goal hierarchies, strategy hierarchies, managerial hierarchies, and organizational hierarchies are similar, and the processes by which goals are established are probably similar. Unfortunately, we have far too few studies on management, much less strategic management in voluntary organizations. Moreover, we have practically no comparison studies on goals, goal structures, and the process of establishing such structures in profit and voluntary organizations.

At least four studies indicate that some characteristics are different in not-for-profit organizations than in profit-making organizations. Newman and Wallender (1978) note that these constraining characteristics seem to account for unusual managerial problems, but that such characteristics also appear to a greater or lesser extent in profit-oriented organizations. These characteristics include:

1. Service is intangible and hard to measure. This difficulty is often compounded by the existence of multiple service objectives.

2. User influence may be weak. Often the organization may be the only source of a service and user payments may be only a secondary source of funds.

3. Strong employee commitment to professions or to a cause may undermine their allegiance to the organization.

4. Resource contributors may intrude into internal management--notably fund or grant contributors and government.

5. Restraints on the use of rewards and punishments result from Points 1, 3, and 4 above.

6. Charismatic leaders and/or "mystique" of the organization may be an important means of resolving conflict in objectives and overcoming restraints (Newman and Wallender, 1978).

Although Mason (1979) also listed a set of distinctive characteristics, his list was much more exhaustive. These distinctions in voluntary organizations included: (a) their purposes are not for profit; (b) these organizations are generally more complex than

profit-oriented organizations; (c) their principal operations tool is volunteerism produced through persuasion; (d) money is a means, not an end, in achieving goals; (e) organizations have no monetary tools (e.g., financial ratios such as return-on-investment) to evaluate effectiveness; (f) they require more diplomacy in achieving objectives; (g) the production of resources and provision of services are two distinct systems, whereas in business the two are integrated; (h) managers differ in their motivations when they seek employment in voluntary organizations; (i) voluntary organizations have special legal status, which grants them fewer regulations; (j) they have a constituency, which gives the constituents a feeling of both ownership and belonging; (k) the market value of services cannot be measured precisely; (l) they tend to accumulate pluralistic purposes; (m) the quantity of available resources is not as limited as profit-oriented organizations; and (n) they can continue to exist even though their consumption of resources consistently exceeds output (Mason, 1979).

In a study of managers in voluntary organizations compared to managers in profit-oriented organizations, Gatewood and Lahiff (1977) found that managers from voluntary organizations rated relationships with co-workers higher, community involvement higher, and prestige lower than managers from profit-oriented organizations.

In examining the not-for-profit literature, Wortman (1979a) found little or no literature on top-level planning, strategic planning, or strategic management. Most of the differences in these three conceptual studies and one empirical study clearly indicate the need for significantly more data-oriented studies.

BUREAUCRACY IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

During the 1920's, Weber (1946) formulated the concept of an ideal form of organization called "bureaucracy." His work was not published in the United States until 1947. Since then, it has been widely discussed by organization theorists (Bedeian, 1980; Blau and Scott, 1962; Dessler, 1980; Rogers, 1975; Ullrich and Wieland, 1980). Weber described bureaucracy as having the following components:

1. A well-defined hierarchy of authority.

2. A clear division of work.

3. A system of rules covering the rights and duties of position incumbents.

4. A system of procedures for dealing with the work situation.

5. Impersonality of interpersonal relationships.

6. Selection for employment and promotion based on technical competence.

In voluntary organizations, many of these "ideal" components are either not followed or they are badly distorted. Although many voluntary organizations do have a defined hierarchy of authority, there are many more that do not. Churches frequently have committee structures that have no clearly delineated priority or authority structure, that is, which committee has precedence. In some organizations, the constituents, the employees, and the boards all seem to be in command. In many voluntary organizations, there is no clear division of work. Employees and managers freqently complain about the ill-defined nature of their work. Part of this emanates from the lack of clear goal definitions--either short or long range.

Although voluntary organizations frequently have a system of rules covering the rights and duties of position incumbents, they violate this component of an ideal organization. The system is violated because there are constant influxes of new volunteers, new employees, and new managers who are not oriented to the system, and because the previous incumbents may have changed the rights and duties as they personally interacted with their positions. Again, this frequently is related to ill-defined goals.

Moreover, a system of procedures for dealing with the work situation may be violated for many reasons including changing resources and changing environments. The component of "impersonality of interpersonal relationships" is constantly violated by participants in voluntary organizations. As noted above, managers work for voluntary organizations because of the possibility of close personal relationships and these relationships tend to hold voluntary organizations together.

Lastly, selection for employment and promotion based on technical competence does not always occur in voluntary organizations. Indeed, the question of competence is not always primary in selection. Frequently positions are decided on the basis of who is known, who has done a good job in the past, and who has appropriate political connections.

From these multiple violations of the ideal bureaucratic model of organization, it is clear that most voluntary organizations do not operate as classic bureaucracies. Rather than reshaping the organization along a bureaucracy to planning to strategic planning to strategic management framework which would take many years to develop, voluntary organizations should consider moving directly to an operating management-strategic management framework.

DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

During World War II, strategic planning began its evolution as a field. In order to mobilize the immense resources needed to fight a major war, governments were forced to plan the long-range utilization of capital, material resources, and human resources. Following World War II, the socio-economic environment was relatively stable and there was little emphasis on strategic planning (Frankenhoff and Granger, 1971). Occasional strategic activities were employed by a voluntary organization (see Figure 1). The responsibility for efficiency, effectiveness, and growth of the voluntary organization was placed almost exclusively upon operating (day-to-day) management. The rate of change in responsibility for these issues increased during the 1970s. During this period, voluntary organizations shifted their emphasis to staff corporate development and were involved in practically no strategic planning (see Figure 2). As the rate of change increases even further during the 1980s and 1990s, there will be more and more emphasis on strategic management. Less and less responsibility for efficiency, effectiveness and growth of the organization will be laid at the feet of operating management (see Figure 3). The emphasis upon these shifts in responsibility for achieving the goals of the organization assumed that voluntary organizations must meet the demands of an increasingly critical public.

These shifts in responsibility for the achieve-



FIGURE 1: RATE OF CHANGE IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: FAIRLY STATIC (1950s).

ADAPTED FROM: WILLIAM F. FRANKENHOFF AND CHARLES H. GRANGER, "STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A NEW MANAGERIAL CONCEPT FOR AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE." LONG RANGE PLANNING, 3, No. 3 (April 1971), 9.



FIGURE 2. RATE OF CHANGE IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: BECOMING MORE FLUID (1970s).

ADAPTED FROM: WILLIAM F. FRANKENHOFF AND CHARLES H. GRANGER, "STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A NEW MANAGERIAL CONCEPT FOR AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE," LONG RANGE PLANNING, 3, No. 3 (April 1971), 10.



FIGURE 3. RATE OF CHANGE IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT: RAPID AND DYNAMIC (1980s and 1990s).

ADAPTED FROM: WILLIAM F. FRANKENHOFF AND CHARLES H. GRANGER, "STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A NEW MANAGERIAL CONCEPT FOR AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE," LONG RANGE PLANNING, 3, No. 3 (April 1971), 10.

ment of organizational goals are consistent with the Ansoff model of strategic management developed in 1972. In that model, he made the following assumptions: (a) different organizations exhibit different styles of behavior and that underlying them are different managerial cultures; (b) there are two distinctive managerial activities: operations management (today's management of voluntary organizations?) and strategic management; (c) respective managements call for different organizational cultures; (d) there is a simultaneous demand for both strategic and operations management in organizations; and (e) this demand for both types of management sets up a conflict in organizations (Ansoff, 1972). Moreover, he pointed out that there were two basic behavioral styles in organizations: incremental and entrepreneurial (see Table 1). Voluntary organizations begin as entrepreneurial organizations designed to seek change, to conduct global searches for alternative, to generate multiple alternatives, and to choose the best possible alternative. As the organization matures, it settles into an incremental mode that maintains internal and external equilibrium with its environment. It is not interested in change, but change must be controlled, absorbed, or minimized. Only in an extreme crisis will a voluntary organization return to its entrepreneurial manner. Few older voluntary organizations are entrepreneurial in character. Newer voluntary organizations clearly are entrepreneurial.

Ansoff noted that strategic management is concerned with establishing and maintaining relationships between the organization and its environment which enable it to pursue its objectives or goals, which are consistent with its capabilities, and which continue to be responsive to environmental demands (Ansoff, 1972). Thus a strategic manager attempts to bring about strategic change within the organization, to build an appropriate organizational structure for that strategic change, and to select and develop suitable personnel capable of providing strategic change. Operations management exploits the strategic position as a means of attaining organizational goals (Borst and Montana, 1977). The operations manager is interested in obtaining output to meet the goals and by so doing obtain a reward for his/her performance. Thus, a strategic manager is a change-seeker, is risk-propensive, is a divergent problem-solver, and skillful in leading others to try new directions, whereas the operations manager is a change absorber, a cautious risk-taker, a convergent problem-solver, a skillful

Attribute Mode	Incremental	Entrepreneurial
Intent	To preserve status quo	To induce change
Value System (Objectives)	1. Usually not explicit 2. Stable or smooth extrapolation of past performance	1. Usually explicit 2. Determined through interaction of opportunities and organizational capabilities
Reward and Penalty System	1. Rewards for stability, efficiency 2. Penalties for deviance	1. Rewards for creativity and initiative 2. Penalties for lack of change generating initiative
Risk Attitude	1. Conservative--minimize risk	1. Risk propensive 2. Balance of risk vs. gain 3. Maintain a risk portfolio
Leadership Style	1. Based on popularity and consensus	1. Based on charisma 2. Skill to inspire people to accept change
Organizational Structure	1. Stable 2. Activities grouped according to common skills and capabilities 3. Search for economies of scale	1. Fluid 2. Activities grouped according to problems 3. Premium on responsiveness to change

Table 1. Comparison of Organizational Styles

Attribute Mode	Incremental	Entrepreneurial
	4. Activities loosely coupled 5. Reliance on routine	4. Activities closely coupled
Management Problem-Solving		
a) Recognition of action need	1. Reactive in response to problems 2. Time lagged behind occurrence of problems	1. Active search for opportunities 2. Anticipatory
b) Search for alternatives	1. Reliance on past experience 2. Preference for minimal departures from status quo 3. Single alternative generated at a time	1. Creative search 2. Wide ranging from status quo 3. Multiple alternatives generated
c) Evaluation of alternatives	1. Satisficing--first satisfactory solution accepted 2. Also see "risk attitude" above	1. Optimizing--best of a set of alternatives is selected

Source: H. Igor Ansoff, "The Concept of Strategic Management, "Journal of Business Policy, 2, No. 4 (Summer, 1972), 4.

Table 1. Comparison of Organizational Styles con't.

diagnostician, coordinator, and controller (see Figure 4).

THE USE OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

If we assume that strategic management is possible in voluntary organizations, significant shifts in the management of such organizations probably would occur (Taylor, 1973; Wortman, 1979b; Wortman, 1982). First, voluntary organizations would adopt a systematic framework which includes individual segments of the strategic management process (analysis of the long-term goals of the organization and the long-term challenges and opportunities of the organization, formulation of the appropriate goals and goal structures to meet those challenges and opportunities, implementation of appropriate plans to meet those goals, interpretation of those goals and plans by top voluntary organization executives, and ultimate evaluation of the success or failure of those goals) and the integration of the segments of that process (Hodgetts & Wortman, 1980). This framework would be an explicit way of stating policy throughout the organization.

As an illustration of this systematic framework, let us take a small church (which has a membership of approximately 250 members). Several years ago, the church (which then had a membership of 90) decided that its present church building was too small. After analyzing the needs of the community and the needs of the congregation, the church governing board decided to build an all-purpose structure meaning that it could serve as a unit for worship, church suppers, aerobic dance classes (through the Free University), scouting activities, repertory theatre, and other community activities. These long-term goals of service to the community and to the congregation were then implemented through the raising of funds and the building of the structure. Communications which interpreted the goal of that structure were communicated throughout the town. Unfortunately, the tremendous effort that went into the operational phases of building the structure caused the organization to lose sight of the long-range goal. Seven years later, the church governing board again had to go through the process (including the steps above) and discover again why they had built the structure. If the board had evaluated the long-term goal on a regular basis and employed feedback to the appropriate steps in the process, it probably would not

Figure 4.


Analyze problems and opportunities.
1. Determine variables operating in situation.
2. Analyze impact of variables on each other.
3. Ascertain short, medium, and long-range effects of internal and external environments upon variables.
Formulate appropriate solutions and responses.
1. Determine within present goal structure.
2. Establish new goal or goal structure if no proper response.
3. Plan short, medium, and long-range steps to be taken.
Implement solutions and responses.
1. Organizing appropriate structural units.
2. Staffing these units.
3. Directing operations.
Integration of actions and inter-actions (Feedback)



Figure 4. The Strategic Management Functions of the Executive in a Voluntary Organization

Source: Max S. Wortman, Jr., "Strategic Management and Changing Leader-Follower Roles," Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences, 18 (April, 1982) (In press).

have lost sight of the long-term goal and would have been able to refine that goal and establish new ones.

Second, by utilizing a strategic management approach, voluntary organization executives would be better able to integrate goals, strategies, management structure, and organizational structure. Richards (1978) suggested that there is a relationship between goals and strategies at different hierarchical levels (see Figure 5). As noted in the figure, the goals are related to strategy in a feedforward manner. Although not shown, strategies have a feedback impact upon the goals in exactly the same manner (except in the reverse direction). This figure shows the interactive effects of goals upon strategy and strategy upon goals. Furthermore, it demonstrates the relationships between managerial and organizational levels with goals and strategies (Richards, 1978).

For example, by looking upward, managers would be able to reassure themselves that their strategies are consistent with their goals and that their goals best serve their superiors' strategies. Looking downward, their subordinates' goals would be indicators of how well they can carry out their strategies. In similar fashion, by looking laterally, managers can reassure themselves that their goals are consistent with other members of the organization. As a result, self-coordination occurs between managers at the same hierarchical level (Richards, 1978).

Third, changes would occur in leadership style and organizational culture. One hopes these changes would lead toward innovative, creative, risk-propensive, and change-oriented leadership behavior and concommitant shifts in the organizational culture. In older voluntary organizations, like large philanthropic granting organizations, the organizational culture tends to be conservative, reactive to challenges rather than proactive, stable, and using implicit goals. Such organizations frequently become less and less aware of the environment within which they are operating. As a result, they tend to operate on a year-to-year basis rather than on a long-term (five to twenty year) basis. Indeed, it takes a major crisis to rejuvenate such an organization. For example, government regulation or intervention may shake the organization up sufficiently to again become an entrepreneurial organization with an orientation toward the future and the utilization of an operating-strategic management posture.

Organizational Hierarchy	Managerial Hierarchy	Goal Hierarchy	Strategic Hierarchy
Public CEO Office	Chief Executive Officer	Economic and Social Values and Balance Among Them	Guiding Philosophy
Cabinet	Chief Executive Officer	Overall Goals Government Objectives	Master Strategy
Department	Executive Secretary (Department)	Department Goals	Department Strategies
Agency	Agency Head	Agency Goals	Agency Strategies
Division Functions	Divisional Head	Functional Goals	Functional Strategies

Figure 5. Federal Government Goal Structures and Hierarchy*

*This is an adaptation of a concept in: Max D. Richards, Organizational Goal Structures (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1978), p. 43.

Fourth, there would be changes in the organizational structure. Many voluntary organizations have little idea of what constitutes an efficient, effective, and perhaps growth-oriented structure. The establishment of a structure flexible enough to withstand the changes that continually occur in the environment or to withstand changes that are related to the goal structure and goal orientation of top corporate executives. If the executives are operations oriented rather than oriented toward a combination of operations and long-term strategies, there is little likelihood that changes will occur and that the organization will maximize its long-term potential in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, and growth. Moreover, new types of structure could be attempted in voluntary organizations. Matrix organizations would provide more flexibility to organizations which are constantly facing shifting environments. Participative organizations, rather than the autocratic organizations which dominate our society, conceivably would satisfy the needs of managers as Gatewood and Lahiff (1977) suggested---that is, improvement of work relations with co-workers, improvement of work with community leaders and organizations, and the down-playing of prestige within the organization. Experiments with participative modes of management in voluntary organizations could lead to new modes of management which presently do not exist.

Fifth, operating management would be improved by better tactical (short-term) planning, programming, and budgeting systems which emphasize the long-term goals of the organization which might include efficiency, effectiveness, growth, and survival. For example, the church which was mentioned above in terms of the strategic management process also had problems with short-term goals. Due to the tremendous effort in building the structure, they had not only lost sight of the original short-term goals. Indeed, they began to look at the primary goal of the church as that of maintaining the institution (which is a goal) including maintaining such items as grounds, the building, the worshop service, and the women's group. There was no external relationship to the community nor to the long-term goals of service to the congregation and to the community. At the same time that the church board began examining long-term goals, it also analyzed short-term goals including programs (operations) and budgets and their interrelationship. Therefore, there is a critical tie between operating management and strategic management in voluntary organizations. Many

voluntary organizations need to look at both operating management and strategic management and the relationship between the two.

Sixth, motivation and incentive systems for all employees would be introduced. If these motivational systems encouraged creativity and initiative rather than encouraging stability and efficiency, the employees of voluntary organizations probably would become more innovative in solving some of the difficult problems facing their clients and those facing the organization. Such systems should be related to productivity measures so that there is an opportunity to evaluate the new systems. Management by objectives and management by goals are systems that could be used. However, these systems in many organizations have been poorly understood and, as a result, have been used ineffectively under both autocratic and participative modes of management. Moreover, few organizations have tied MBO or MBG systems to strategic management as they should have been. Lastly, in order to motivate employees to high levels of performance, they must be routinely and systematically developed in creative ways of doing their jobs.

Seventh, both operating managers and strategic managers must be developed through managerial and executive development programs. Although first-line management in voluntary organizations occasionally receives some type of development programs related to their jobs, it is uncommon when middle managers and top executives receive any type of training or development. All too often, voluntary organizations do little or no development of their staff or assume that the staff is developing itself. Clearly, programs which teach first-line supervisors and middle-managers (as operating managers) how to analyze short-term challenges, opportunities, and problems, how to formulate solutions to these challenges, how to implement responses to them, how to communicate and interpret these responses to subordinates, and how to evaluate them are needed throughout voluntary organizations. In addition, methods of strategic management for upper-level middle managers and top managers are particularly needed. Voluntary organizations will continue to utilize operating management at all levels of management unless these upper-level middle managers and top executives are trained to respond to their environments and to establish long-term goals which strengthen the organization.

Eighth, more sophisticated information and control systems should be established to make managers more aware of environmental changes. Presently many voluntary organizations have little or no idea as to what is going on in the organization (this includes both professional staff and volunteers). In general, organizations tend to operate at a much higher level of effectiveness if the level of communications, both written and oral, is at a high level. Moreover, managers who have adequate information about internal and external environments are better able to utilize both operating and strategic challenges and opportunities. Information and control systems also would be extremely useful to the boards which govern voluntary organizations (Amis and Stern, 1974; Schooler, 1980a, 1980b). Frequently these boards operate in an information vacuum or are given only that information which the chief executive officer deems to be necessary. As a result, boards are unable to make intelligent decisions on appropriate short and long-term goals for the organization.

Thus, significant changes would occur throughout the organization if an operating management-strategic management approach were adopted by managers and executives in voluntary organizations.

IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS

If an operating management-strategic management posture were employed throughout the organization, it should be viewed as a major shift in the way the voluntary organization is operating on short and long-term bases (Taylor, 1973). Implementing such a system is a movement toward an organizational change program which would be oriented toward changing managerial and volunteer attitudes and behavior throughout the organization.

In large organizations, the impact would be significant. If a large organization has a clear idea of its goals, has plans to implement those goals, has a means of communicating those goals and plans both internal and external to the organization, and has developed ways of evaluating the goals and plans, it probably will have a significant impact upon the problem or challenge which faces it. It will have a clearer understanding of the funding campaigns necessary to operate the organization, a better understand-

ing of its budgeting systems, and a better use of its funds. For example, business executives frequently do not use their expertise on boards of voluntary organizations because they believe that the organizations are significantly different than business organizations. In one case, a campus ministry organization had $200,000 in capital funds which was to be held until the building plans were complete. The finance committee decided to put the money in the bank. At that time, the rate of inflation was higher than the rate of interest in the bank. Clearly, the money could have been placed in Treasury bills that were related to agriculture or urban affairs. Thus, the rate of interest would have closely approximated the rate of inflation. After the moderator of the group pointed this out, the funds were shifted to Treasury bills and the proper amount of money was available when the building plans were completed. Otherwise, the building would have been smaller than originally intended due to the lack of funding. An operating management (rather than no management at all) posture would have been quite useful to the campus ministry.

In another case, two similar organizations in management development decided to institute a third organization which would certify managers. No long-range goals were established for the third organization other than to certify managers thereby improving management throughout the United States. However, as the new organization grew, questions began to arise such as: Who shall run the organization? Have we established a competitive third organization? Should there be dues? What does a person gain by a long-term commitment to certification? Clearly, this organization needs an operating management-strategic management posture because it has a few short-term goals, but no long-term goals. Although there is only one executive running the organization, the board clearly needs to define its goals---both short-term and long-term---so that the third organization is clearly a servant of the other two, rather than becoming a competitor.

In similar fashion, hospitals and universities frequently are more concerned about long-term physical facilities, but are not concerned about the actual services rendered to their constituencies (patients and students). Little or no strategic management of these types of organizations has existed. If an

operating-strategic management posture were adopted, these organizations would be better able to establish goals of service to their constituencies and to meet those goals.

Smaller organizations should employ an operating management-strategic management posture as well as large organizations. Smaller organizations, which are continuing organizations, such as various types of performing arts and sports associations need to maintain both short-term and long-term goals in order to survive and grow (if they wish to do so). Frequently, performing arts are badly managed. Part of this comes from the attitude that the performer would be corrupted if a manager actually ran the operation. However, this is not necessarily the case. If a manager or managers ran the financial operations of the organization, the performers would be able to perform without worrying about many of the mundane aspects of running the organization. This assumes that the manager has been well-trained in managerial operations and is well-grounded in the performing art. It also assumes that sufficient information and control would be given to the board of directors, which would have several performers on it.

Other smaller organizations, which are continuing but oriented toward one or two events annually, biennially, or at irregular intervals, also should be oriented toward an operating-strategic management posture. Indeed, the operating management is less critical in such organizations because it expands rapidly and contracts rapidly during the given event. For example, a county fair or a performing arts festival may operate for one or two weeks annually with a small amount of start-up and concluding time. Thus, strategic management of the organization is vital in order for it to survive and to grow. Funding of such organizations may indeed be more of a strategic consideration than an operating consideration. Political organizations are similar in their orientation. Seldom do they have full-time managers at the county or regional (sub-state) levels.

Clearly, voluntary organizations should adopt an operating management-strategic management posture and should not reinvent the wheel by moving into older management methods. Since many organizations have already moved toward such operating-strategic management postures, there are sufficient models that can

be used initially in voluntary organizations today. As time passes, these models can be adapted so that other voluntary organizations can learn from the experiences of the voluntary organizations which initially adopt such a posture. By adopting this posture, most voluntary organizations will be more forceful in establishing both short-term and long-term goals. Moreover, they will be able to become more flexible and proactive in their responses to an ever-shifting environment.

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RESPONSE

Mary C. DeCarlo

Voluntary organizations have taken on increased importance in society and this independent sector has grown significantly in the last two decades. The visibility this sector is receiving under the Reagan Administration is unprecendented. Unfortunately, the sector, because of its diversity--reflecting an accurate picture of our pluralistic society--can only be described in generalities. Few comprehensive studies on the sector itself are available.

Therefore, Professor Wortman's essay is a welcome and useful attempt to apply business management and organizational theory to solve the problems of administering voluntary agencies. His thesis is that voluntary organizations will be much better administered if strategic management is used. Wortman draws upon the findings of existing studies and uses Weber's concept of the "bureaucracy" as his premise. Weber described the bureaucracy as having certain definite components such as a well-defined hierarchy of authority, a clear division of work, a system of rules covering the rights and duties of position incumbents, a system of procedures for dealing with the work situation, impersonal interpersonal relationships, and a selection for employment and promotion based on technical competence. To prove that voluntary organizations will be much more successful if they apply strategic management techniques that profit-making organizations now use, Wortman compares the profit-making organization with the voluntary organization and provides steps which would expedite voluntary organizations' transition. He discusses what a strategic posture involves and accurately diagrams some of the problems in making the transition. He notes that the voluntary sector has been moving toward strategic management and feels that, to save time, voluntary agencies should move directly into an operating management-strategic management framework rather than take the classic steps of first reshaping the organization along a bureaucracy.

Although this essay represents an advancement in the understanding of the administration of voluntary organizations, there are still some areas that are insufficiently addressed in Wortman's analysis. The first problematic area concerns the size of the volun-

tary organization. Even though Wortman briefly discusses the problems of the small voluntary organization, the main thrust of this presentation is applicable to larger, older, and more "bureaucratic" voluntary organizations; in other words, the high-budgeted, well-staffed national and international organizations. He neglects to make clear the effect that organization size has on management's achievement. Just as the business sector is composed of companies at various stages or growth and development, voluntary agencies also are representative of small, medium, large, and extremely large organizational structures with budgets and resources to match. While Wortman recommends that the manager of a voluntary organization take on the attributes of an entrepreneur, he neglects to consider the likelihood the entrepreneurial manager would achieve more in smaller, rather than larger, organizations because the smaller organization is less bureaucratic. The manager of a small voluntary organization would have a greater span of control and be able to perform a wider variety of functions, permitting more flexibility and creativity.

With regard to administration in voluntary organizations, Wortman states that most arrangements appear to be ad hoc divisions of work associated with program delivery as well as services--by implication less concern with long range planning for change. Because of dependency on voluntary assistance and frequent staff turnover, goals become remote and increasingly "ill-defined." Wortman's solution is to move to an operational/strategic management framework. However, while he tells us what it is, and what the benefits are, he neglects to tell us how to get there.

One of the difficulties frequently encountered in making changes is the inflexibility from the Board of Directors. One cannot talk about operational/strategic management without taking into consideration the driving force of the Board membership behind a voluntary organization. It seems that a strategic management style of administration would be highly dependent on the voluntary organization's Board initiatives and direction; any strategy approved by the organization's administrators must also receive approval from the Board of Directors.

This is not to say, however, that the strategic management style of organizational administration can-

not exist with a board that is hierarchical and bureaucratic in its disposition, but that it would require an entrepreneurial manager who must first be willing to educate the Board about the necessity of developing a mechanism for anticipating political, economic, and social changes and their impact on the organization.

One way to address this problem would be to institutionalize planning functions in an office for policy development and evaluation. Such an office would provide alternative approaches as well as guidance and support for consideration of future directions by the voluntary organization's Board. Within this environment the entrepreneurial manager will have the data and information needed to make maximum use of strategic planning and operational management.

A further difficulty with Wortman's analysis is that he fails to tell us how we mesh the operational and strategic management functions. The former is concerned with internal objective achievement. The operational manager often is caught up in immediate and short term action objectives. The strategic planner, however, must be concerned with external environmental changes. If we consult Wortman's diagram of the functions of the executive in a voluntary organization in Figure 4, it is obvious that the focus of this diagram is on internal change. It is unclear how the strategic functions or long range planning would be adequately addressed. An office of planning and evaluation as proposed above might help here as well. This office would concern itself with external effects. For example, a forecasting capability might have been able to predict and anticipate recent changes in support for public program given the mood of the country as shown by the passage of Proposition 13 in California three years ago. With enough lead-time such an office might have been able to minimize the adverse effects of federal cutbacks presently being experienced by some voluntary associations dependent on public money for service delivery.

This brings us to the final point about Wortman's paper that deserves further comment--the area of evaluation. Again looking at Figure 4, one can see that Wortman does not address the evaluation concept using that term as such but implies it when he alludes to the ideas of "integration of actions and interactions (feedback)."

Evaluation is the formal and systematic assessment of achievement of goals and objectives. Evaluation theory has identified two areas of evaluation that have applicability to the voluntary sector. One form of evaluation is concerned with strategies for the delivery of the program; e.g., is it as efficient and effective as it should be? The other form is how does the program affect or change the life of clients. Program evaluation as a source of internal and external information deserves more attention by Wortman.

Wortman briefly discusses the problem of staff turnover in voluntary organizations and the organizations' dependence on volunteer support and a concommitant dilution of goal achievement which can result in low morale. Evaluation research can provide a vehicle for constituents' input that might help overcome this. In the process of evaluation, an executive can use research instruments to keep goal and objectives in the forefront of staff and volunteers' thoughts. In addition, if constituent groups, including the staff and volunteers, feel that evaluation is a credible source of information to decision-makers and will thus "make a difference," a sense of participation in guiding the organization's future can result that will increase morale.

Despite such oversights, Professor Wortman's paper provides new and needed insights into common problems of voluntary organizations. Its timeliness is illustrated by some organizations' attempts to move in the direction he indicates. For example, the American Society of Association Executives (ASAE) has reported the results of their efforts at strategic planning. In Association Trends, they outlined under the title, "Basic Assumptions for Strategy Plan for the Next Few Years,"[1] a number of projections of political, social, and economic trends. On the basis of these projections, they surveyed their constituents to obtain their ideas for ways to meet the challenge these trends pose. These ideas were used to formulate new long range strategic plans which were adopted by the Board and the membership. In addition, evaluation was an integral part of this process. For example, reports were made rating the effectiveness of the organizational services and soliciting proposals for improving them.

Professor Wortman's paper thus provides a fresh

perspective on common problems of voluntary organizations. However, Wortman's analysis regarding the trend toward strategic management, which he views as happening, in spite of the fact that many voluntary organizations haven't achieved the ability to plan strategically, remains an area of concern.

In the final analysis, however, we must recognize that the strategic/operational manager performing his functions under the best of circumstances, given the best planning system, cannot control all those external forces that can affect the services of a voluntary organization. The strategic/operational approach assumes control over the most important factors affecting the organization, and while we can discuss the rational approach to solving organizational problems, the effect of external forces can often unexpectedly dominate service outcomes in spite of the best of intentions. As a result, only the presence of creative and effective planning and evaluation and the alertness of an entrepreneurial manager can minimize those spontaneous and unforeseen conditions often encountered in the "real world" which spell the difference between organizational survival or demise.

Notes

[1]Association Trends, November 27, 1981 and December 11, 1981, p.4.

PART III

VOLUNTEERISM IN A DEMOCRACY

Theory and Practice

VOLUNTEERING AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY*

Jon Van Til

Volunteerism is rarely discussed in terms of its contribution to democracy; it is customarily evaluated in terms of the social services it provides to the needy and destitute, or the satisfaction it engenders in the volunteer. Nevertheless, the individual decisions of millions of people to volunteer to perform actions they may deem to be in the general interest may be seen to be central to the development and maintenance of democracy.

This paper explores some interrelations between volunteering and democracy. Many of these connections are familiar ones regularly explored in the social science literature: citizen participation in public policy implementation, participation in social movements, voting and other modes of voluntary electoral participation. Other forms are less often related to democratic ends: helping a fellow citizen in distress, giving blood at a local Red Cross chapter, serving as a board member of a local service agency.

Volunteering in more than its directly political forms contributes to the development and maintenance of a fully democratic society, this paper hypothesizes. For test, material is selected from the major forms of democratic theory and related to principal forms of voluntary action.

DEFINING DEMOCRACY

It is difficult to arrive at a definition of democracy that will seem reasonable to most thoughtful persons, and nearly impossible to develop a theory of how democracy is institutionalized that will be accepted by more than a minority of political theorists.

*An initial draft of this paper was presented to the Conference on Philosophical Issues in Volunteerism, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, Virginia, November 14-15, 1980. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Booth Fowler and John Harman, which have been decidedly helpful in revising the earlier draft.

The recent definitional efforts of political theorist J. Roland Pennock offer a case in point. Democracy is given a dual definition, one ideal and the other procedural. As an ideal, democracy is seen as "government by the people, where liberty, equality and fraternity are secured to the greatest possible degree and in which human capacities are developed to the utmost, by means including free and full discussion of common problems and interests. (1979:6).

Procedurally, Pennock defines democracy as:

> 'Rule by the people' where 'the people' includes all adult citizens not excluded by some generally agreed upon and reasonable disqualifying factor, such as confinement to prison...or some procedural requirement, such as residency within a particular electoral district for a reasonable length of time before the election in question. 'Rule' means that public policies are determined either directly by vote of the electorate or indirectly by officials freely elected at reasonably frequent intervals and by a process in which each voter who chooses to vote counts equally ('one person, one vote') and in which a plurality is determinative. (1979:7).

Pennock's precise and painstaking definitions of democracy as ideal and procedure are difficult to fault, and comprehend the vision of democracy as one of humankind's greatest social inventions. But these definitions are congenial with a multitude of theoretical forms for their implementation. Such competing "power" theories, as Pennock calls them, define those who hold power and the bases for the limitation of power.[1]

These power theories may be identified as populism, idealism, pluralism, neo-corporatism, and social democracy, and fitted to a typology developed by Pennock. Thus populism empowers the many, with no limitations on their power. Idealism also involves rule by many, but under prescribed constitutional limits. Neo-corporatism provides for control by elites, under constitutional empowerment. Pluralism, another elite theory in its conventional presentation, relies upon social arrangements for the limitation of power. The

final type of theory, social democracy, provides for rule by the many under limits of social arrangements.

These forms of democratic theory each provide a distinctive approach to the problems of institutionalizing the democratic vision in complex and large-scale societies such as our own. In the following pages, each form is briefly summarized and described.

FIVE FORMS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY

Populism--populist visions of democracy are among the easiest to conceptualize, and the most difficult to organize, in societies as complex as our own. Most simply, populist democracy is that of the town meeting, the referendum and recall, the long ballot, and the theory of participatory democracy. As a historical movement in American society, populism has featured the voluntary action of farmers joining the Grange and citizens flocking to the support of William Jennings Bryan. More recently, populism has taken the form of environmental concern, preservation of farmland, and evangelical preservation of traditional moral standards (Boyte, 1981: 65). Populism involves a belief in the importance of decision-making by all members of a constituency, direct and unmediated, on those issues of most central concern to the constituency.

Populism, in contemporary democratic theory, stands almost always as a critical perspective on other forms of democracy, particularly pluralism. Rarely if ever is it presented as an alternative theory, and for reasons not difficult to fathom. It is exceedingly difficult to conceive of a democracy actually working in a large-scale complex society without the establishment of any limits to power beyond participation in majority votes. Even in small communities dedicated to decentralized and participatory ideologies, the limits of participatory rule are quickly felt, as Rosabeth Moss Kanter noted in her study of communes:

> Even in anarchistic communes that reject any formal organization or demands on members, informal group pressure still constitutes a powerful influence for conformity, and members often report a great unease at 'letting down the group', that is, failing to live up to the standards of the community. (1972: 233).

Perhaps the search for limits in the communal experience reflects the weakness of populist theory as a base for contemporary society. In any case, the populist critique of elite forms of democracy seems to drift into the development of idealist democratic theories. When power is limited only by the vigilance of its holders in continuous session, the burdens of democracy become insupportable.

Idealism is one of those "polysemic" terms that plague readers and creators of social science--that is, it is one term with many meanings. In political theory, idealists are those descendants of Plato, Aristotle, T.H. Green, and Rousseau who view the polity as the locus of dialogue and mutual enlightenment. To the idealist, political participation is, as Robert Paul Wolff put it, the establishment of one's place in a "rational community. It is an activity, an experience, a reciprocity of consciousness among morally and politically equal rational agents who freely come together and deliberate with one another for the purpose of concerting their wills in the positing of collective goals and in the performance of common actions." (1968:192).

Idealista are those democratic theorists who view politics as the locus of genuine community in which people fulfill themselves by performing the humanizing activity of political participation. Politics, in the idealist vision, is not mere bargaining and the advancement of self-interests of individuals and groups; rather, it becomes a process of mutual education and the creation of community.

On the local level, contemporary idealists like Edward Schwartz seek to create community and neighborhood organizations in which a full range of issues are resolved in the context of mutual discussion and dialogue. Nationally, theorist Theodore Lowi has called for the creation of "juridical democracy," in which public administration and public law are fused in the creation and production of rights, justice, and legitimacy (1969:313-314).

Idealism is a theory of reflection, intellect, and the refinement of institutions. But how well does it reflect the realities of human motivation as they confront the political system? In particular, how does idealism transform personal interests into the

advancement of the general good? Building on the critique of idealism as impossibly rational, the pluralist perspective has sought to explain how democracy "really works."

Pluralism--another polysemic term, pluralism in the context of democratic theory refers to the balance and competition among groups and their interests in political society. The core of the pluralist vision has been powerfully expressed by Durkheim:

> A nation can be maintained only if, between the state and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life. (1933:28).

To the pluralist, the individual is preoccupied with personal concerns and interest--economic, family-based, religious, and ideological. As a citizen, the individual is hardly eager to participate in dialogue and communal determination. Rather, he or she must be "dragged" into the torrent of the political process. This participation is seen by the pluralist as best accomplished by means of the voluntary association.

A theory greatly elaborated in American political science by Arthur Bentley, David B. Truman, and Robert A. Dahl; in political sociology by Robert Nisbet, William Kornhauser, and Seymour Martin Lipset; and in economics by A.A. Berle, Gardner Means, and the younger John Kenneth Galbraith--pluralism has tended to focus on the need to preserve the autonomy of the major societal sectors (polity, economy, associational, and cultural) in decision-making, and on the preservation of multiple centers of power in each of those sectors. Attention has also been paid to the putative contribution to civility and decision product of a pattern of multiple and cross-seaming membership patterns.

The tendency of many pluralists to conclude that participation is sufficiently problematic to warrant its relegation to a level of secondary importance, if not to celebrate outright the function of its limitation, has led many to reject pluralism. As we have seen, idealism and populism draw much support from a more active concept of citizenship, as does the

attempt to preserve elements of pluralist thought in the context of participatory theory. This vision is shared by the perspective of social democracy.

Social Democracy--The critics of pluralism have ruled the roost in the past two decades of American political thought. Ruthlessly, they have probed the weaknesses of the pluralist vision, contending that pluralism is elitist and inegalitarian in its point of departure, insufficiently aimed toward the provision of justice in its quest to balance interests, ignorant of the bureaucratic realities of many less than "voluntary" associations, and destructive of the ties of political community. Further, they have argued, the claims of some pluralists that the theory describes decision-making in America are both overblown and wrong: rather than balancing institutional interests, American political society demonstrates an overarching power of corporate decision-making.

The weight of the attack on pluralism has seen a resurgence both of contemporary idealism and, to an even greater degree, of theories of social democracy in contemporary political thought. Such theories tend to retain much of the pluralist vision, but seek to extend it in a fashion that moves the theory toward a central focus on participation, the reduction of inequality, and the special role of the state in assuring democracy.

The theorists of social democracy contend that pluralism has not been presented in a sufficiently radical cast. By forging an union between key points of socialist, idealist, and populist political perspectives--a new and reformist theory of democracy has been developed--one that became highly prominent in academic writing on American political society in the 1970's.

Social democrats claim that the problem of pluralism in America is that it has not been extended with sufficient vigor to counter the criticism that it prescribes a quiescent political system in which the interests of the wealthy dominate. The cure for ailing American democracy, these theorists argue, is more democracy. As Gar Alperovitz, one of the most searching of this group, has written:

> To review and affirm both the socialist

> vision and the decentralist ideal is to suggest that a basic problem of a positive alternative program is how to define community institutions which are egalitarian and equitable in the traditional socialist sense of owning and controlling productive resources for the benefit of all, but which can prevent centralization of power, and finally, which over time can permit new social relations capable of sustaining an ethic of individual responsibility and group cooperation upon which a larger vision must ultimately be based.
>
> A major challenge of a positive program, therefore, is to create 'commonwealth' institutions which, through decentralization and cooperation, achieve new ways of organizing economic and political power so that the people (in the local sense of that word) really do have a chance to "decide"...(1973:64-65).

Social democracy, Alperovitz argues, provides the most direct path to Pennock's "rule by people" - distant as that vision appears from the realities of power and decision-making in contemporary politics.

Neo-Corporatism--Forms of political theories, like old soldiers, appear never to die, but fade in and out as the moods and circumstances of history dictate. The type of democratic theory whose intellectual star is on the rise with the dawning of the 1980's is neo-corporatism--a theory most intellectual historians had imagined consigned in permanence to the dustbin of discarded ideas, particularly after Mussolini's disastrous flirtation with the concept in Fascist Italy.

And yet, we now encounter the "new corporatists," armed with the contention that the concerns of pluralism are passé, and that contemporary political realities involve a balancing of the only three interests that matter in the worlds of power: business, labor, and government. Moreover, these latter-day descendants of Saint-Simon and Cole argue that the balance of power has slipped into the hands of government bureaucrats, who have become the key brokers of societal power as they arrange the "understandings" between business and labor that determine the rate of infla-

tion, the level of unemployment, and the general fate of the interlinked and complex contemporary political economy.

In the words of Streeck, Schmitter, and Martinelli (1980:29), leading students of contemporary corporatism, "the corporatist hypothesis proceeds from the assumption that social integration and economic exchange in advanced industrial societies are not 'naturally' accomplished and maintained through the aggregation of the independent decisions of individual actions in the market but rather have to be produced by policial arrangements at the societal level." In their assertion that such organization is required of business, as well as labor organizations, neo-corporatists depart from conventional pluralists, who view business as operating in the context of the market and bargaining in the political sector.

While neo-corporatism has not been developed as a normative theory, it certainly leaves little room for either citizen participation or voluntary action. Rather it describes a decision-making system in which the leaders of business, trade unions, and government meet as formally designated agents of their organizations to decide the great issues of economic policy, social distribution, and general welfare. The perspective of this theory, and the residual role it provides for the individual citizen (voter and trade union member) suggests that normative statements of the theory be attended closely by students of democracy. Neo-corporatism may come to be implemented in the modern political economy, but it is far removed from "rule by the people."

VOLUNTEERING IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY

Volunteering and the ideology that supports it, "volunteerism," may be specified to include the following distinctive behaviors:

- Service volunteering, aimed at the alleviation of distress and the enhancement of quality of life of those population groups identified in need of such service.

- Self-help volunteering, aimed at the advancement of those sharing a common interest, perspective, or life experience.

- Grassroots volunteerism, aimed at the clarification and advancement of interests of citizens at the local level of social-political organization.

By focusing on these quintessential forms of volunteering, our review will exclude from analysis the major forms of institutional "voluntary association," such as labor unions, trade associations, consumer organizations, professional associations, civic associations, and ethnic-cultural associations, as well as political parties and associations. Thus we focus on the acts of individual volunteering as democratic behaviors, rather than on the work of formal organizations which draw sustenance, at least in part, from voluntary energies. We focus, in short on forms of voluntary action not generally thought to be relevant to democratic theory.

NEO-CORPORATISM AND VOLUNTEERING

About the role of volunteering in neo-corporatism, little can be said, save that volunteering's only value is seen in the tax savings it engenders, and not in its strengthening of democracy. The theory centrally focuses on those forms of organization that advance economic interests at the level of collaboration among elites. Such economically-inspired activity, however important, is neither voluntary nor democratic--in that it is remote from the rule of the people.

A distinctly neo-corporatist tinge characterizes the administration of Ronald Reagan, although the governmental and trade union partners are viewed as considerably junior to the corporate interest. Key advisor Edwin Meese has succinctly expressed the low value citizen participation is given by the Reagan team. When asked if citizens would be encouraged to participate in the shaping of a new foreign policy, he replied, "Yes, every four years" (quoted in Wolin, 1981:4).

One can only hope that neo-corporatism will remain a field for empirical study, and not become defined as a form of normative theory. Goodwyn puts it boldly:

> Today, the values and the sheer power of corporate America pinch in the horizons

> of millions of obsequious corporate employees, tower over every American legislature, state and national, determine the modes and style of mass communications and mass education, fashion American foreign policy around the globe, and shape the roles of the American political process itself. (1978:322).

There would seem little case to add to our troubles by celebrating this condition as the achievement of democracy.

VOLUNTEERING IN POPULIST THEORY

As was remarked earlier, populism tends in American theory to be a point for criticism rather than a fully developed theory. From the populist perspective service volunteering would appear to be of little salience, but grassroots action and self-help may be seen as central.

If the role of voluntarism in populism is to be understood, it is the work of historians who have studied specific social movements that will be of greatest use. Thus Saloutos and Hicks write in Twentieth Century Populism (1951) of the agricultural movement in the Midwest in the first decades of the 20th century, chronicling the organization of agricultural interests into cooperatives and associations. The central thread of the populist movement is found in their work to involve the organization of citizens' economic associations in the search for direct governmental rule, and the replacement of monopoly rule. (1951:33).

Reviewing a more recent experience, that of McCarthyism, Michael Rosin (1967) concludes that the late Senator's support did not consist of a "right-wing populist movement." Rather, "McCarthy was supported by the activities of a party that emphasizes free enterprise, achievement, and individual responsibility. The politics of these people seems more sensibly explained by their preoccupations with achievement and failure than by their populist concerns" (Rosin 1967: 251). Rosin concludes that the prevailing tendency to identify the McCarthy movement as populist can be explained in terms of the inability of pluralist theory to focus directly on specific issues in political life. (1967:261).

But the most far-reaching examination of populism as citizen democracy in action emerges from the historical analysis of Lawrence Goodwyn (1978). To Goodwyn, the Populist revolt of the 1870's saw the flowering of democratic voluntarism, and was then followed by a period of severe restriction by pervasive corporate power that continues into the present. Populism, Goodwyn writes, "cannot be seen as a moment of triumph, but as a moment of democratic promise. It was a spirit of egalitarian hope, expressed in the actions of two million beings--not in the prose of a platform, however creative, and not, ultimately, even in the third party, but in a self-generated culture of collective dignity and individual longing" (1978:295).

The links between Populism and volunteering are clearly shown by Goodwyn when he notes that the core vision of populism was:

> a profoundly simple one: The Populists believed that they could work together to be free individually. In their institutions of self-help, Populists developed and acted upon a crucial democratic insight: to be encouraged to surmount rigid cultural inheritances and to act with autonomy and self-confidence individual people need the psychological support of other people... . The Populist essence was... an assertion of how people can ACT in the name of the idea of freedom. At root, American Populism was a demonstration of what authentic political life can be in a functioning democracy (Goodwyn 1978:295-296).

Goodwyn's monumental research and eloquent presentation of the populist vision suggest the systematic development of contemporary populist theory as a high item on the agenda of democratic theory. Contemporary populist theorist Harry Boyte has noted that voluntary participation may open "free social spaces that, under certain conditions, can turn into breeding grounds of insurgency." (1981:63). It may be expected that significant restatements of the populist theory will be forthcoming. Assuming that Goodwyn's work will serve as a beacon to these theorists, a central role for such forms of volunteering as self-help, citizen participation, and educative forums will be found in

the theory of Democratic Populism.

VOLUNTEERING IN IDEALIST THEORY

Idealists focus in their democratic theory on the role of dialogue in the building of political community. In the most sophisticated statement of the position, Lowi writes directly of volunteerism, and his tone suggests the message he later makes explicit--that the private bureaucracies that acrete about the provision of volunteering require public observation and regulation.

> Life in the cities would be hard to imagine without the congeries of service and charitable agencies that, systematically, keep our streets clean of human flotsam and jetsam. Of growing importance are the family service agencies, agencies for the elderly, for adoption, and for maternal and child care, all of which in turn draw financial support from still other (e.g. Community Chest, United Fund) agencies that are still more tightly administrative. To repeat, all such groups naturally possesses potential political power, but only occasionally are they politicized. The rest of the time they administer (1969:38).

With a far more ruthless pen than idealists like Robert Pranser (1968), Lowi comes to view voluntary action as a threat to democracy, rather than its embodiment, as pluralists are wont to contend. Thus

> there is the proliferation of groups--"do-gooders" groups--manifestly dedicated to ministering to one problem or another of socialization or social control. Between church school and public school, almost nothing is left to the family, clan, neighborhood, or guild--or to chance. Even sandlot baseball has given way to Little Leagues, symptomatic of an incredible array of parental groups and neighborhood businesses organized to see that the child's every waking moment is organized, unprivate, wholesome, and, primarily, oriented toward an ideal of adjustment to the adult life of rationality that comes too soon (1969:37).

If the point has not yet been fully digested, Lowi puts it more bluntly: "All of the larger voluntary associations, as well as most of the smaller ones, have given up their spontaneity for a solid administrative core" (1969-37:38). The voluntary sector is handmaiden to a repressive and less than fully democratic society: it requires the "tempering" of the "excesses of pluralism" (Wolin, 1968) and the distrust of interests and groups (Lowi, 1969:296).

The idealist tradition, thus, is one that views volunteering and volunteerism with distrust, and probes the consequences of their establishment with other forces of bureaucratic and administrative power. Only when legitimated by the active will and voice of the people does the organized voluntary impulse come to be valued by the idealist.

VOLUNTEERING IN PLURALIST THEORY

Pluralists frequently write of the contributions of service volunteering, self-help, and grassroots action--and find little to fault in these approaches, though their emphases vary among the three forms. Service volunteering, when it is discussed by pluralists, is generally valued for its participatory contributions, rather than the service outcomes it provides. In this respect, it is the associational aspect of volunteering that is most central to pluralists. Thus, Berger and Neuhaus write that "Associations create statutes, elect officers, debate, vote forces of action, and otherwise serve as schools for democracy. However trivial, wrongheaded or bizarre we may think the purposes of some association to be, they nonetheless perform this vital function" (1977:34).

Writing from the perspective of long experience in the development of volunteering, Eva Schindler-Rainman and Ronald Lippitt note that volunteering "not only represents a significant contribution to the volunteer's own psychological health and self-actualization. Volunteering offers many experiences necessary to democratic personality development" (1975:15).

Volunteering, to Schindler-Rainman and Lippitt, is an important form of participation in democratic society, and is to be valued for gains it provides to both individual and society. Similar themes echo in the works of other pluralists (see Kornhauser 1959:76;

Nisbet 1962:266; Truman 1951:101; and Berle 1959:150).

The case for self-help is made even more strongly by many pluralists. Berger and Neuihaus, for example, note the way in which self-help activities allow the fulfillment of public policy. They cite "the growth of the women's movement, which in some areas is effectively challenging the monopolistic practices of the medical establishment." They go on to suggest that the "ideas of such people as Ivan Illich and Victor Fuchs should be examined for their potential to empower people to reassume responsibility for their own health care. Existing experiments in decentralizing medical delivery systems should also be encouraged with a view toward moving from decentralization to genuine empowerment" (1979:39). Nisbet writes of the contribution of mutual-aid associations in the nineteenth century to the development "of both security and freedom - security within the solidarity of associations founded in response to genuine needs; freedom arising from the very diversity" of associations and their relative autonomy (1962:266).

As for grassroots organizing, the pluralist literature is largely devoid of explicit discussion of it. Kelso does treat the matter directly when he writes of the centrality of "issue publics" in pluralism - noting that such an "interest-public may be a loosely knit group of people who are troubled about a particular problem in their local neighborhood" (1978:62)

The pluralists, thus, value each form of volunteering--but in an order of preference: first, self-help; second, service-volunteering; and third, grassroots action. This order may be explained by their historic preference for order and civility as outcomes of pluralist decision-making. Service volunteering is not usually seen as central to decision-making processes by pluralists, but grassroots organization is often seen as a way of shortcutting more established paths to participation, and thereby of threatening the orderly workings of the pluralist system. The spectre of mass society remains, in the eyes of pluralists, a central threat. Therefore, any form of direct action must be viewed with a wary eye.

VOLUNTEERING IN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

The three forms of volunteering under discussion are generally positively valued by social democrats, as well, although once more there are definite shadings among their preferences.

Service volunteering is the most controversial in the social democratic view. Amitai Etzioni, to take a supportive example, speaks positively of the contributions of "service collectivities" - organizations in which "service to others and a societal cause is a central value (1968:539). Gar Alperovitz writes of the benefits that flow from cooperative activity: "voluntarism and self-help can achieve what centralized propaganda cannot--namely, engender group involvement, cooperative enthusiasm, spontaneity" (1973:80). And Michael Lerner notes that the spirit of volunteerism is not entirely foreign to the new democratic theory, though not at the highest priority: "it is good to put iodine on scratches, but iodine will not cure a malignant tumor. Obviously, a situation in which people are starving or suffering under intolerable conditions cannot be analogized by minor abrasions; hence the revolutionary movement takes on the struggle against poverty, for adequate food, free and adequate health care, and for welfare rights as high priorities" (1973:240).

Marcus Raskin comes closest among the social democrats to a negative position on service volunteerism, when he writes

> Suppose I distribute food to the poor at Thanksgiving time. In itself this is not a bad act--but only because I feel good in the process. I am looked at as being good because I fulfilled a role of being good. But the facts are otherwise. There is no sense of equality or association between me and the one who sets the good, the object of my affection or need. There is also the perverse reinforcement of scarcity and my role as giver in that act. I help the taker reinforce the colonized reality. I am the representative of the hierarchic other now reaffirming the object state of the taker-beneficiary (1971:220).

The social democrats are far less cautionary when they consider self-help. Gartner and Riessman (1974), leading students of self-help point to the contribution of "alternative institutions," many of which operate on the basis of volunteer participation. They particularly focus on such institutions, as organized by young people, which "have been involved in service giving and service receiving in the area of tutoring and a great variety of youth-serving endeavors--runaway houses, crash pads, free clinics, bookstores, educational reform projects, cooperatives, hot lines, vocational and educational clearing houses, peer counseling groups" (1974:85). Seen as ways in which consumers and service receivers can be united, volunteerism can be a part of a socialist strategy of transformation and reorganization, Gartner and Reissman imply.

Self-help appears to be even more strongly supported in the social democratic tradition than by the pluralists. Social democratic theorists see the positive functions of self-help in the black ghetto and youth communes (Cf. Alperovitz, 1973:90), in consciousness raising groups, health collectives, women's caucuses (cf. Lerner, (1973:214-215).

The attractiveness of self-help to social democrats may reflect the belief that such "small groups," to use Lerner's phrase, may easily develop into independent centers of political consciousness and action in times of social change. This faith in decentralized and spontaneous social action also underlies the social democrats' enthusiasm for grassroots movements.

Michael Harrington writes directly of the need to take America's "most cherished conservative myth seriously: that the 'grassroots' should be a spontaneous, natural locus of political life. To make this old saw come true will take a radical reorganization of local and regional government in America - and therefore a frontal assault on a bastion of undemocratic, conservative power" (1968:111).

Lerner (1973:248), Litt and Parenti (1973:249), Alperovitz (1973:93), and Raskin (1974:258) also speak strongly of the contributions of grassroots groups. Raskin notes that such groups may have the "political effect of withdrawing legitimacy from the colonizing apparatus" of State and large institutions, while providing a chance for its participants to embrace

their humanity of developing "projects" for the restructuring of political society along more fully democratic lines. It is this view of democracy as continuing struggle by means of citizen volunteering that marks the social democratic perspective.

CONCLUSION

This paper has reviewed the role of volunteering in five contemporary forms of democratic theory, and has found that volunteering is central to two variants (pluralism and social democracy), highly relevant to a third (populism), viewed rather negatively by a fourth (idealism), and considered nearly irrelevant by a fifth (neo-corporatism). These findings are summarized in Table 1.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
HOW DEMOCRATIC THEORIES EVALUATE VOLUNTEERING

FORM OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY	TYPE OF VOLUNTEERING		
	SERVICE	SELF-HELP	GRASSROOTS ACTION
POPULIST	0	+	+
IDEALIST	-	0	0
PLURALIST	+	+	+
SOCIAL-DEMOCRACY	+	+	+
NEO-CORPORATIST	+	0	-

SYMBOLS

- \- negatively valued
- \+ mixed valuation
- 0 no opinion

Thus, conclusions about the role of volunteering in democratic theory must be conditioned by remarking that they depend upon, first, the form of democratic theory, and, second, the type of volunteering. Variation is far wider among forms of democratic theory in relation to volunteering than among forms of volunteering as viewed from democratic perspectives. There is a tendency for evaluations of service volunteering, self-help, and grassroots participation to be relatively consistent across particular interpretations of democratic theory.

At its core, volunteering provides a means by

which democracy can be built and maintained. Together with the other important forms of voluntary action that sustain democracy--participation in political parties, unions, and other associations--volunteering undergirds the vitality and activity level of a democratic society.

Volunteering matters in democratic theory; it matters a great deal. Susan Greene has put it passionately and convincingly: "without groups of people voluntarily banding together over principles and philosophy, our country would not have been born. Without concerned people voluntarily addressing political, social, and economic inequities, women would not have the vote, nor would orphanages, settlement houses, hospitals, fire departments, and museums have been established. The Abolition Movement was a voluntary movement. The Civil Rights Movement was born in the private sector. From the voluntary sector comes the initiative, experimentation, implementation, and proof of a concept's worth. It is then at this point that the governmental sector, and sometimes the corporate or profit-making sector, can begin to support the proven service, concept, or principle and voluntarism moves on to find other methods, in a million different areas, to improve our civilized society" (1977:2).

Our democracy, in the long run, may prove to be no better than we ourselves. Perhaps even idealist theorists should take that point, so central to their own perspective, to heart in reflecting on the intimate connections between volunteering and the achievement of democracy.

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VOLUNTEERING AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY: RESPONSE TO VAN TIL

Deborah Mayo

The primary claim of VanTil's paper "Volunteering and Democratic Theory" is that volunteering is central to the development and maintenance of democracy. Noting that typically only the more formal types of volunteering, such as labor unions, and consumer professional and civic associations are considered relevant to democracy, Van Til wants to show that the less formal acts of individual volunteering; service volunteering, self-help volunteering and grass-roots volunteerism are relevant to democracy as well. To this end he describes five different theories of democracy: populism, pluralism, idealism, neo-corporatism, and social democracy, and he examines the role of volunteering in each. He concludes that volunteering is either central or highly relevant in the first three while it is viewed negatively or as irrelevant by the remaining two.

However, it is not clear that the evidence upon which he bases his conclusion is adequate. For example, Van Til concludes that idealist views volunteering negatively on the basis of the remarks of idealist Theodore Lowi. Lowi is opposed to proliferation of those voluntary organizations that have "given up their spontaneity for a solid administrative core;" for they tend to make life so highly organized that little is left to individuals or neighborhoods. But it does not follow that an idealist would necessarily be opposed to voluntary organizations run entirely by volunteers, e.g. a women's shelter or an emergency hot-line, and avoid the sort of bureaucracy that Lowi finds oppressive.

In Van Til's initial description of idealism idealists are said to "seek to create community and neighborhood organizations" fostering "mutual discussion and dialogue," and this seems to conflict with his conclusion that idealism views volunteering negatively. Van Til admits that the idealist values volunteering when it is "legitimated by the active will and voice of the people." But he has claimed to be focussing not on formal organizations but only on acts of individual volunteering, and it would seem that such voluntary acts are just the sort of cases

where volunteering is legitimated by the voice of the people. As such it appears that the idealist could well support the type of volunteering being discussed.

Conversely, it seems that those democratic theories in which according to Van Til, volunteering is either central or highly relevant, are consistent with viewing volunteering negatively. Such a negative view would result if it were believed that while people have the right to the benefits provided by the individual acts of volunteering Van Til discusses, it is undersireable for voluntary groups to provide them. Rather, it may be felt that such benefits should be provided by governmental agencies (e.g., welfare). It might be argued that having one's needs satisfied by charitable or other voluntary groups is demeaning, and that it tends to reinforce inequities between the giver and receiver. Indeed, Van Til quotes the social democrat Marcus Raskin as having this sort of view about service volunteering. Raskin claims, "there is no sense of equality or association between me and the one who gets the food" which has been voluntarily given. On this view, volunteering (at least in some of its forms) may be seen to hamper rather than promote the aims of democracy.

It is not clear whether Van Til wants to show that volunteering has in fact contributed to achieving democracy, or that volunteering is somehow essential for fully achieving democracy. If he wants to show the latter, stronger claims, he will have to argue that it is not the case that holding any democratic theory is equally compatible with viewing volunteering positively or negatively. While he does not specifically develop such an argument, one might be able to find the elements scattered through his discussion of specific democratic theorists.

For example the social democrat Gar Alperovitz points out that "volunteerism and self-help can achieve what centralized propaganda cannot--namely, engender group involvement, cooperative enthusiasm, spontaneity." Van Til also notes that the pluralist values volunteering "for its participatory contributions, rather than the service outcomes it provides." Thus it appears that if the same service was provided by the state, essential aims of pluralism would not be achieved. Using such consideration he may be able to show that the aims of each of the democratic theories claimed

to favor volunteering are best accomplished by volunteer associations, and that while the activities that volunteer groups perform could be accomplished by the government this would impede various democratic goals. In this way it may be possible for the stronger claim to be substantiated.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NEIGHBORHOOD EMPOWERMENT

Dick Simpson

Volunteerism occurs at many levels. But most volunteers participate either in their local chapters of state or national organizations or in their local community groups. Since so many volunteers participate locally, it is important to inquire into the role of these neighborhood based organizations.* Have these groups been granted enough power and do they have sufficient resources to make their maximum contributions both to their members and to our society?

Three goals for neighborhoods and local voluntary organizations which would cause us to consider granting them greater public authority and funds are that they provide: 1) increased opportunity for democratic participation, 2) more humane and responsive services- and 3) a greater sense of efficacy and a lessening of alienation for citizens.

These three goals for neighborhoods and neighborhood voluntary organizations are made explicit in the National Neighborhood Platform adopted by 47 local conventions in cities across America attended by over 10,000 neighborhood leaders:

> Rediscovering democracy, we join with neighbors in communities across our land to create a neighborhood movement built upon the belief that people can and should govern themselves democratically and justly. The neighborhood is a political unit which makes this possible;

*(Some of the principal works on why people volunteer their time, work, and money to these groups; what rewards they seek; what rewards they receive; what effects these local groups have upon the world; and what they do for their own members include, de Tocqueville, 1969; Dubeck, 1973; Erbe, 1964; Greer, 1959; Greer and Orleans, 1962; Salem, 1974; Salem, 1978; Selznick, 1969; Sills, 1957 and 1962; Smith, 1966; Wilson, 1962; and Wirth, 1954)

> since the smallness of the neighborhood enables all residents to deliberate, decide, and act together for the common good... People organized in neighborhoods are best able to pronounce and amplify in firm tones the voice of citizens so as to command the respect of government and private institutions. People organized in neighborhood assemblies are best able to create government under their control. (N.A.N., 1979, p.2).

The National Neighborhood Platform also proclaimed the importance of the neighborhood as the locus for delivering humane services:

> People organized in neighborhood, responding to their fellow residents as human beings and families rather than as clients, are best able to provide needed services.....
>
> Certain social services must be provided to the residents of our neighborhoods, and the provision of these social services must promote self-sufficiency, not dependency. Neighborhood organizations are best equipped to identify and provide the social service needs of residents in a way that enhances their human dignity. (N.A.N., 1979, pp. 2 and 7)

In addition the platform took special note of the place of volunteerism in neighborhoods:

> The quality and freedom of community life require deep and widely shared voluntary citizen action and commitment by neighborhood residents. The activities of volunteers in neighborhood organizations should be increased and strongly supported by the public and private sectors. (N.A.N., 1979, p.7)

It went on to make several recommendations that detailed how such support could be implemented, including the development of leadership training courses for neighborhood organizations, tax deductions for volunteer work, and access to bulk mailing rates for

neighborhood volunteer associations.

Finally, the National Neighborhood Platform offered a vision of the neighborhood as a place for the fulfillment of human capacities as well as providing a sense of efficacy and control over our own destiny:

> In response, we now turn to our neighborhoods and communities to fulfill our human capacities as citizens by participating in making those decisions which directly affect our lives. Rediscovering citizenship in our neighborhoods, we reaffirm the principles of freedom, justice, and equality upon which our nation was founded. We believe that those who are affected by the decisions of government must be consulted by those who govern; that it is the right of citizens to have access to the instruments of power; and that it is their duty to learn to use them effectively and wisely. (N.A.N., 1969, p.1).

POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL ACCEPTANCE OF NEIGHBORHOODS

This positive view of the neighborhoods as the locus of democratic participation, humane services, and human development has yet to penetrate fully more established institutions such as the political parties and major candidates for public office. However, both have recognized the importance of neighborhoods and neighborhood organizations in their platforms for the first time.

The Democrats, following the Carter Urban Policy, have emphasized a partnership with neighborhoods and have recognized the importance of achieving community development without housing and resident displacement. They said in their 1980 platform plank on neighborhoods:

> During the 1980s we must continue our efforts to strengthen neighborhoods by:
>
> Making neighborhood organizations partners with government and private sectors in neighborhood revitalization projects.

> Continuing to make neighborhood concerns a major element of our urban policy.
>
> Developing urban revitalization programs that can be achieved without displacing neighborhood residents.
>
> Continuing to reduce discriminatory re-lining practices in the mortgage and insurance industries. (1980 Democratic Platform Committee, 1980, pp. 46-67).

The Republicans also recognized neighborhoods in their 1980 platform:

> The quality of American neighborhoods is the ultimate test of the success of failure of government policies for the cities, for housing, and for law enforcement....We are...committed to nurturing the spirit of self-help and cooperation through which so many neighborhoods have revitalized themselves and served their residents....
>
> A Republican Administration will focus its efforts to revitalize neighborhoods in five areas. We will:
>
> Cut taxes... and stimulate capital investment; create jobs;
>
> Create and apply new tax incentives... to stimulate economic growth...
>
> Encourage our citizens to undertake neighborhood revitalization and preservation programs in cooperation with three essential local interests: local government, neighborhood property owners and residents, and local financial institutions;
>
> Replace the categorical aid programs with block grant or revenue sharing programs...
>
> Remain fully committed to the fair enforcement of all federal civil rights statutes...
>
> The revitalization of American cities will proceed from the revitalization of the

neighborhoods. (1980 Republican National Convention Platform, 1980, pp. 13-14)

With Ronald Reagan's sweeping election as President in 1980, the Republican view is of particular importance. It means that the rhetoric of self-help and volunteerism rather than community control will guide neighborhood programs by the government during the next four years. There will be fewer government grants available to local organizations to run social service programs and more tax incentives for neighborhood business development and an encouragement of charitable contributions to community groups. Budget cutting will, however, have negative impacts. Among the Reagan budget cuts which will harm neighborhoods are the following:

1) The Legal Services Corporation, which in 1980 served over one million poor people is to be eliminated.

2) VISTA. In 1977, ACTION found that each VISTA volunteer generated an average of $35,000 in resources for his or her community, but VISTA is to be eliminated by 1983.

3) The Community Services Administration, which provides funds at the local level to administer local programs, mobilize resources, coordinate service delivery and provide for the needs of low income people. Some of these programs were put into a block grant program but it is expected that most of the community action agencies and their current activities will be eliminated.

4) The Neighborhood Self-Help Development Program, which provides financial assistance to neighborhood organizations to undertake specific projects to revitalize their communities was eliminated.

5) CETA. The administration's proposal ended all Public Service Employment (PSE) meant lost employment opportunities for approximately 500,000 people, 41% of whom are minorities, and it will also mean a loss of services to neighborhood groups and local governments.

6) Title XX Social Service Programs, which provide matching grants to states for social services for

the poor (including day care, child abuse and child neglect programs, and services to the elderly), were cut.

7) The Community Development Block Grant Program, which allocates funds to local governments to finance a wide range of housing community development and economic development activities has lost funding and its elimination is being discussed.

8) Section 502 Loan Development Company Program of the Small Business Administration, which offers guaranteed and direct loans to qualifying local development corporations either profit or non-profit corporations authorized to promote and assist small business growth and development in the community where they operate, was cut back.

9) The Subsidized Housing Program, which provide rent subsidies to low income tenants living in Section 8 housing, public housing and other HUD subsidized housing units, was cut and now may be eliminated.

10) Community Health Centers. The Administration proposed integrating this program into the health services block grant in FY82 while reducing its FY81 funding of $325 million by 25%. States would be free to use their discretion to fund community health center; 932 health center projects in 862 cities face elimination or reduced support.

(Much of the information on these budget cuts is taken from Sandy Solomon and Ken Kirchner, 1981)

IDEOLOGICAL BASIS AND PRACTICAL EXPERIMENTS IN NEIGHBORHOOD EMPOWERMENT

Despite the actual budget cuts, the neighborhood movement and neighborhood empowerment are supported by both liberals and conservatives. From a conservative perspective, such as is now politically dominant, participation in ones neighborhood is a fulfillment of the Christian commandment: "Thou shall love thy neighbor as thyself." As Cardinal Karol Wojtyla (now Pope John Paul II) explained:

> Participation is closely associated with both the community and the parsonalistic

> value. This is precisely why it cannot be manifested solely by membership in some community but through this membership must reach to the humanness of every man. Only because of the share in humanness itself, which is at the roots of the notion of "neighbor," does the dynamic feature of participation attain its personal depth as well as its universal dimension... We may say this participation serves the fulfillment of persons in any community in which they act and exist. The ability to share in the humanness itself of every man is the very core of all participation...

Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus enlarge this view of human nature to include the neighborhood as an important mediating structure between individuals:

> The contradiction between wanting more government services and less government may be only apparent... the modern welfare state is here to stay, indeed that it ought to expand the benefits it provides--but...alternative mechanisms are possible to provide welfare - state services. (Berger and Neuhaus, 1977, p.1)

Mechanisms such as the family and the neighborhood are seen as critical mediating structures by Berger and Neuhaus.

Altogether conservative politics supports empowering existing neighborhood organizations in order to conserve traditional moral values and traditional institutions such as church and family. This leads logically to strengthening neighborhood institutions and to creating neighborhood government as an alternative to massive national government. These "mediating structures," such as neighborhood organizations, provide the proper link between the lone citizen and his or her society and provide services in a form that promotes the dignity of the individual.

Thus, most surprisingly, ideologies of the left and the right converge in theory to support neighborhood empowerment and neighborhood government. Not only is there support for neighborhood empowerment in the United States but there are experiments with various

forms of decentralization of governmental authority in most industrized nations of the world. (Nanetti 1979, 1980 and forthcoming; Sharpe, 1979; Stavrcianas, 1976)

Of the European nations Italy is probably most advanced. Bologna first adopted a policy of decentralization in 1963 which by 1974 delegated the following powers to its neighborhoods:

> 1) formation and approval of neighborhood budgets; 2) release of building permits; 3) planning of neighborhood public facilities; 4) planning of the neighborhood commercial network; 5) implementation of the process of social management of all neighborhood public services; 6) neighborhood traffic planning; and 7) planning for the use of municipally owned land in the neighborhood. (Nanetti, 1979, p.167).

Then in 1976 Italy adopted national law 278 which established a framework for neighborhood government in all Italian cities with more than 40,000 people. As this law has been implemented in cities such as Florence; it has meant dividing the city into neighborhoods, electing neighborhood councils at official city elections, giving them authority over local services such as the parks, rehabilitating villas as historic landmarks not for housing but as community centers run by the neighborhood councils, allocating $300,000 a year to each neighborhood to spend as it chooses within general city guidelines.

Norway is perhaps the second most advanced European nation in decentralization experiments. The first official Neighborhood Council system was established in Oslo in 1973 despite attempts throughout the 1960s to achieve them. (Stokkeland, 1980, p.2) The creation of Neighborhood Councils has not required any change in laws because there was already provision for "municipal committees." There has been pressure to adopt new laws to change electoral and municipal jurisdictions to encourage further development of Neighborhood Councils but this has not yet occured. Nonetheless 19 muncipalities have officially established Neighborhood Councils and 22 others have some type of special semi-public relationship with community organizations. All members of the Neighborhood Councils are appointed but the municipal government is in many

cases officially and legally required to consult Neighborhood Councils in their policy-making. Neighborhood Councils in Oslo have developed official neighborhood area plans to include "estimates of the present and future needs of the neighborhood...to become premises for the overall city planning." (Stokkeland, 1980, p.12). Three of the ten urban municipalities with councils provide funds to their neighborhood councils which in Oslo amounts to between $15,000-$20,000 a year.

Nor are Italy and Norway alone. A movement for greater decentralization began in England with metropolitan reorganization and the London Government Act of 1963 which created the two-tier government of Greater London. (Nanetti, 1979, p.165). The thirty-two autonomous boroughs are, of course, much larger than neighborhoods with most of them having between 200,000-250,000 inhabitants but this decentralization has sparked discussions of neighborhood government not only in London but in the smaller cities and towns. Several government committees and commissions have called for neighborhood government and the Labor Party appears now committed to instituting neighborhood government when they regain their power in Parliament. Most importantly, a national Association for Neighborhood Councils was founded in 1970 for the explicit purpose of creating just such a national system of elected neighborhood councils. The dominant fact of the European experiments is the spontaneous growth of a neighborhood movement in all the industrialized nations and in the effort to empower neighborhood organizations and neighborhood governments with duties and authority which have previously been held only be the centralized government. It suggests that industrialization itself and the achievement of a mass, urban society demands counterdevelopments towards decentralization to overcome the inevitable problems of impersonal governance, alienation, and positively to mobilize the voluntary capacities of people to tackle their own problems in their own communities more successfully than a remote, bureaucratic government alone can manage.

Obviously neighborhood empowerment can mean quite different things to different people. What powers would such be granted neighborhood organizations? The National Association of Neighborhoods has proposed the following powers for neighborhood groups:

1) A stronger voice regarding how federal and state funds are spent in their neighborhoods.

2) Authority to prepare and present a neighborhood development plan to guide future federal Revenue-Sharing and Community Development Block Grant expenditures.

3) The ability and authority to monitor all government programs in their neighborhoods.

4) Public funds or grants to allow them to be staffed sufficiently to carry out these enlarged public duties.

5) The ability to define their own geographic boundaries.

6) The right to public access to city and state government documents which are withheld from citizens now in many jurisdictions.

7) Notice of all plans for city programs in their neighborhoods in advance, with the right to local public hearings on matters of special concern, and the requirement of a neighborhood impact statement on all public works programs funded by government funds. (N.A.N., 1979, pp.4-6).

There are of course, those who oppose empowering existing neighborhood organizations. This opposition appears to arise on three grounds. One involves the uncertainty about what is a neighborhood, the second involves the standards a neighborhood organization should meet if it is to be granted official, quasi-governmental powers, and the third is fear that neighborhood will be parochial and discriminatory.

A neighborhood is simply a community of people living in a contiguous geographical area which the residents themselves recognize as a neighborhood. Like a nation, it usually has some common features such as a common language. For the purpose of granting formal powers to neighborhood organizations the Congress might reasonably decide to set some size restrictions on neighborhoods eligible to perform these duties so that only neighborhoods with more than some number, say between 10,000 and 50,000 residents, could qualify. Similarly, neighborhood organizations eligible to

exercise these powers might be required to have their membership open to all residents in the neighborhood, to elect their own officers and to determine their organization's policies by democratic procedures.

Some opponents of "neighborhood empowerment" fear that neighborhoods will use these powers parochically and will discriminate against minority groups. While neighborhood leaders reject this fear as unfounded, discrimination must be understood to be unlawful no matter which level of government might practice it. Thus, any neighborhood empowerment legislation might reasonably propose safeguards specifically to prevent its use to aid discrimination.

NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT

Many who favor neighborhood empowerment also favor neighborhood government as the long term solution to our societal problems. Neighborhood government is in many respects as old as the practice of democratic government. It is similar to Athenian democracy 2500 years ago as well as our own New England town hall meetings 200 years ago. Athenian democracy allowed 40,000 citizens to participate directly in the Assembly which made the laws and guided the government, to serve on the juries which decided guilt or innocence as well as punishments, and to serve on a rotating basis in the key executive positions.

Neighborhood or community government with Ward Assemblies was vigorously recommended by Thomas Jefferson as the means of achieving the revolutionary ideal of Republican Government, which he defined as "a government by its citizens in mass acting directly and personally according to rules established by the majority; and that every other government is more or less republican in proportion as it has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct action of the citizen." Edward Dumbauld explains the practical aspects of Jefferson's theory of republican government as follows:

> With regard to the machinery of government, Jefferson also favored the principle that all questions would be decided by those whom they concern. This meant the application of a system of federalism or "government gradation." Local concerns

> would be dealt with at the local level. Jefferson favored the division of counties into "wards" for the administration of affairs affecting only groups of that size. County, state, national and international concerns would be handled by progressively wider units in the political hierarchy. (Jefferson, 1955, p. xxix)

Today neighborhood government experiments based on Athenian and Jeffersonian principles range from neighborhood advisory councils to "Little City Halls," and occur in more than 100 American cities. The National Neighborhood Platform recommended that these neighborhood governments be granted the following powers:

> The ability to raise tax revenues, to incur bond indebtedness, to enter into inter-jurisdictional agreements, to settle neighborhood disputes, to contract with the City or with private providers of services, to conduct elections, to sue and be sued, to determine planning, zoning and land use, to exercise limited eminent domain, to undertake public investment, to provide public and social services, and the ability to operate proprietory enterprises. (N.A.N., 1979, p.5).

Based upon experiments around the country and particularly in Chicago's 44th Ward, the type of neighborhood government to be preferred can be further specified. In large American cities like Chicago there should be four components to neighborhood government:

1) Ward Assemblies or Neighborhood Advisory Councils in each neighborhood of the city or at least in all neighborhoods in which residents indicate their willingness to participate more fully in government by collecting petition signatures.

2) Administrative decentralization in the form of "Little City Halls" with Ward or Neighborhood Managers chosen by the Neighborhood Advisory Councils and Neighborhood Service Cabinets to co-ordinate the delivery of city services in each neighborhood.

3) Specialized units of neighborhood government for planning such as Community Zoning Boards and Traffic Review Commissions.

4) A city-wide, or preferably metropolitan, Congress of Neighborhoods with representatives from every ward, neighborhood, and suburb to guide general city or metropolitan policy-making.

The central unit of neighborhood government would be the legislative, participatory branch. These Neighborhood Advisory Councils or Ward Assemblies should have a minimum of at least fifty voting members. Some will be larger and a few, smaller according to the population in the neighborhood they represent. These voting members may be chosen by several different methods: 1) members appointed by the Mayor and the City Council from among both community residents and neighborhood businessmen, 2) community organization members selected by each group with more than 25 or 50 members, and 3) at-large, elected delegates chosen either at mass public meetings for the entire neighborhood, or preferably elected at meetings of small geographical areas or precincts within the neighborhood. As we have seen from the European experiments, it would also be possible to elect them directly as we elect City Council members in United States.

In addition to these voting members of the Neighborhood Advisory Councils, elected officials such as City Councilmen and State Legislators should be ex-officio member--perhaps even serving as chairpersons of the NAC's. All residents of the community also should be automatically non-voting members with the right to attend and to address the NAC.

The responsibilities and duties of the Neighborhood Advisory Councils or Ward Assemblies would include:

A. The Council shall consider the needs of the neighborhood it serves, and shall cooperate, consult, assist and advise any public official, agency, local administrator or local legislative body with respect to any matter relating to the welfare of the neighborhood and its residents.

B. The Council shall meet regularly with its City or Metropolitan Councilman to advise them on the specific needs of the neighborhood and on pending

city or metropolitan legislation.

C. The Council shall consult with city and other governmental agencies on the capital needs of the neighborhood, participate in capital and operating budget consultations, and shall hold public hearings on the capital project and service needs of the community.

D. The Council shall prepare comprehensive and special purpose plans for the growth, improvement, and development of the neighborhood. If a separate Community Zoning Board and Community Planning Board are not established it should have the power to review and decide, at least as the agency of first hearing, upon applications for zoning variations, zoning map amendments, and development plans.

Obviously, to fulfill these duties the NAC's must meet regularly at least once a month and must be provided full time staff to prepare for these meetings.

The second, more administrative unit of neighborhood government is what some cities such as Boston call "Little City Halls" and what the suburbs have called for years "City Managers." Obviously, inherent in the concept of neighborhood government is the idea that cities will be divided into Wards or Neighborhoods. These local units, under the guidance of their own NAC's, would hire their own Ward or Neighborhood Manager to coordinate the delivery of city services to the community. He or she would be charged not only with coordinating service delivery but with handling all service complaints, presiding over meetings of the Neighborhood Service Cabinet, and carrying out those special programs and projects assigned to him or her by the NAC's.

In addition to the Neighborhood Manager, a Neighborhood Service Cabinet composed of various city agency officials and representatives from the NAC would be responsible for coordinating and planning service delivery in the ward. Thus, the Cabinet should include representatives of the city agencies and other local units of government (such as special districts) which provide services on a regular basis in the neighborhood, plus the Neighborhood Manager, the City Councilman, and other representatives of the Neighborhood

Advisory Council. Special agencies of government involved in neighborhood programs from time to time may also be invited to join in special meetings of the Cabinet. The Neighborhood Service Cabinet should meet regularly, as often as once a week in the morning.

If the NAC's do not themselves handle all planning functions, there will be a need for specialized units of Neighborhood Government to undertake them. These units provide a public forum in the community in which proposed zoning changes and neighborhood plans from traffic patterns to public works projects can be discussed and decided. It is critical to take these decisions on the physical future of our neighborhoods out of the private boardrooms of developers, smoke-filled rooms of politicians, small government offices and downtown hearing rooms. Citizens who will have to live with the consequences of these physical plans for decades must have a voice in making these decisions. Hearings before local boards provide for local input and something approaching community control.

The final unit of neighborhood government, which has been proposed but not implemented by Mayor Byrne of Chicago, would be a city-wide or metropolitan Congress of Neighborhoods. It would be composed of neighborhood delegates or representatives including at least one elected representative from each NAC, all NAC Chairpersons, and all Neighborhood Managers. In addition the Mayor, city councilmen, and department heads would serve as ex-officio members. The Congress of Neighborhoods would:

A. Improve communication and coordination among the NAC's city departments, and the Mayor.

B. Suggest and help to implement city-wide programs, plans, and projects of assistance to the neighborhoods.

C. Provide feedback to the Mayor and city departments on proposed community programs.

D. Review comprehensive plans that affect more than one neighborhoods, mediate any disputes between NAC's and provide NAC's with information on plans which affect local neighborhoods.

The Congress of Neighborhoods should elect its own steering committee and adopt its own resolutions on

public policies by a 2/3's vote of those neighborhood delegates who are present and voting.

Neighborhood government is not just abstract political theory, it has been tried in hundreds of cities both in the United States and abroad. One of these experiments is in Chicago. Between 1972 and 1981 in Chicago's 44th Ward there were major experiments in neighborhood government, which included a 44th Ward Assembly with elected delegates from each precinct and community organization in the neighborhood. These delegates since 1972 by their deliberations mandated their Alderman's vote in the Chicago City Council. Ward Assembly delegates have proposed new legislation which their Alderman introduced and projects which were undertaken in the community without requiring official city approval. (For a detailed analysis of this experiment see Salem, 1974, 1978, and 1980; Simpson, et.al., 1979; and Simpson, 1979)

The accomplishments of the 44th Ward Assembly during this decade were numerous. Perhaps most important was the existence of the assembly itself as a model of the type of neighborhood government which is possible. Also, the 44th Ward Assembly provided the critical manpower to deliver a 44th Ward Almanac with reports on the state of the neighborhood and a guide to city services to 30,000 families. It conducted a 44th Ward Fair every year with displays of community art, photographs, ethnic foods, community organization exhibits, and children's games for the 3,000 people who attended. The Assembly undertook special drives such as fund drives for local private food pantries which feed the hungry of the community. In the area of services, the 44th Ward Assembly identified sites for playlots and parks which have been built. It planned truck load limits which keep trucks over 5 tons in weight off sidestreets. It coordinated special service efforts on trash baskets, garbage pickup and street sweeping. Moreover, the Chicago's anti-redlining law which has since become the model for cities throughout the nation was developed by the assembly. Finally, it offered amendments to a variety of city legislation on issues such as unit pricing and condominium conversions that have become law.

A Community Zoning Board, Traffic Review Commission, and Spanish-Speaking Assembly, Asamblea Abireta, also existed in the 44th Ward from 1974-1981. The

Community Zoning Board has heard over 40 zoning cases including the controversial legislation to down-zone the Lakefront of the community to prevent further high-rise construction. It was upheld in all of its decisions except one in which the community itself was divided. The Traffic Review Commission modified the one-way street system and approved stop signs and traffic lights. Asamblea Abierta undertook a number of ambitious projects including suing the City of Chicago for discriminating in the hiring of Latinos.

It is not necessary to detail the successes and failures of neighborhood government in the one hundred cities where it has been tried. Given the successes which have been achieved, it is sufficient to point out that neighborhood government is the only system which can allow for democratic participation; it is one of the few means by which higher levels of government can be held accountable by our communities; and it is the only system which can provide humane and responsive government services. It is for these reasons that neighborhood leaders are dedicated not only to empowering existing neighborhood organizations but to full neighborhood government in the future.

Experience in the 44th Ward also suggests that Neighborhood Government is most securely built upon a base of existing voluntary organizations. It is not by chance that a major portion of the delegates to the 44th Ward Assembly, Asamblea Abierta, Community Zoning Board, and Traffic Review Commission were explicitly selected representatives of community organizations which had existed for up to 25 years in the Lakeview community. Such organizations were given the explicit right to either elect or to recommend their representatives to the various units of the Neighborhood Government. These voluntary organizations are particularly important because they teach citizens to cooperateate in common tasks, help form a clear point of view which can be articulated as part of public deliberations, and provide through their own decision-making processes the essential training necessary for participating effectively in democratic institutions. Thus, experience with voluntary organizations is useful for participants in Neighborhood Government and because citizens are already organized by the voluntary organizations it becomes easier to insure their fair representation and for their members in the Neighborhood Government to make inportant contributions to its

success.

Neighborhood Government is itself a kind of voluntary organization. Citizens volunteer to serve as delegates, to attend meetings, and to speak out. The processes used in Neighborhood Government decision-making are also similar to those of other active voluntary organizations--issues are proposed, discussed, and voted upon. Neighborhood Government differs primarily in that it attempts to gain official governmental powers through the passage of laws to enforce the decisions which have been reached by the Neighborhood Government.

For most neighborhoods, building successful voluntary organizations in their community is the critical first step in attempting to create Neighborhood Government. Empowering those organizations to be more effective does not detract from Neighborhood government but helps to set the stage.

CRITICS OF NEIGHBORHOOD EMPOWERMENT AND NEIGHBORHOOD GOVERNMENT

As with neighborhood empowerment, not everyone supports neighborhood government. Critics believe that 1) neighborhood government is too parochial because neighbors will make decisions against the common good of the entire city; 2) neighborhoods do not have the leadership skills or the practical resources to govern themselves; 3) the proliferation of governments would make government even more unmanageable than it is already; 4) the cost of staffing these new governments is simply too great since the same governmental services can be delivered under existing systems; 5) the benefits of neighborhood government are minimal and 6) the voluntary, self-sacrificing effort required to sustain neighborhood government is not possible in modern day America with competing jobs demands and entertainment opportunities.

The fear of parochialism and narrow self-interest in communities is not without some foundation. Certainly many white suburban communities have been unwilling to integrate voluntarily either their housing or their schools nor have they willingly shared their wealthier tax base with the inner city faced with providing more expensive social services. Why should we think that city neighborhoods will behave differently

than suburbs and, if not, why should we foster more parochialism?

The answer from participatory democratic theorists has always been that participating in decision-making is the best way of educating the public to broader self-interest rather than narrow self-interest and parochialism. The experience with the 44th Ward Assembly in Chicago bears this out. Residents from different parts of the community came for the first time really to understand the problems of people and business in other sections of the ward, to discover their common problems on which they could undertake joint efforts and to defer solution of their own lesser problems in order to concentrate on more serious ones for other community members. They also began to consider problems in a city wide perspective and to recommend city, state and national legislation which would provide a common solution for everyone.

As for the argument that neighborhoods lack the requisite leadership, leaders are created to a large extent out of the experience of leading and taking responsibility for common enterprises. In short, given opportunity, authority, experience, practice and responsibility the neighborhoods provide a vast untapped reservoir of leadership. This can not be proved a priori but experience with groups like the 44th Ward Assembly have supported this view with hard evidence of many new leaders born through participation in neighborhood government. Of course, good leadership is required to properly begin a neighborhood government, it cannot just be accomplished by fiat or by law but the dividends in terms of new leaders is vast.

The proliferation of governments is a spurious argument. If there are too many already, as I believe, many of the special district and overlapping local governments can be collapsed. In Cook County, Illinois there are 520 existing units of local government. If metropolitan and neighborhood governments were the dominant form, considerably less than 200 local units of government would be needed. But even if neighborhood government were added to existing governments and none were eliminated we would not pass some tipping point from good to bad government and we would gain, what we do not get from existing governments, democracy.

As to costs and benefits, the modest costs of

staffing neighborhood government would be amply repaid in more humane services, citizen participation, and a return to democracy.

There are several methods of achieving neighborhood government. A good beginning point would be neighborhood empowerment legislation passed at both national and local levels. As to neighborhood government, the states should pass enabling legislation to establish the common framework for neighborhood government with the state. The federal government can help by attaching a rider to Revenue-Sharing and Community Development Block Grant funding to allow funds to go only to those states which have passed legislation establishing neighborhood government and to cities which have established at least the minimal forms of neighborhood government needed to allow neighborhood input and veto over the spending of public funds in their communities.

The other alternative is to create neighborhood government strictly at the local level as has occurred in some cities charter or by initiative through petitions to put a charter change on the ballot where that is legal. It may be accomplished by a simple city or county ordinance. Or it may be achieved by voluntary covenants between elected officials and their communities. All are possible presently and all can succeed. Eventually, however, neighborhood government, if it is to be permanent, must become a matter of law, and probably through a combination of city, state, and national legislation.

Even though there are various ways to begin neighborhood government, there is one principal condition necessary for it to succeed--volunteerism, or as it is usually called in discussions of democratic government, citizen participation. Neighborhood government clearly demands self-sacrifice on the part of many citizens if it is to succeed. Voluntary action and a willingness to give time and money is a particularly American tradition. It is true that current economic stresses which force Americans to spend more time with their paying employment, take second jobs, and pinch pennies may make volunteerism more difficult. It is also true that television provides more compelling entertainment to distract citizens from participating in duller, real life meetings.

However, the need for volunteerism and citizen participation can be met even under modern conditions provided that we do not demand that every citizen participate in making every decision and that we grant real powers to neighborhood organizations and neighborhood governments. For the purposes of democracy it is enough if every citizen has a realistic opportunity to participate in neighborhood organizations and in neighborhood governments at different times during their life. But they will be motivated to participate only if their neighborhood organizations and units of neighborhood government have actual control over some neighborhood decisions importance to them and some binding authority to influence the outcome of decisions at higher levels of government. It is for this reason that the neighborhood movement in America pursues the twin goals of neighborhood empowerment and neighborhood government. Both are essential to democracy. Both elevate volunteerism to patriotic citizenship.

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GOVERNMENT FUNDING AND THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR: IMPACTS AND OPTIONS

Nelson Rosenbaum

The activities of the voluntary sector have a special value for society. Because voluntary institutions are not as constrained as either government or business in the things they may do, or the ways in which they may do them, the voluntary sector can act as a catalyst of innovation, operating on the frontiers of human initiative and imagination. It can also, at the opposite end of the spectrum, act on a much more homely and human scale than either government or business to help individuals in need.

The activities of the voluntary sector are, in the broadest sense, motivated by the interest of the individuals and institutions performing them in increasing in some way the stock of human welfare. They vary widely in scope and scale, ranging from reading to the blind in a local community to multimillion dollar programs of research into improved varieties of foodgrains. They have traditionally been initiated by the voluntary impulses of individual men and women who perceive a social need and have been supported by voluntary gifts of money, goods or time.

An extensive voluntary sector is a quintessentially American phenomenon. It reflects and celebrates those values of pluralism, diversity, and individualism which are distinctively part of the American heritage. This tradition contrasts sharply with Europe's centralized statism, whether of the totalitarian or democratic variety. The idea that individuals might voluntarily come together to try new and alternative ways of doing things, or that they might help those in need without government support or approval, is not uniquely American, but it is deeply rooted in this country's origins, has been developed to a uniquely high degree here, and has served this country well in terms of concrete social and economic benefits.

In recent years, however, the voluntary sector has confronted a set of developments which has raised serious issues about the continued existence of voluntary institutions as independent, innovative organizations. Foremost among these developments is the

increasing dependence of voluntary sector institutions upon government financial support. Since the mid-1960s government has greatly expanded the scope of its domestic activities. Multi-billion dollar health and welfare programs, increased support for the arts and humanities, extensive community development activities, and wide-ranging subsidies for research and education have brought government agencies into areas previously financed largely by voluntary contributions, foundation grants, and user fees. Because voluntary institutions have an established record of achievement and service in these areas, government funds in the form of grants and contracts have been increasingly offered to these agencies for the purpose of carrying out specific programs (Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, 1975; Smith, 1978; Wedel, 1973).

IMPACTS

In many respects this greatly expanded intercourse between government and voluntary institutions has had positive and mutually beneficial effects. From the perspective of the voluntary sector, it has allowed agencies and organizations to expand their operations to meet a broader range of needs. As a recent study of New York social agencies concluded, "In the most positive sense, government funding has played a key role in helping the voluntary sector maintain existing services and extend these services to segments of the population which, heretofore, it could not afford to reach (Hartogs and Weber, 1978: iii).

From the perspective of government, the utilization of voluntary, non-profit organizations to deliver services or carry out research has avoided the need for massive increases in direct public employment. It has also allowed services to be delivered more efficiently by taking advantage of existing networks that have been built up over many years.

In light of these benefits, neither government nor the voluntary sector would welcome or initiate a reduction in current levels of government support. Indeed, most voluntary sector leaders seek higher levels of government support. Certain subsectors, such as education and health, have developed highly-effective lobbying organizations to press their case for increased government support.

Yet all is not well in the relationship between

government and the voluntary sector. I refer not to the everyday problems of conflict over specific accountability requirements, payment schedules, and so on. These "technical" issues of grant and contract administration are vitally important and deserve intense scrutiny on their own merits. But they are not really unique to the voluntary sector's relationship with government. Nor do they touch upon the unique function and potential of the voluntary sector as a source of innovation and independent action in society. Rather, the problems I refer to are structural in nature--that is, they affect the basic management and governance of voluntary institutions and, in turn, their ability to continue serving in an independent, innovative role.

MANAGEMENT IMPACT

With respect to the management of voluntary institutions, the predominant structural impact of increased government funding is acceleration of the trend toward bureaucratization. To be sure, bureaucratization is not solely a consequence of government funding. The voluntary sector has not escaped the general emphasis within our society upon professional management and organizational efficiency. As voluntary sector institutions have grown larger over the past several decades --particularly in the health care, social service, and educational arenas--some degree of increased specialization and professionalization of administrative tasks is to be expected. Yet, it is the enormous administrative burden of applying for, and accounting for, government funds that has accelerated this trend to the point that it threatens the flexibility and freedom of voluntary organizations.

To put it baldly, administrative work threatens to dominate substantive work in many voluntary organizations. Following the pattern of the government agencies that provide the funds, administrative work is increasingly carried out by specialized personnel with titles such as contract administration specialist, fiscal affairs officer, equal employment opportunity officer, proposal writer, auditor, and so on. In keeping with the imperatives of bureaucracy (as required by government), memos must be written, clearances obtained, reports filed, etc. Each administrative staffer, as a highly-trained professional, demands and deserves a substantial salary and fringe benefit package.

From one perspective, the bureaucratization of the voluntary sector is a welcome development, replacing amateurism and crisis management with professionalism and planning. The previously-cited study of New York voluntary agencies concludes that, "...bureaucratic management is what some of the agencies need to develop sound management practices" (Hartogs and Weber,1978: 13). Indeed, if one views government funding as the dominant component of voluntary sector support in the future, as many do, then bureaucratization can be seen as an essential condition of survival. The same study finds (also on p. 13): "The large budget agencies, on the other hand, have as a distinct advantage the fact that they are developing into a classical bureaucracy. In that respect, they should be in the best position to deal with government funding sources who have already successfully completed the bureaucratization process."

However, from the perspective of maintaining diversity, flexibility, and willingness to innovate and experiment, the growth of bureaucracy in voluntary institutions has chilling implications. Part of the distinctiveness of the voluntary sector, part of its unique contribution, is that most voluntary organizations have been "lean" on administration, allowing them to put most of their dollars into program and facilitating rapid, flexible response to changing social conditions and needs. Necessary administrative work has often been carried out by volunteers or by pro bono efforts of professionals in the community. As voluntary organizations become more like business and government, these qualities are at peril. A Filer Commission research report found that voluntary organizations are increasingly characterized by "heavy routines, administrative uniformity, homogenization of approach, and safe, traditional patterns of operation" (Levy and Nielsen, 1975: 1035).

Perhaps it is simply nostalgia to long for an era that may be gone forever. Perhaps we must all get on the bandwagon of bureaucratization and accommodate ourselves to the inevitable. But before succumbing to this trend, voluntary institutions need to take a hard look at the ultimate implications for their role in society. Bureaucratization affects not only their ability to initiate and innovate, but also their ability to attract the continued private support that constitutes the crucial counter-weight to government funding. Already, there is a great deal of sensitivity about administrative costs in charitable solicitation regu-

lation. Citizens are increasingly leary of voluntary agencies that spend a high proportion of the contributed dollar on administrative costs. A special irony here is that government often fails to cover the full cost of the administrative work necessitated by its grants and contracts and the balance must come from the contributed dollar. Thus, citizens wind up subsidizing government-instigated bureaucratization.

GOVERNANCE IMPACT

Equally as serious as the impact of government funding upon voluntary sector management is its impact on governance. The threat here is that as the proportion of funding from government grows and the proportion of private volunteer support declines, non-profit organizations may lose the intimate grassroots contact and independence of outlook and direction that constitutes a vital part of their unique position. Of course, some organizations have never had much grassroots contact, deriving their support primarily from foundation funds or the contributions of a small group of wealthy individuals. But, for the most part, the discipline of seeking charitable contributions and donations of volunteer time from the public has kept voluntary organizations in close contact with their communities and responsive to changing community needs. Indeed, a large number of voluntary agencies are membership organizations with a formal structure of democratic control by the membership through the Board of Directors.

There are some disturbing signs of change in these governance patterns precipitated by government funding. Foremost among these is that Boards of Directors appear to be "distancing" themselves from the direction of voluntary agencies as the proportion of government funding increases. Other than receiving pro forma notification of applications for government funds, Board members played little role in seeking or directing the government-funded programs operated by the agencies in the New York study. Decreased levels of Board member participation in agency governance were ascribed to: 1) less urgency in fund raising due to government support; 2) diminished control of policy due to the detailed terms of government grants and contracts; and 3) concern with increased Board member legal responsibility in the context of accountability requirements imposed by government (Hartogs and Weber, 1978: 79). The consequence of Board alienation is

that the community outreach and independent views of active citizens who are willing to serve on the Board are lost. Staff is then left in the position of hustling government support on terms dictated by the government and in accordance with government definitions of social needs and conditions. This is not to say that government perceptions are necessarily inaccurate or misguided. Indeed, given the extensive processes of citizen participation accompanying most government programs in recent years, government agencies may be as firmly in touch with the grassroots as any voluntary agency. Yet we have historically valued pluralism and diversity in this nation. The threat to these qualities represented by the alienation of active citizens in voluntary agencies must be acknowledged.

A second cause for concern about the governance of voluntary institutions is that the real level of giving and volunteering in non-profit institutions has stagnated in recent years (Nelson, 1975; Nielsen, 1979; and Weisbrod, 1977). This weakening of the voluntary impulse--the sentiment that is the wellspring of all independent efforts to improve human welfare--has many causes among which government tax policies, the corrosive effects of inflation upon consumer purchasing power, and the change in women's roles are prominent. Yet the stagnation in public support may also be at least partly attributed to public perception of increased government funding for voluntary sector functions. Under the circumstances, the ordinary citizen can be forgiven for believing that he or she is making an adequate (or even excessive) contribution to the cost of improving the general welfare through paying taxes. The consequence is that voluntary organizations become even more dependent for their support upon government.

Unfortunately, most voluntary organizations have not counteracted this "unanticipated consequence" of government funding by broadening their outreach to the community, improving their accessibility, and making a strong case for continued private support. Yet it is these actions upon which the future of voluntary organizations as independent actors ultimately rests. Once the proportion of private support falls below some critical point, perhaps 25% or 35% of total funding, voluntarism becomes a fiction whatever the nature of the formal governance structure. As Waldemar Nielsen (1979: 206) concludes, "More fundamentally, the institutions of the Third Sector will, over the

long term, be able to hold their position of significance only to the extent that they build and broaden their base of public support.... It is failure in these areas, at least as much as the destructive tendencies of bureaucratized government itself, which menaces the Third Sector."

OPTIONS

What might be done to ameliorate the consequences of government funding and to insure that voluntary institutions continue to make an independent, innovative contribution to American life? As a first step, both sides will have to recognize the seriousness of the problems and resolve to do something about them. These issues are not high-visibility concerns like the energy crisis or inflation, yet they touch upon the basic fabric of our society. Second, we will have to shape changes in policy and practice on both sides of the relationship that will ameliorate the destructive impacts of government funding while also acknowledging and retaining the mutually-beneficial aspects of the exchange. In the remainder of this paper let me recommend some directions for change.

CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT POLICY AND PRACTICE

1. There should be a single governmental "cognizant agency" for all non-profit organizations receiving government funds from multiple sources. This cognizant agency would conduct all accountability monitoring according to a set of standards agreed upon with the non-profit organization. All government agencies providing assistance to the organization would defer to the cognizant agency for purposes of fiscal and procedural (cross-cutting social standards) auditing.

This change would eliminate some of the worst elements of bureaucratization fostered by conflicting and confusing accountability standards imposed by different agencies. Through negotiations with the cognizant agency, non-profit organizations should be allowed to establish accountability procedures that are compatible with a less-bureaucratized mode of operation. The cognizant agency should be authorized to make appropriate changes and adaptations in accountability standards to reduce bureaucratization in the organizations it oversees.

2. Government should increase the use of "intermediary agencies," funding competitions, and peer review in providing funds to non-profit organizations. Wider use of these approaches, pioneered in the National Science Foundation and the National Endowment for the Arts, would help to introduce a greater element of creativity and independence into the relationship between non-profit organizations and government. For example, the arts community itself helps to define the programs at the NEA and to select the recipients of government assistance. There is room for innovation and experimentation in grant proposals. Under these circumstances, government does not appear so monolithic or so grave a threat to the independence of the voluntary sector.

3. Government should cover fully the costs of bureaucratization that it imposes. If government wants high-salaried administrative personnel submitting reports to it, it should pay for them fully. The contributed dollar should not be expected to subsidize bureaucratization.

4. Government assistance agencies should make greater use of matching or challenge grants to non-profit organizations, thereby providing a strong incentive for organizations to reach into the community and strengthen their base of public support.

5. Government grants and contracts should subsidize and/or require clientele participation in institutional governance and clientele evaluation of services to insure that voluntary organizations remain relevant and responsive to community needs. Direct opportunities for clientele involvement can serve as an invaluable source of community intelligence, supplementing the information provided by the Board of Directors. Citizen involvement requirements are "captive" non-profit organizations--i.e., mental health centers, community action agencies, public radio and television stations, and so on. They can be applied as well, with caution, to organizations that receive a lesser proportion of funding from government.

6. Government tax policies should be modified to encourage private donations of money and time by all segments of the citizenry. While not a sufficient condition for increasing the level of private support, changes in tax policy are surely a necessary condition.

CHANGES IN VOLUNTARY SECTOR POLICY AND PRACTICE

1. Voluntary organizations should establish and use administrative services consortia to provide the professional services necessary for dealing with government grants and contracts. This is perhaps the single most important step that small and medium-sized agencies can take to avoid internal bureaucratization. The choice does not have to be between "professional management" and "amateurism" if professional services can be made available on an "as-needed" basis by third-part technical assistance consortia.

2. Voluntary organizations should refuse to accept grants and contracts which impose overly-burdensome bureaucratic accountability requirements and should present a united front to government in protesting unreasonable bureaucratization. The fundamental flaw in the current relationships between government agencies and voluntary organizations is that it is so asymmetrical and unequal. Organizations need the money, but government has many options. Thus, voluntary organizations negotiate from a position of weakness while government feels free to impose whatever conditions it wants upon the assistance provided. Until this inequality is counter-balanced by a more assertive posture on the part of voluntary organizations, it is doubtful that the problem of bureaucratization can be dealt with successfully. But it is not enough for individual organizations to take a stand on principle. If an organization stands alone, refusal to comply with government demands may be viewed as petulant self-righteousness and self-serving elitism. Indeed, under these circumstances, government can easily go organization-shopping. Rather, it is necessary for voluntary organizations to act together to protest and lobby against unnecessary and harmful requirements and to advocate and support reasonable and necessary standards.

3. Voluntary organizations should not accept government funds until and unless Boards of Directors make a conscious affirmative decision that the government-supported program is compatible with the central

mission of the organization. In essence, Boards need to assert themselves. Instead of viewing government-supported programs as an "alien" component of the organization about which they need not concern themselves, Board members should integrate these programs directly into the core functioning of the agency. If a government-funded program does not fit in, then it should not be applied for or accepted.

4. The institutions of the voluntary sector, acting through their sub-sector associations and umbrella organizations, should develop and adhere to minimum standards of accessibility and openness that will assure adequate clientele and donor participation in the planning, delivery, and evaluation of services. The greatest threat to the voluntary sector is that citizens will view it as irrelevant to their needs and concerns. If voluntary organizations are viewed as little more than passive deliverers of government-defined services, then why should citizens contribute to or participate in the activities of the organization? Indeed, one might as well concentrate one's efforts on government, where the real power and initiative lie. Voluntary organizations must counteract this threat by aggressively seeking expanded participation of both old and new constituencies. Such efforts should not depend on the whim of a particular executive director or the happenstance of citizen participation requirements in a government grant, but rather should be coordianted and stimulated by groups which take a broad view of voluntary sector survival.

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PART IV

CONCLUSION

Volunteerism and the Future

PHILOSOPHIC ISSUES IN VOLUNTEERISM

Harry J. Hogan

The actual and potential role of the volunteer in our society must be understood in relation to the social crisis of our time. That crisis is essentially a philosophic one of the breakdown of nineteenth-century Liberalism and the necessity of constructing a new set of social values that will allow us to live and work together. The crisis must be approached in its historic context.

I shall attempt a summary analysis under four headings:

1. The Need for a Philosophy of Social Responsibility;
2. The Need to Institutionalize Moral Responsibility Outside the Political State;
3. The American Situation: Statist Humanism vs. Pluralistic Humanism;
4. National Service: Last Chance for Pluralism.

By "philosophy" I mean a basic set of beliefs on which people make decisions and act. By "volunteerism" in its philosophic aspect I mean that philosophy in the context of American history which reflects values of individually accepted social responsibility rather than of immediate self-interest or of state-imposed duties. I shall use the term to refer to both community service activities and to citizen participation in social decision-making.

THE NEED FOR A PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

THE NEED: PRESENT ALIENATION

Any viable society must have a consensus on social values that will enable its members to live and work together. America is now deciding that the nineteenth-century Liberal philosophy of unrestrained self-interest is inadequate for the construction of a liveable society. We live in an urban technological society with a highly mobile population in which individuals shape their lives by contract decisions designed to maximize self-interest. But concentration on immediate self-interest makes it impossible to meet long-term needs such as inflation control, defense, and energy

conservation. Frustration and alienation are epidemic. People believe that they have no way to affect the decisions which control their lives. Every poll indicates that they have no confidence in their elected representatives, their lawyers, business leaders, or anyone else in a position of authority. A society based on self-interest alone logically should degenerate into an aggregate of isolates. That atomistic prospect forces America into a search for a philosophy of social responsibility.

SOCIAL ALIENATION IN WESTERN HISTORY

History provides us perspective in understanding how we got into our predicament. In the last thousand years, Western civilization has moved from a familial, spiritually oriented society, aware of past and future, to a view of society as an aggregate of isolates, engaged as mobile interchangeable parts in short-term, impersonal, task-oriented corporate relationships. Epistemologically we have moved from a socially accepted conceptual--in philosophic terms "idealistic"--view of reality to a personal, immediately empiric view. Ontologically we have shifted from a view of ultimate reality--"God"--as unitary and as personal in the sense that both a societal and personal relationship were possible. Our present view is that reality is impersonal and that life for the individual and society is directionless.

We have moved from an acceptance of revealed authority to a dependence upon individual reason, interpreting immediate sensory impressions. In that evolution, Aquinas and his fellow scholastics in the thirteenth century elevated reason and applied it to the world around us. In the early fourteenth century, the Pope rejected the effort of the Spiritual Franciscans, acting within the existing authority structure, to discipline rational inquiry in explanation of the events of nature. William of Occam had proposed that that explanation of causality must be tentatively accepted which is the simplest and most direct. Occam's razor is now the basic test in scientific inquiry.

That Papal decision can be regarded as the decisive turning point in Western civilization. It separated the evolution of rational empiricism from the ontologic institution. Rational empiricism re-surfaced independently two hundred years later in the Renaissance, followed by the Reformation, the Enlightenment,

the Industrial Revolution and nineteenth-century Liberalism. In the absence of an institutional ability to provide perspective, all produced the ultimate primary focus on man that we term "Humanism."

In epistemology, the key step was Descartes' analysis that began with an individual having only reason and sensory capability. Thereafter, Newton reduced the physical universe to mathematics; Locke attempted a similar rationalization in democratizing politics; John Stuart Mill gave us his classic defense of individual liberty. Adam Smith and Ricardo gave us the theory of self-interest to support individualism in economics. The combination of political and economic individualism produced that version of Humanism known as nineteenth-century Liberalism.

Today, however, that Liberalism has become increasingly unsatisfactory. We recognize that somehow the rational self-reliant individualism of American Humanism must be reconciled to a larger open-ended view of the universe. That reconciliation must be expressed in terms of social responsibility and purpose. Only thus can individualism avoid individual alienation. Only thus can the Abrahamic tradition of man's covenant with God over time be continued for an open-ended future.

In that effort, those of us involved in citizen participation traditionally known as volunteerism can make a major contribution. Stated more strongly, we in volunteerism, by our own ethic, have a responsibility from our special historic perspective to participate in the social dialogue.

THE NEED TO INSTITUTIONALIZE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY OUTSIDE THE POLITICAL STATE

OPTIONS IN SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

For America and for the people of the world, in selecting socio-political institutions expressing values, there are two major categories of options. The decision-making process is now well underway. The simplistic solution is a closed-ended socially frozen totalitarian state. Soviet communism, with the Comintern's version of Marx's teachings as the gospel, is one variant. The Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, with a rigid version of Mohammed's teachings gives us a view of another possibility.

The second option, permitting individual freedom, would give us a pluralistic society. It would continue our Western tradition allowing institutional independence to our social service institutions. Although those institutions perform their functions in intimate interrelationships with the political state, they are ultimately identifiably independent of the state. The dialogue between the social institutions and the state would be based upon the Hegalian premise that we do not know the final philosophic truth, and that, through social pluralism generation after generation, we are engaged in a continuing exploration of its possibilities.

In developing this open-ended option, America's special history and circumstance make it the hope of the world. America has relied more strongly than any other nation upon private sector institutions, most particularly the business corporation and the voluntary association.

HISTORIC APPROACH

Throughout history the problem of development of a set of values that will guide social decision-making has always been categorized as a philosophic or religious one. The two words are usually interchangeable in social function, but because the word "religious" in our society, for social and historic reasons, is pejorative I shall use the word "philosophic" except where the institutional aspect is important. In our self-interest society, operating on an empiric epistemology, the problem of values is being approached, not as a philosophic one with historic precedents, but as an empiric, first-time, step-by-step problem-solving process.

Perspective on our efforts can be provided by a look at our predecessor society, the Middle Ages. Medieval society was rural, with an agricultural technology and a subsistence economy. It was a highly structured society, politically and socially hierarchical. In one major respect it was different from the societies that had preceded it or were co-existent with it around the world. It separated its institutions for political authority from its social service institutions. In political theory, that is described as the separation of church and state. The diversity in authority made the future open-ended. Therefore it was the West that made the technological breakthrough.

The churches in our contemporary society are identified as limited essentially to performing the special function of institutionalizing a worship relation to God. In the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church performed a much wider function. The church was then the means for institutionalizing social values, i.e. values expressing individual responsibility in society, in politics, and in the economy (e.g. setting interest rates and determining a fair price for goods), in education, and in such social welfare enterprises as providing care for the poor and the sick. Society was conceived as familial.

Following the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, the West has become less and less a familial society in which personal conduct is controlled by custom. In the nineteenth-century the philosophy of Humanism, expressed most strongly in the economic arena as Liberalism, replaced traditional beliefs. We have become more and more an atomistic society requiring individuals to set the course of their lives by contract decisions. In a contract society, relationships are inevitably structured in legal terms. Decision-making tends constantly to become political. Therefore the state readily becomes dominant. In the subsequent dualistic society, each individual alone confronts the all-powerful state.

In the Depression trauma of the thirties, the word "Liberalism" was politicized. It was applied to the philosophy advocating pursuit in the political arena of solutions for interest group problems of poverty, unemployment, old age, and sickness. In extension of that trend, "Liberalism" now means, as John Galbraith has said, what is meant by "socialism" in any other society. It elevates the state as the means for defining and achieving social justice. Note, however, that because of our special history of evolution of social theory from nineteenth-century Liberalism, based on self-interest, the achievement of social justice is treated as recognition of special interest entitlements, not as a system of reciprocal social responsibility.

The future must move us toward a philosophy of social responsibility. We must hope that we choose the pluralistic option.

THE AMERICAN SITUATION:
STATIST HUMANISM AND PLURALISTIC HUMANISM

HUMANISM: AMERICA'S DOMINANT RELIGION

In the atomistic society from which we, in this last quarter of the twentieth century, are struggling to emerge, the dominant religion is man-centered. Expressed philosophically, we call it "Humanism." In nineteenth-century economics and politics we call it "Liberalism." Both Humanism and Liberalism express religious values in the sense that they base standards of conduct upon certain beliefs in the nature of ultimate reality. Although we in the Western tradition, because of our special history in relation to Christianity, regard religion as necessarily characterized by belief in a transcendent deity, most of the peoples in the world, now and in the past, are believers in non-transcendent religions. Such religions include, for example, Buddhism and Confucianism. Humanism and Liberalism fit in that religious non-transcendent category. The term "secular Humanism" should be understood to mean that Humanism is a non-transcendent religion rather than not a religion.

Within Humanism it is understandable that the emerging statist version of Humanism, i.e. belief in the all-powerful state, will want to dispose of two competing sets of belief. One is the traditional Christian church within which Humanism itself is a man-centered heresy. The other is pluralistic Humanism institutionalized as the business corporation and the voluntary association. They are spin-offs from Humanism itself during its nineteenth-century stage institutionalizing a then vital individualism. They retain the potential for a non-statist institutionally pluralistic approach while re-working their social philosophies so as to restate goals of individualism in terms of social responsibility.

STATIST HUMANISM VS. TRADITIONAL CHRISTIANITY

Statist Humanism views the Christian church as irrelevant or as hostile to modern values. Such a negative view is not only historically explicable but also strategically desirable if we are to preclude the possibility of returning to the medieval solution of setting up the familial church as our balancing social institution. Accordingly, churches have been excluded from participation in social and political decision-

making by that political institution which Humanist activists have made the instrument for "sanctifying" Humanistic values, the Supreme Court. The Court has accomplished the exclusion by a new interpretation of the non-establishment provision of the First Amendment. The Court has rejected its historical meaning which was limited to prohibiting the preference by the state of one or more religions over others. Instead it has interpreted the provision as requiring a wall between all religions, defined most particularly as traditional Christian churches, and the state. The definition of "religion" as traditional in institutional structure and transcendent in ontology is essenital to disenfranchise only the traditional churches. Correspondingly, the eligibility of Statist Humanism for establishment as a functional religion is assured by describing it as "secular Humanism" and by defining "secular" as non-transcendent rather than "worldly" and defining "Humanism" as non-institutionalized. The Court decisions thereby enshrine Statist Humanism as our society's religion with the same effect that in a Muslim country Islam is the official religion.

STATIST HUMANISM VS. PLURALISTIC HUMANISM: THE GOVERNMENT VS. BUSINESS AND VOLUNTARISM

Today in America the private sector moral institutions with right of entry into the political arena are the business corporation and the voluntary association. They institutionalize the version of the man-centered Humanist tradition that I shall refer to as "Pluralistic Humanism" to distinguish it from "Statist Humanism." They must supplement or replace the churches as advocates for pluralism in the dialogue with the state within the society in the Western tradition. Statist Humanism would end that tradition by having America express its religion through political institutions. The state and society would become one. In accomplishing that non-Western purpose, the Statist Humanist must undertake a typically non-Western religious effort to establish a societal monopoly. In accomplishing that purpose, it views both the business community and voluntarism as competition which the government must subdue. For that competition the business corporation and the voluntary association are ill-prepared. They are philosophically unsophisticated with almost no historic perspective.

The social problems that business and voluntarism

must face are: (1) creation and marketing of a viable social philosophy; and (2) institutionalization of that philosophy in social structures that will allow role identification, define service and advocacy functions, and validate access to funding that recognizes and protects institutional independence.

The Church in its heyday in the Middle Ages faced both these problems, and achieved a remarkable success, measured against the situation of the business corporation and voluntary association today. The church had unchallenged control over moral values. It had control over the universities, having created them as institutions of education, and over hospitals for the institutionalized care of the sick. It had generalized responsibility for the care of the poor and those affected by disaster. In regard to funding, the church established a direct right to funds independent of the state. The tithe was paid directly by the constituent member to the church. The church also became a major proprietor of wealth-producing agricultural land administered under a trust responsibility for social purposes.

In contrast today Statist Humanism, with the objective of maximization of the state in solution of social problems, is moving strongly to shape the structure and function of the business corporation and the voluntary association so that they become extensions of the state. This pressure is exerted in requirements of accountability, bureaucratization, redirection of the independent entities' activities into government-set purposes, and by domination of social advocacy.

The business community and the voluntary sector, as the moral surrogates of the churches in the economic and social welfare sectors of society in the twentieth-century moral dialogue, face a difficult threshold philosophic problem. Their philosophic base in nineteenth-century Humanistic self-interest is now being rejected by society and the emerging social version of Humanism is being pre-empted by the state. On the one hand there is a constant temptation to return to the classic Liberalism of Ricardo which saw the best society as that which minimized the state in order to allow individual self-interest decisions. Milton Friedman is today's best known advocate of this point of view. On the other hand, there is the strategic difficulty of asserting the desirability of

state activity without giving exclusive responsibility to the state for social welfare. The corporation and the voluntary association must face the medieval problem of institutionalizing moral responsibility independent of but in relation to the state.

The problem is complicated and its solution made urgent by the fact that both the business corporation and the voluntary association have lost legitimacy under their own nineteenth-century terms. A corporation is theoretically a mode for advancement of self-interest of stockholders. Fifty years ago, Adolph Berle pointed out that stockholders of the corporation no longer control management. Voluntary work, by definition unrewarded economically, was regarded in the nineteenth century as an eccentric personal decision.

If the donor of charity was under no enforceable duty to give, the donee had no right to expect help. By the terms of nineteenth-century Liberalism, individual failure is a personal fault for which the one who fails should accept poverty and suffering. That prospect then serves the social purpose of inspiring everyone to try very hard to succeed. In the mid-nineteenth century, for example, that philosophy gave the English no basis on which to organize other than haphazard aid to the Irish who were starving as a result of the three-year failure of the potato crop.

In this latter half of the twentieth century, the self-interest basic premise of "Liberalism" has produced the view that individual failure is not a personal fault. It is the state's responsibility to repair the damage. In that view voluntary action to help the suffering individual can be seen as either irrelevant or negative in value because it may delay or frustrate the real remedy of state aid. The state develops its own institutions to do the work formerly done by volunteers as if they no longer existed. So in the 1960s the Peace Corps displaced private volunteer efforts in Africa. In the extreme, this attitude can go beyond treating the volunteer effort as irrelevant. Under Proudhon's pronouncement that "all property is theft" an altruistic gesture can be regarded as insulting.

The change in mode of expressing self-interest from the private sector to the political has had the effect of greatly weakening the claims of the business corporation and of the voluntary association that they

are primary vehicles for expressing society's moral purposes. More importantly, perception of the larger failure of the self-interest philosophy itself has come at a time after the self-interest philosophy has made the political stage the most important. The private sector institutions of business and voluntarism must now not only develop a new moral base, but also recapture a leadership position from the state. The alternative for voluntarism is to accept an exploratory role preliminary to state action. Predictably, in a Humanist society using an empiric epistemology, that exploratory effort will address only immediately functional concerns. Social advocacy will tend to become institutionalized by the state in state-funded patterns related to government programs and for the special purpose of developing support for new government programs.

Let us consider the second institutionalization problem. It is that of creating social structures that express social roles, define service and advocacy functions, and validate funding, all in relation to but independent of the state. Institutional advocacy for social roles requires national organization. There has been some success in that difficult enterprise, most particularly in the national organization of constituencies, such as in education, immediately dependent upon federal funding. Awareness of the potential is also evident in the creation of Independent Sector, a national association with membership across the voluntary spectrum and able to engage in the public dialogue on matters of broad concern. Most of the effort of Independent Sector so far has been spent on protecting traditional private charitable contribution funding from erosion through negative tax treatment. That protection can obtain a philosophic base only by a modern version of the medieval justification for that protection as necessary to the separation of church and state. Independent Sector now proposes also to address the necessity of simplifying procedures for accountability by private entities for government grants and contracts. Here again, simplification has to be obtained in a way that recognizes the desirability of maintaining institutional independence of voluntary associations per se, rather than treating them as simply grant and contract entities carrying out assignments from state programs.

Little thinking has been devoted to the possibility of restructuring federal aid so as to provide the money directly to the individuals needing it. Such a

procedure would then allow those needing service to pay for it. Such was the procedure explored by the universities in obtaining federal aid through student aid programs. The necessary characteristic is that the student receiving aid can cash the aid only at the university.

Beyond procedures, accountability also requires bureaucratization and professionalism that predictably is viewed by voluntarism as compromising its self-image as a private moral enterprise. The problem of dealing effectively with the government while still preserving private moral purity is very real. This is true whether the voluntary effort is based in traditional Humanism or in traditional Christianity, as in the emerging evangelical Protestantism. The problems that both face, in relation to the state, are identical.

Meanwhile, the strategy of Statist Humanists is to define all social problems in a fashion that invites state solutions and ignores private sector potential. Apart from direct welfare programs providing needed support, this strategy is already evident in the key area of individual moral responsibility. There the Statist ignores historic volunteerism, and creates a new category of state-supported programs under new titles, e.g. "citizen participation." Peace Corps, VISTA and the Foster Grand Parent Program are the first ventures of the state into an area that was once entirely a private sector concern. They are programs that provide opportunities for people to do good for other people. If the government succeeds in asserting dominance in this area, the state and society will then become one.

NATIONAL SERVICE: LAST CHANCE FOR PLURALISM

Fifty years ago, in the Depression era, volunteerism missed its first major opportunity to abandon its Victorian self-interest base and to redefine its social role in broad terms of responsibility. At that time the necessity of providing assurance of basic support services to people buffeted by life became a national problem. Before that time the government had been only marginally concerned with the problem. The primary support role was in the private sector. In the Thirties the decision was made to move the basic responsibility into the government area and to make the private sector role at most supportive but really peripheral. One would have to go back to the expro-

priation of monastic properties by Henry VIII in the sixteenth century to find a comparable national income and function transfer. The special advantages of volunteer involvement, viz., personal quality of service, cost-effectiveness and expression of personal responsibility, were disregarded in the assertion of the role of the state.

The social decisions in the Thirties on reallocation of national income had to be made in the political not the private arena, and had to recognize the realities of an increasingly urban technological society. The private voluntary sector, however, did not meet its responsibility to society at that time to participate effectively in the decision-making. If it had done so, it might have made the income transfers socially reintegrative as well as subsistence supportive. It might also have related government funding to a service-delivery role for the independent sector institutions. Most of the problems that volunteerism faces today in relation to access to government funding arise from the failure of volunteerism in the Thirties to have its social mission recognized and accepted.

Volunteerism now faces its second major social crisis. The nation's primary need today is moral revitalization. We must move toward a recognition of people as entitled to participation in the social decisions which affect their lives.

NATIONAL SERVICE: THE CATALYTIC ISSUE

Efforts to achieve national moral revitalization will be made in a variety of directions but will ultimately focus on the creation of a system of national service. That system will offer service opportunities to people of all ages, at all income levels. The service experience will lead people into much fuller participation in modes of accepting citizenship responsibilities in political decision-making.

The opportunity to legislate national service will come early next spring when the President and the Congress address the military manpower problem. That problem must be solved if America is to have credible defense. The 1980 Presidential election can be interpreted as a mandate to accomplish that purpose. The recruitment for the Armed Services is now based on the nineteenth-century Liberalism philosophy. Salaries and job benefits, including pensions, are supposed to be

made attractive enough, in competition with other job opportunities in a national market system, to appeal to the self-interest of the needed recruits. Under that system the Armed Services find the military to be so uncompetitive that they have become an employer of last resort for those who can't find another job. Recruits leave as soon as they find a better job. There are two solutions: one would retain the nineteenth-century philosophy and increase the rewards to the point where the needed recruits would be obtained. It can be anticipated that the President and Congress will recognize the cost of that solution to be prohibitive. America's military personnel costs are already 63 percent of our military budget in contrast with 26 percent of the Russian military budget.

The inevitable alternative is to move toward our emerging philosophy that views man as social rather than motivated primarily by self-interest. Under that philosophy, military service will be presented as the acceptance of a social responsibility and, most effectively, as one of a number of social service options. During the election campaign, Ronald Reagan stated his opposition to the draft and, indeed, to registration. A system of service options, military and civilian, with varying rewards designed to attract applicants, he maintained, will meet the need.

National service offers the nation its one immediate hope of arriving at a new national consensus on social values. With that philosophic consensus goes the possibility of addressing in realistic fashion many of the problems, beyond inadequate defense, that now appear out of control. They include special interest pressures, unemployment, inflation, affirmative action, funding of Social Security, failure of education, federal bureaucratic growth, and the weakening of the Presidency in its role of national leadership. Of course the solutions will not fall automatically into place but they do become possible.

A consensus on values expressed in national service elevates social responsibility above concerns about individual self-interest. It makes possible restraint in both advocacy of and decisions on special interest claims. It will take us years, perhaps with luck a generation, to produce leaders and a public imbued with a sense of social responsibility and with the validating experience in performing citizen participation roles. But as we move ahead we will

begin to find solutions for special needs in holistic problem-solving rather in meeting the claims of each special interest group.

National service opportunities--stipended and unpaid, full-time and part-time--will provide manpower to attack social problems now beyond reach. In so doing, people will receive career training that will place them in useful post-service employment--and without the stigma of certified failure that many federally funded job training programs now entail.

National service may not solve the inflation problem. In some part inflation may be the way each generation repudiates the load passed on to it by the preceding generation. Over the years, however, the sense of social responsibility encouraged by the national service experience may lead a generation to think in terms, not of enjoying now the heritage that might be conserved for future generations, but actually of treating that heritage as a trust responsibility.

Affirmative action is now required to provide opportunities for minorities, women and disadvantaged groups. If those groups are assured of equality of experiential opportunities in national service placements, they may be able to make their entry into careers on a much more nearly equal basis.

Funding of Social Security in a time of inflation is a constant and increasingly difficult problem. It would be greatly eased if senior citizens were provided earned income opportunities for part-time, flexi-time community service work. Such opportunities, in a time of erosion of family structures, would also reintegrate them socially into their communities. Senior Service might well be the breakthrough for a national service system.

Our education system is criticized in every quarter as a failure. It isolates students from society over long years, giving them a sense of purposelessness and frustration. Community service opportunities for students in secondary schools and in colleges will provide a reality to education and a sense of social membership by students. It should provide for all the perspective that the classic Junior year dropout experience now provides for those able to manage it.

The reward system in a national service program

will very probably pre-empt higher education student aid programs on the GI Bill model, doubling or tripling present aid appropriations. The increase will be justified as costing less than salary and benefit increases to make the present military recruitment system competitive. It will also change the basis of grant qualification from a status qualification--family poverty--to a volitional qualification--acceptance of service obligation. That change should minimize class distinctions and strengthen social democracy. It should also have great impact on the social role of educational institutions.

The necessity under a national service system of offering community service opportunities funded by federal program appropriations will mean that communities will have responsibility for developing holistic community-wide plans integrating federal programs which are now administered separately. The tendency will be to place program decision-making, within authorization limits of course, in the community and to limit the federal agency to a monitoring and evaluation role. The selection of program emphases, within the general authorization, now performed by the administering federal agency, and expressed in program regulations, will be done in the community.

Lastly, such a national service system of community planning and citizen service will move us strongly toward a parliamentary government. Community decision-making will strengthen Congressional interest in program definition. The decision-making pattern will be one uniting the community and its Congressional representatives. The federal agency's role will become that of servicing pass-through arrangements rather than effective policy maker.

What can we propose that will aid America in crossing this philosophic watershed?

Serious discussion of national service will provide an opportunity for the voluntary sector to ask for a National Foundation for Voluntary Citizen Participation. It should be a quasi-public corporation with a board of governors chosen largely from the private sector. Such a foundation should have two responsibilities. One would provide technical assistance around the country to community organizations administering service and participation opportunities. The foundation should have capabilities for research

and development, information gathering and dissemination, and evaluation. The second responsibility of the foundation should be that of advocacy. If service and participation opportunities are to be provided in large part by community organizations, then such organizations must be able to call upon an institutional capability, not only to help them in program administration, but also to represent them in the continually ongoing national dialogue.

The voluntary sector should also ask for an office in the White House so as to be assured of ready access to the President. We should also ask that program administration offices be set up in each federal agency involved in supporting service opportunities or in obtaining citizen participation in its decision-making processes. The federal agencies so restructured must include the all-powerful Office of Management and Budget.

In Congress we should ask for recognition of volunteerism's social role by requesting the creation of special subcommittees for voluntary citizen participation on both House and Senate.

All this activity will be based upon society's emerging philosophy that expresses social responsibility and institutional diversity protective of individual freedom. That the new philosophy will express social responsibility is inevitable. All societies that survive will have that philosophic base. Institutional diversity, however, is not assured. In America it will depend upon our ability in our technological society to continue the Western tradition that sees reality as evolving and therefore as requiring pluralistic social structures.

We are now living in a time of social decision-making. With that good fortune goes responsibility. The volunteer sector has a great deal to contribute to the dialogue. We must accept that responsibility.

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